Japan, Australia are forging a new security paradigm in Asia. India should take note
Japan and Australia made their latest gambit on the Asian chessboard this January. After seven years of painstaking negotiations, Prime Ministers (PM) Scott Morrison and Fumio Kishida signed a landmark defence treaty — the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) — that is likely to reshape the regional power balance. By laying the groundwork, RAA paves the way for a new era of defence cooperation between Tokyo and Canberra.
The moving force behind this agreement has been China’s aggression in the Indo-Pacific. While Japan has faced military pressure from Beijing in the disputed Senkaku Islands, Australia has found itself in
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s detention room as both sides have locked horns in a tussle over China’s embargo on select Australian goods. Tokyo and Canberra have also watched warily as Chinese air squadrons try to intimidate Taiwan. A defence treaty that prepares Japan and Australia for military contingencies is a significant development.
For India, which is hosting the two PMs this week, RAA is an encouraging sign. All roads to an effective Indian Indo-Pacific policy go through Tokyo. Japan’s decision to sign this agreement, only the second of its kind, signals that it is looking to shed its pacifist Cold War foreign policy and traditional dependence on the United States (US). Should New Delhi play its cards right, it could secure an expanded defence partnership with a Japan that is looking for likeminded partners and is one of the few Asian players willing to risk Beijing’s ire. With Tokyo and Canberra, New Delhi may seek to expand its defence technology partnerships that will enhance joint military operations and help diversify India’s sources of military material.
The signing of RAA also represents a coming of age moment for India’s partners in the Indo-Pacific. While major developments such as the AUKUS nuclear submarine pact stand testament to the importance of the US, RAA shows that India’s Quad partners remain capable of doing the heavy-lifting on security affairs, even without significant US involvement. For India, RAA is another step in the long march towards the evolution of a new security and military architecture in the Indo-Pacific. This involves deepening defence ties among Quad nations and shoring up players vulnerable to Chinese pressure in Southeast Asia, such as Vietnam and the Philippines.
Some may worry that India is increasingly looking like the odd one out as the US, Japan and Australia draw closer. The RAA, following closely on the heels of the AUKUS, may raise some awkward questions about how India fits into a deepening military relationship among three nations that have cooperated closely since the days of the Cold War. Such worry is premature. India’s security ties with its Quad partners have only taken off in the last decade. In that period, progress has been rapid and substantial by any measure: High-level officials and political leaders meet frequently, military exercises are regular and security ties enjoy a high degree of domestic political support. By contrast, Japan and Australia have been part of the US-led alliance system in Asia since the conclusion of World War II. Landmark agreements like AUKUS and RAA are as much a function of trust and successful cooperation over a period of time as they are of military compatibility. To take relations to the next level, New Delhi will have to make some much-needed changes. For example, India’s troubled defence acquisition process continues to baffle observers while attempted improvements have been incremental. New Delhi would do well to take a page out of Tokyo’s book where Shinzo Abe built and operationalised a defence acquisitions agency from scratch in a few short years. An agreement like RAA would also tax New Delhi’s limited bureaucratic capacity. As their military ties deepened, Tokyo established a separate Japan-Australia Defence Cooperation Office just to handle its security relationship with Canberra. Should India wish to draw closer to its Quad partners, bolstering its understaffed diplomatic corps and ensuring bureaucratic follow-through on high-level political commitments will be the way forward.