‘Anxiety in US about India’s position but ties will stay strong’
WASHINGTON: Ashley J Tellis, the Tata chair for strategic studies at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is among the foremost experts on Asia in the US. As both a policymaker and an analyst, he has played a critical role in deepening Delhi-Washington ties in recent decades. He spoke to HT about the shifts in the global order and India-US ties in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Edited excerpts: How has the world changed since February 24?
We are entering a new and troubled era. First, there is a much deeper Russian-Chinese embrace than anyone thought possible a few years ago. Even though the trends were moving in that direction, it appeared that both sides were sufficiently conscious of protecting their own freedom of action. But in the week leading up to the Ukraine invasion, that has proved to be less true. So an axis of authoritarianism that ties two very powerful States, who will owe each other a lot because of the circumstances under which this embrace has occurred, portends big challenges.
The second reality is that for the first time we have had a major power attempting to change what is a settled border through the massive use of force. Not just grey-zone tactics aimed at nibbling marginal territories, but the naked use of force without any pressing provocation aimed at large-scale annexation and regime change.
The third reality is that these developments will make the strategic challenges facing the US more complicated, because Washington will now have to divide its attentions between both protecting European security as well as managing the challenges posed by China in the Indo-Pacific. The US can certainly do both, but it cannot do both without more sacrifice.
Now, the saving grace here — and we have to see if this plays out to its fullest — is the rise of Europe, hopefully, as a new united security actor that takes its responsibility for protecting its continent seriously. And if that happens, that would be a huge asset for the US, and a big force for stability in the global order.
Does Russia’s action encourage Chinese ambitions, or does the strong response to Russian action deter Beijing?
I hope it is the second, but much will depend on how this crisis evolves and how it ends. If this crisis evolves with Russia getting bogged down in Ukraine, with the costs of sanctions increasing steadily to weaken Russia as a State, that will hopefully have a sobering effect on Chinese calculations. I hope that the Chinese draw the right lessons. First, that the gamble of supporting the Russians has been a very poor choice for Xi (Jinping). Second, that it is very hard, even in the most optimistic circumstances, to fight a major war and get quick and decisive results. And third, that flagrant and unprovoked aggression will induce the global community to join together to oppose you. On all these three counts, I hope that Xi is sufficiently sobered.
How do you see India’s response?
I don’t envy India at all. I think New Delhi truly found itself between a rock and hard place. I doubt there are any apologists for the Russian invasion in the Modi government. Indian leaders know that the Russian invasion has put them in a very awkward and difficult place. But they are so fearful about the implications of what a deeper Russian-Chinese embrace might mean for Indian security, that they are still struggling for ways to avert that. I think they concluded that the only trick within reach was to avoid a public censure of Russia, which is what India did. I believe that PM Modi was actually quite tough in his private conversations with Putin. But certainly, in public, India has maintained a studied neutrality only because it wants to preserve whatever remnants of leverage it still has with the Russians – that is, New Delhi does not want the Russians to reach the conclusion that they have only China as a partner, with India out there uninterested in preserving the relationship with Moscow.
I think India’s abstention in the UN Security Council (UNSC) was probably inevitable, though I wish India would have voted differently on the procedural issues. There were two substantive resolutions of condemnation and then a procedural vote on whether to admit a discussion. I think India erred by abstaining on the procedural vote because there was nothing in India’s national interest that would have been compromised if a discussion was held— which it was anyway.
Further, I thought the statement of explanation on India’s abstention vote was excessively subtle. India used all the right formulae to convey the gap between its position and that of Russia’s, but it could have buttressed that by simply calling out the invasion for what it was, an invasion. Instead, just reiterating the need to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity and immediately cease violence and hostilities, without in any way alluding to the perpetrators of the calamity, sounded unjustifiably neutral in the circumstances.
All the same, while India’s abstention may have helped it dodge a bullet for now, it is still a gamble. If Putin and his regime survive the war in Ukraine,
India’s abstention could pay off. But if Putin or Russia falters as a result of this aggression, Delhi’s situation will become quite parlous and its abstention may come back to haunt it.
