Hindustan Times (Jalandhar)

India’s infra push behind Chinese aggression

- ANIL DHASMANA

To set the matter straight, the Prime Minister’s Office on Saturday, in a statement, said that the Prime Minister was crystal clear that “India would respond firmly to any attempts to transgress the Line of Actual Control (LAC)”. He specifical­ly emphasised that in contrast to the past neglect of such challenges, Indian forces now decisively counter any violations of LAC, the statement further said.

As PM Modi said, because we have better infrastruc­ture in place at LAC, we are to patrol more, and hence we tend to meet more and confront more. To put things in the right perspectiv­e, the increased strategic infrastruc­ture has rattled China to no end as the Dragon is facing resounding Indian military might, not the relatively docile India it used to deal with, before 2014.

DECODING THE LAC CONFLICT

In the last few years, there have been frequent face-offs in certain sensitive areas in Eastern Ladakh. It has been a direct outcome of India’s ability of increased patrolling in the area due to vastly improved infrastruc­ture readiness.

In fact, the more frequent faceoffs are not necessaril­y a sign of weakness, or due to deteriorat­ing relations, but indicate greater ability on the part of Indian Army to monitor, detect and respond to Chinese PLA patrolling.

As infrastruc­ture keeps improving, these possibilit­ies will only increase.

There is a long history of India’s dealings with China, and almost all of the reverses that India has suffered have been during the previous rule, particular­ly of Congress regimes. It all started with the Tibet’s annexation by China which India accepted quietly in 1959. In 1962, the loss of large chunk of territory, and the then Indian Prime Minister interpreti­ng it by saying that “not a blade of grass grows there”, sums up the attitude towards border issues.

During the 1980s and 1990s, when China started taking lead over India economical­ly, militarily, and in infrastruc­ture constructi­on, India was not able to respond and match up in equal measure. In the 1990s, boundary management agreements were signed that further limited India’s manoeuvrin­g ability, particular­ly the 1993 Accord.

The United Progressiv­e Alliance era (2004 to 2014) allowed multiple transgress­ion of Indian land through deceptive salamislic­ing methods of the Chinese, and even lost lands in Demjok areas of Ladakh during the period of 2008 to 2012.

AK Antony, the then defence minister, conceded in Parliament that we have lost the infrastruc­ture race with China. It was in this era, that the serving army chiefs repeatedly pointed out how our armed forces were facing shortfall of critical ammunition and border infrastruc­ture woes to counter enemies.

The policy paralysis was reversed following the regime change in 2014 and Prime Minister Narendra Modi changed decades of drift in India’s policy towards China by bridging the infrastruc­ture gaps in border areas by constructi­ng roads and bridges with faster pace.

It was PM Modi who dared China on several fronts and foiled its bids in Doklam, stopped RCEP, and strongly opposed Chinese dream project OBOR.

BIG INFRA PUSH WORRYING CHINA

The genesis of the building up of faster strategic infrastruc­ture can be traced back to 2014, when the Modi government gave it a big push. One of the first decision of the government was to issue a general approval in July 2014 for the creation of road network by Border Roads Organisati­on (BRO) within 100km of aerial distance from LAC. This general approval ensured that requiremen­t of prior central government and other bureaucrat­ic process were done away with.

Subsequent­ly, this exception has been extended to all border security related infrastruc­ture such as border outposts, floodlight­s, fencing etc, and all projects executed by the Central paramilita­ry organisati­ons of the ministry of Home Affairs.

This was in stark contrast to the approach taken by the UPA government where blocking of such sensitive infrastruc­ture projects under various reasons was the norm. Often the delays were due to flip flops on environmen­tal clearances.

Similarly, the Modi government delegated powers to DG, BRO, clearing the way for constructi­on of 66 operationa­lly critical Indo-China borders roads. Earlier, every approval came to the ministry of defence. These powers were subsequent­ly delegated to officers up to chief engineer level in BRO.

The government also took crucial steps like the procuremen­t of modern constructi­on on a massive scale during 2017-2020. It also enhanced airlift of constructi­on equipment and material from 2017 onwards, often using Chinhook helicopter­s.

The proactive shift in the policymaki­ng resulted in massive infrastruc­ture creation.

According to BRO statistics, between 2008 and 2017, the formation cutting of about 230km of roads were done annually, but this has now been increased to 470km per year between 2017 and 2020 along the India-China border. Similarly, between 2008 and 2017, the speed of surfacing of roads was 170km per year, but it has been increased to 380km per year between 2017 and 2020.

Only one tunnel was constructe­d between 2008 and 2014, while six tunnels have been made during 2014 to 2020. The constructi­on of about 19 tunnels is also under progress.

During 2008 to 2014, 7270 metres long bridges were built, while 14,450 metres of bridges were built between 2014 and 2020. In the period between 2008 and 2014, roads of 3,610km were constructe­d on the border while 4,764kms of roads were built between 2014 and 2020.

For about five decades after 1962 war, the constructi­on of these roads which were neglected has now been taken care of and it has been constructe­d in record period of time along the LAC. Undoubtedl­y, India’s push to build and upgrade infrastruc­ture along the LAC is behind China’s aggression and recent border skirmishes.

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