Mr Oli, all is not well yet with Kathmandu
India needs to politely remind the Nepal PM that the country’s constitution needs wider ownership
Nepal’s Prime Minister KP Oli is in India after a troubled phase in ties.
In the past six months, Kathmandu has accused New Delhi of intervening in its constitutional process; imposing a blockade; and stoking the Madhesi agitation. New Delhi has accused Kathmandu of not addressing the internal political conflict in the Tarai, of stoking ‘anti-Indian sentiment’, and opposed its human rights violations.
The rapprochement occurred when the Nepal government proposed — interestingly to New Delhi, not to the agitating Madhesis — a four point proposal, which involved two amendments and leaving the issue of federal demarcation to a mechanism.
The Madhesis felt the proposal did not go far enough. But New Delhi — fatigued by the flak it was receiving for ‘mishandling Nepal’ — assessed that Kathmandu’s proposal represented some forward movement. The RSS told the Indian political leadership that anti-Indian sentiment had increased in the hills and that New Delhi should find a way to restore ties. India was also sceptical of the ability of the Madhesi leadership to sustain the agitation.
Eventually, two amendments were passed — the hill establishment claims this will award 79-80 out of 165 seats in the lower house to the Tarai. If this is indeed the case, it is positive. But there are competing interpretations by Madhesi lawyers who suggest that there would be around 70 seats. Greater clarity on this would be welcome. The second amendment reintroduced the term ‘proportional inclusion’ of groups in State organs. It, however, spread the benefits of reservation across many groups, including the dominant upper castes, which is problematic.
The Nepal government, as promised to New Delhi, formed a political mechanism on demarcation. But it did not seek Madhesi buy-in. This mechanism will be led by the deputy prime minister Kamal Thapa — who is a firm opponent of federalism in principle. Top leaders, who are in a position to take the decision and exercise flexibility, will not be a part of the mechanism. Its terms of reference — especially issues of mandate and validity — have not been clearly defined. The Madhesi parties have indicated they will not participate in it.
A pattern is clear. Kathmandu is more interested appeasing New Delhi than reaching out to the Tarai. This has partly satisfied India’s desire to reasserts its cen- trality in Nepal. But it does not solve the problem of Madhesi and Tharu alienation.
An entire generation in the Tarai is radicalised. And it is not willing to listen to either Kathmandu or New Delhi. This generation wants to be treated as equal citizens. It wants federal units carved in a manner where excluded groups can exercise self-rule. It wants clarity on citizenship laws. It wants representation according to population in both houses of the central legislature. And if this does not happen, it is willing to flirt with the idea of violence and secessionism.
And this is why — even as state to state ties get restored — New Delhi must politely tell Oli that all is not yet well.
India, while recognising the constitution as an important step, must not endorse it fully. It must remind Kathmandu that it needs wider ownership and inclusion. It must signal to Oli that India would be closely watching progress on three issues — citizenship, demarcation and upper house representation. It must urge him to shed unilateralism. And it must make it clear that the Nepal government must do this not to please New Delhi, but for its own internal stability.