Ukraine crisis: India secured its interests
Given the current global circumstances, and internal differences, India has done well in converting a crisis into an opportunity. But it must not get complacent
On February 24, when Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, India was hit by a geopolitical crisis, not of its making. It had close ties with actors involved in the conflict — and these actors were now at odds with each other. It also had little leverage to shape the course of the war, let alone stop the conflict.
There were also institutional divergences within India’s national security apparatus. All internal players agreed that Putin’s action wasn’t good for either global stability or Indian interests; they also agreed that Delhi had to continue engaging with Moscow.
But beyond that, assessments and conclusions differed. Some believed that the war would leave Russia unstable, weak, isolated, and more dependent on China. To them, the economic response to the invasion had shown the West’s power. It was time to begin a long-delayed conversation on strategic autonomy from Moscow, continue the structural shift towards the West, and be on the right side of the debate on State sovereignty.
Others believed that while Russia was facing military setbacks, it would eventually attain, partially, if not wholly, its objectives in Ukraine — and it would also remain a formidable player in its wider periphery. To them, it was imperative that Moscow did not tilt towards Beijing when it came to matters involving Indian security, and that Delhi maintains some distance from the western narrative on the issue.
This internal churn produced a synthesis in India’s policy approach. Take Russia.
With its acquisition of the S-400 missile systems, Delhi had already shown Moscow its ability to take an autonomous position. With its abstentions at the United Nations (UN), India has once again sent a signal to Russia, and others, that it retains the ability to take decisions on its own, in its own interests.
But, at the same time, Delhi has ensured that Moscow cannot take it for granted. It has let it be known that Russian actions have imperilled Indian interests. It has directly engaged with Putin’s bete noire, Volodymyr Zelensky, and offered Ukraine humanitarian aid. And by pointing to the UN charter and the need to cease violence, India has told Russia that its actions violate established norms and the current path isn’t sustainable.
Delhi’s challenge is in preserving this balance — of making it clear that Russian actions don’t have support here, yet retaining Moscow’s support or neutrality when it comes to Delhi’s core security interests.
Take the United States (US).
In its private engagements in Washington, and with its explanation of the vote, India has made it clear to the US that it does not stand with Russia but also explained its predicament in the language of interests — a language that the US understands quite well. The measured statements from both the White House and State Department on India’s position, the US’s offer to offset Indian dependence on Russia with deeper defence ties, its repeated commitment to the Indo-Pacific, and its fairly aggressive approach to China has shown that what binds the India-US relationship is stronger than what divides it.
Delhi’s challenge is in taking its message — and here the language of interests alone won’t suffice — to a wider audience, for public opinion and the mood on the Hill is driving the executive’s policy on Russia. India should avoid actions that can alienate these already disenchanted constituencies.
And take China.
India watched as a debate played out in Washington DC between those who saw Beijing as a part of the problem or a part of the solution. Eventually, China’s actions strengthened those who saw it as a part of the problem. Beijing is now saddled with an ally (Russia), which has made a mess of an invasion, an adversary (US) which has warned it of economic and diplomatic consequences, and a hedging bloc (Europe), which is slowly overcoming its illusions about China. In the run-up to the party congress later this year, this external climate has forced a temporary reset in China’s approach from belligerence to accommodation — which explains Wang Yi’s uninvited visit to Delhi.
By engaging with him, but also making it clear that a return to the diplomatic status quo wasn’t possible with the existing military status quo, India — after two years — finally has the upper hand in the diplomatic duel with Beijing. This may be temporary and may not translate into concessions, but it expands Delhi’s options. Delhi’s challenge is to make the most of the moment while remaining cleareyed about Beijing’s intentions and capabilities.
In sum, Delhi has managed to secure its basic interests. It has crafted a diplomatic position that allows it to shift to any side depending on circumstances. And it has even emerged as a potential peacemaker — with United Nations secretary-general Antonio Guterres, in his meeting with foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla, emphasising how important a role India can play with its equities on all sides.
A month ago, India ran the risk of being at the receiving end of all its key relationships — with an upset Washington which would wield the stick, a more belligerent Beijing, and a Moscow feeling betrayed. Today, Delhi is dealing with a moderately grateful Moscow, a temporarily tame Beijing, and a Washington which is converting its disenchantment to carrots. But precisely because the situation is so fluid, India must not be complacent, continue its internal policy adjustments, sustain its external outreach, and keep its ambitions aligned with its abilities.