Hindustan Times (East UP)

Hindus’ consolidat­ion may shape UP results

- Bhanu Joshi, Ashish Ranjan and Neelanjan Sircar letters@hindustant­imes.com (Bhanu Joshi is a PhD candidate in political science at Brown University. Ashish Ranjan is an independen­t election researcher. Neelanjan Sircar is senior fellow at the Centre for P

BAREILLY: In a rally in Akbarpur in Uttar Pradesh on Monday, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in an apparent reference to the Trinamool Congress (TMC), “Aap khule aam, hindu vote ko baatna chahte hain, toh aap kiske vote ikkhata karna chahte hon (You openly talk about splitting the Hindu vote. Whose votes are you trying to gather?)?”

The apparent confidence of this claim may belie nervousnes­s around the fragmentat­ion of the “Hindu vote.” The 2013 Muzaffarna­gar riots made the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) nearly unassailab­le due to a consolidat­ed Hindu vote. Indeed, in the 2017 elections, the BJP achieved a strike rate of 91% in assembly constituen­cies (ACs) that went to polls in Phase One of the Uttar Pradesh (UP) election. The strike rate dropped to 69% in ACs in Phase 2, indicating that the BJP was less able to engineer Hindu consolidat­ion.

As one moves east from Muzaffarna­gar district to Bareilly district, there is a noticeable shift in the social context. Unlike the outright Hindu-Muslim polarisati­on that drove BJP’s support in Phase 1 ACs in 2017, the party relied on the popularity of PM Modi to mollify tensions between various caste groups and paper over local rivalries in Phase 2 ACs. On the surface, there appears little reason for these groups to shift from BJP to the Samajwadi Party (SP) as there is little affirmativ­e reason for them to do so. But the social tensions that the BJP adjudicate­d effectivel­y in 2017 seem to have come to the fore again.

In Meerapur constituen­cy, for example, the BJP won a close contest by consolidat­ing Hindu groups in 2017. This time, both the BJP and the SP have fielded candidates from the powerful Gujjar community. “Last time, all Gujjars supported the BJP, but this time half of us, including me, will shift to SP. Yes, it’s true BJP selected a Gujjar, but he’s not from here and no one knows him,” said a local Gujjar man. This may be a stray incident but such sentiment is more common now, than five years ago.

Intraparty centralisa­tion With greater informatio­n, modern survey techniques and political consultant­s, it strains credulity that the BJP would simply make a mistake in choosing the most winnable candidate. Rather, the struggles in ticket selection are a consequenc­e of intra-party centralisa­tion.

UP is a unique case for the BJP. In most states, Modi is unchalleng­ed; the 2017 assembly elections were won on his name as no chief minister was declared before the polls. But since being named chief minister, Yogi Adityanath has quickly consolidat­ed power — so much so that a voter at a tea shop in Kanth said, “Before we voted for Modi, this time the BJP will get votes in Yogi’s name.”

Party elites favour centralisa­tion over more decentrali­sed party organisati­ons because lower-level party workers engage in corruption and run patronage networks that weaken the position of the party leader. By removing all forms of intermedia­tion and offering public goods directly to the beneficiar­y, party elites can risk alienating party cadres and supporters but also consolidat­e power. This supply-side dynamic is supplement­ed by the demand side. In fragmented societies, with ethnicity being central to electoral decisions, party elites know that the voters have a limited pool of voting options. This generates a fundamenta­l political dilemma: Should leaders decentrali­se to allow informatio­n flows, or by limiting their power, establish direct control and relationsh­ip with the voters at the cost of creating local-level complicati­ons?

For parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and SP, the need to invest in party cadres or organisati­ons, given their core voters’ steadfast commitment, is low. But the BJP has to be more careful with its cadre and voters. The party constructe­d an impressive social coalition involving the non-Jatav Dalits, non-Yadav Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and upper castes in 2017. By not decentrali­sing power to lower-level politician­s, the party is taking a risk. The resignatio­n of 11 non-Yadav OBC legislator­s (including 3 ministers) before the elections is an example.

Reducing local politician­s’ discretion­ary powers, and increasing direct transfer of benefits to the citizens, can go both ways. Elucidatin­g the core dilemma for the voter, a female ASHA worker in Aonla said, “If you get into a fight, and you are a Dalit, you would go to the BSP; a Muslim or Yadav goes to SP. I am a Chauhan (Thakur), and I went to the sitting BJP MLA, and I didn’t get anything.” But then she steps back and reverses course, “Hume neeche walo se koi matlab nahin, sab upar se kam hai.. Upar bolenge, to nivaran hoga.” (The lower level doesn’t matter for us, it’s all the top. If the top dictates, then it will be solved.). This is what the BJP is banking on.

MUZAFFARNA­GAR RIOTS IN 2013 MADE THE BJP NEARLY UNASSAILAB­LE DUE TO A CONSOLIDAT­ED HINDU VOTE

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