China, not Russia, is still the bigger threat
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has accelerated many underlying questions within the Indo-Pacific debate vis-à-vis India. India’s strategic relationship with Russia has been a concern for many of its western partners as they seek to strengthen their partnership with New Delhi. India’s inability to condone or condemn Russia’s actions at the United Nations (UN), primarily due to its bilateral partnership with Moscow as well as its military dependence, has raised concerns regarding the feasibility or viability of both New Delhi’s commitment to principles and norms and as well as partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.
The war in Europe has accelerated any underlying questions, especially ones voiced by critics of the Indo-Pacific. In the face of continued Russian aggression towards Ukraine, will the Indo-Pacific still hold relevance (a concept which neither Russia nor China ascribes to) and more importantly, will Washington and its European friends be able to afford their commitments to Asia and in managing and balancing a China threat? Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have its own consequences for the relationship between Moscow and Delhi. However, while the war in Europe does raise certain questions, it is unlikely to reduce either the relevance of the Indo-Pacific or undermine India’s partnerships and commitment to the region.
To begin with, India will continue with its commitments toward the Indo-Pacific for it is not Russia, but China that poses a serious and imminent threat to Indian interests, choices, and sovereignty. For Washington too, the China question remains equally important, although there is no threat to the United States (US)’s sovereignty unlike in New Delhi’s case. The China threat for India is not a question or a debate but a reality, which New Delhi must continue to address. Regardless of how the US and its allies view New Delhi due to its votes in the UN on Russia, India’s commitments to the Indo-Pacific emerged out of drastic shifts in its security environment which are not about to disappear.
For Washington and its partners too, while India’s votes, or lack thereof, at the UN, have raised questions regarding commitment to principles and norms, India is still a key player in the Indo-Pacific. The unscheduled meeting of the leaders of the US, India, Australia, and Japan, known as Quad, on March 3, further reflects the importance of the Indo-Pacific and the convergence in interests between the four nations.
Without undermining the urgency and situation in Europe, China will remain the primary strategic challenge in the long-term. India’s continental border tensions only add to the complexity of problems facing Asian security today as the world grapples with a new geopolitical reality in Europe. Along with the tension along its northern continental border, India will also face a more present and invested Beijing in the Indian Ocean region.
A mapping of China’s energy routes and its sea lanes of communication will quickly outline Beijing’s vulnerabilities. They lie in the Indian Ocean. Balancing Chinese capabilities in the Indian Ocean could become critical in managing Beijing’s actions in the Western Pacific. To be a key maritime power, China will have to both secure its sea lanes of communications and energy routes as well as establish itself as a key security player to its friends and partners in the Indian Ocean region, making a second military facility a necessity.
Perhaps New Delhi in the end will find itself in a position of re-evaluating its relationship with Moscow in the context of its competition with Beijing. For Washington and its partners too, it is important to see India’s position and dilemma in the Ukraine crisis from the lens of India’s deep military partnership with Moscow and an aggressive China at its continental borders.
For New Delhi, the question might be flipped in asking how committed and to what extent Washington can engage in the Indo-Pacific, given recent developments in Europe. India and its partners such as the US, France, Australia, Japan, and others will continue to find convergences in its strategic priorities regarding their respective China question.
Perhaps, it is time for New Delhi and its Indo-Pacific partners to have a frank conversation on interests and priorities in the IndoPacific and the role each can afford to play in the region. Whatever may be the outcome of these uncertain times, New Delhi and Washington today are better placed in having difficult conversations with stronger bilateral partnerships than they did a decade ago.
The foundation of this bilateral partnership should provide a strong base for both sides to understand each other’s sensitivities, red lines and a framework for burden-sharing in paving the way forward.