Is there an understanding of India’s predicament in Washington, or is there annoyance?
That question is a complex one because you have got to look at specific audiences.
Within the executive branch, there is an intellectual understanding of India’s predicament. But that does not diminish the emotional disenchantment because of the belief that the partnership with India is not simply about interests. It is also about values. And while nations often compromise their values for their interests, the feeling in the executive branch is that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is such a flagrant violation of the rules-based order, which India itself cherishes, that India should have done a little more than just abstain in UNSC. Even if that outcome was inevitable, American leaders would have liked the scaffolding over the vote to have been different – at least in the language explaining the vote, India could have been a little more forthright.
On the Hill, the anxieties are much deeper. The disappointment with India is palpable across the aisle. Questions are being asked now about what a global strategic partnership between the US and India actually means if India has substantially different positions on the fundamental questions of global order.
There were always good intellectual explanations for these differences, but the emotive sense of feeling let down remains prominent. This will have to be managed going forward.
I must say that the Indian mission here in Washington has done an extraordinary job with respect to outreach. And Ambassador (Taranjit Singh) Sandhu, in particular, has taken point on this issue. But the fact is that he has the hard job of explaining what is an uncomfortable reality – that India’s interests are not always our own – and that reality speaks louder than any diplomatic gloss.
And, of course, in civil society, the consternation and disappointment are even stronger.
Do you see this translating into tangible costs for India?
I don’t see that, at least not yet. If it does, it will likely be on the margins. No government changes its policies 180 degrees because of a singular disagreement. The question, therefore, is whether the current disenchantment affects issues important to Indian interests. My own sense is that US policymakers are hoping that while India has taken a certain position with respect to developments in Europe, it will continue to remain very strongly committed to the partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.
How do you assess IndiaRussia defence ties? Is further diversification now a national security imperative for India?
I think that is exactly the lesson that India will draw from the current crisis, that further diversification is essential, with “Make in India” becoming even more urgent. But Russia still remains a critical defence partner for three reasons: Russia is willing to work with India on strategic programs where no other State has expressed comparable interest; Russia is willing to pursue co-development and large-scale manufacturing of major weapons systems in India, which other States have been unwilling; and Russian end-use monitoring requirements are much less stringent than those, for example, of the US. So, I don’t see India’s defence cooperation with Russia weakening anytime soon, despite what will be Russia’s accelerated enervation after the Ukraine war.
What would be your advice to PM Modi?
I think there are several things that India probably could do. One, it needs to be a little more open about its disenchantment with what is happening in Ukraine in much the same way that Indira Gandhi was very clear about her disenchantment after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, even though India officially did not take a position of criticism. I think New Delhi then left no one in doubt that it saw the invasion of Afghanistan as dangerous and really subversive of regional stability. PM Modi and his team need to look for ways of signalling that publicly. They’ve done it privately thus far, but there are audiences that cannot hear this message.
Two, India has done well to offer humanitarian aid to Ukraine. I would look to do more because Ukraine is truly the victim of this unprovoked aggression. And Ukraine is also important to India as a source of military equipment. So, it’s not only the Russian connection that needs to be protected. In this context, India also needs to reach out to its European partners who have been disheartened by India’s votes in the UNSC.
And third, I think that India needs to re-emphasise that its investments in the Indo-Pacific architecture remain unchanged, that it will continue to push hard on supporting the coalition in balancing China.
And what would be your advice to President Biden?
We have enough challenges in the Indo-Pacific that warrant no diminishing whatsoever in our commitment to India or to Indian security or to the bilateral partnership. I don’t think this administration is inclined to shortchange the US-India relationship. I hope the coming 2+2 bilateral, and what happens after that 2+2, provides those avenues for both sides to be able to express confidence in the other, despite the current perturbations.
In some ways, the fissure over Ukraine may yet have one useful purpose, which is that it compels the US to think about India realistically. Sometimes we tend to imagine that India will support us everywhere simply because we have clear convergences in the Indo-Pacific. But India has its own ambitions and its own interests. The maturing of our relationship will require recognising that.