Tour of duty in defence forces is not a good idea
That the Indian military, especially the army, has been hounded by shortages and over employment for nearly three decades needs no elaboration. The army has faced a shortage of officers for the same period for the simple reason that the required quality is not forthcoming because the service conditions and the corresponding compensation package are not good enough. Even traditional military families with five generations in the service have parted ways. In today’s commercialised world, age-old concepts of duty and honour are by themselves no longer good enough.
A nation maintains its military as an instrument of national power and means of safeguarding national interests. National security is ultimately a question of evaluating security threats and national interests and deciding on capabilities to meet or secure them. Capabilities in turn mean expenditure. The first must take the shape of a ‘strategic defence review’ and define our military capabilities to be created and maintained. We still await one to be formally articulated.
As this is over the long term, corresponding long-term budgetary commitments have also to be stated. If we as a nation are reluctant to invest in our military capabilities considering all other competing requirements then the answer lies in scaling down our military; not in terms of quality but the overall force structure. A small, well-trained and equipped force is better than a hollow structure.
AD HOC MEASURES
The officer shortage has been attempted to be addressed by various ad hoc measures, each given up after some time. There were at one time seven modes and schemes for officer entry and commission! Now we have the proposal for a ‘tour of duty’ which envisages ‘keen young men’ to serve for about three years after a truncated basic training and thereafter move on to other occupations. The attraction for these young men is said to be the ‘thrill, adventure and pride in wearing the uniform’.
All militaries have a pyramid like structure with a large base rapidly narrowing upwards and the requirement of a young age profile. Consequently, all standing armies have a regular cadre and a support cadre of officers in the ratio of about 1 to 5. We introduced the short service commission for five years, later extended to 10 years and further extended to 14 and further diluted the concept by granting permanent regular commission to more than half of these officers.
This was followed by introducing women short service officers with no permanent regular commission. Judicial intervention followed mandating consideration of permanent commission for all. That buried the concept of support cadre. What remains is lingering agitation and legal battles for entitlements and service privileges to these officers. The emergency commissioned officers inducted in the aftermath of the 1962 debacle and released from service subsequently have a legacy of similar claims and fights till date.
The tour of duty is apparently set on the same path and with the same residual issues as experienced earlier. Then the concept begs an answer to the preserve logic that if a few months of training for such officers is good enough then why are we spending so much time and effort on training the regular officer?
The army today is fully committed on counter-insurgency operations and along the Line of Control (LoC) and Line of Actual Control (LAC). Every newly commissioned officer, including from the services, sees service in Jammu and Kashmir or the North-East in his initial years. This requires well trained, fully committed officers and addressing the concomitant issues of death and disability and allied liabilities of the army and government.
These very service conditions and risks dissuade the suitable young man from military service. Can the tour of duty officers be expected to have different expectations or can be forsaken of these liabilities under these conditions? On the other hand, would a young man volunteer to undertake these risks for the sake of the ‘thrill, adventure and pride in wearing the uniform’?
UNFORGIVING BUSINESS
Actual combat is a dirty and unforgiving business, far removed from the make belief of Bollywood movies, ceremonial parades and uniforms. It has no place for incapacity. A wrong move means loss of life or limb. A soldier trusts his life in the hands of his officer on the assured understanding that the officer is trained and competent to lead him. What faith will they have in such temporary thrill seekers?
It is no secret that a large number of short service officers had failed to enter through the regular route and sought entry with the hope of subsequent permanent commission. This was also perhaps the last option left when other avenues were not available. Yet the requirement of a permanent to support cadre of officers in the ratio of 1:5 remains.
The support cadre (short service or whatever nomenclature) must attract entry through a matter of choice and not a compulsion driven by failure. The support cadre must have a legislated fixed tenure with no option or consideration for permanent commission. This would require a suitable package on release from service with allied benefits such as higher studies, reserved intake into other services etc. backed by legislation to make it attractive.
Past attempts at lateral induction into the central armed police forces were thwarted even after cabinet approval. Similar recommendations by committees for industrial deputation and absorption never saw the light of day. The time for ad hoc measures is long past. If the environment and powers that be are unwilling to ensure these conditions, the army will continue to carry the albatross around its neck.
A SOLDIER TRUSTS HIS LIFE IN THE HANDS OF
HIS OFFICER ON THE ASSURED UNDERSTANDING THAT THE OFFICER IS TRAINED AND COMPETENT TO LEAD HIM. WHAT FAITH WILL THEY HAVE IN SUCH TEMPORARY THRILL SEEKERS?