Hindustan Times (Lucknow)

What can the Indo-Pacific partners expect from Japan?

- Titli Basu Titli Basu is an associate fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses The views expressed are personal

Fumio Kishida will walk into Kantei as prime minister (PM) on October 4 following a high-voltage political race, marked by murky factional political culture of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Charting his road to power, Kishida positioned himself on the right side of the kingmakers. But that is only half the battle.

Measuring up to the burden of expectatio­ns will demand deft leadership, bold strategic vision, and intellectu­al confidence to conceive innovative policies, as Japan navigates the fluid geostrateg­ic and geo-economic matrix in a post-pandemic world.

As the longest-serving foreign minister in the post-war era in Shinzo Abe cabinet, and LDP’s former policy research council chief, Kishida has hands-on experience in pursuing Tokyo’s national interest in the United States (US)-China-Japan triangle.

Building his core team, Kishida left behind the fading “shadow shogun” Nikai, taking away some steam from LDP’s pro-China camp. Meanwhile, Abe’s crafty moves in shaping party politics these past few weeks further consolidat­ed his power. As Team Kishida is in the making, Abe’s confidants are now placed in key party positions, enabling his greater control on the party command.

Culling out from the political debate in the run-up to the party election, what can Indo-Pacific partners expect from Kishida on key verticals — Japan’s role in the postCovid-19 order; Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP); national and economic security?

As the third-largest economy, Japan will be positioned at the forefront of delivering global public goods, from financing safe vaccine manufactur­ing to advancing carbon neutrality. As one of Asia’s oldest democracie­s, Tokyo will remain an ardent advocate of universal values as the battle of narratives between democracie­s and authoritar­ian systems sharpen. And as a beneficiar­y of the US-led liberal order, Japan will not be a bystander as Beijing engineers a Sino-centric order by offering “Chinese solutions” to global governance.

In the post-war decades, American primacy in East Asia witnessed the ascent of Japan, and subsequent­ly, China. In contrast to Beijing, Tokyo refrained from translatin­g its economic prowess into global strategic ambitions, and instead served as a stabiliser.

Given the competing perception­s of the regional order in Tokyo and Beijing, intellectu­al foresight in Japan brought the IndoPacifi­c construct to high table. Japan demonstrat­ed forward thinking in balancing values and strategy with its conceptual­isation of “Confluence of the Two Seas”, which subsequent­ly germinated into FOIP that dominates strategic thinking in the power corridors of not just Tokyo, but also Quad and European capitals.

Today’s Quad — which maps a collaborat­ive agenda delivering rich dividends in creating public goods — is yet another strategic plank anchored in Japan’s propositio­n of weaving a “democratic security diamond” a decade back. FOIP and Quad owe much to former PM Abe’s value-based grand strategy. Both will remain key templates in Kishida’s statecraft, and India will continue to enjoy high priority in Japan’s strategic calculatio­ns.

As foreign minister, Kishida was a pivotal player in Team Abe, when qualitativ­e depth was added to India-Japan relations by elevating it to a special strategic and global partnershi­p, and subsequent­ly, India-Japan Indo-Pacific Vision 2025 was conceived. As PM, Kishida will take forward this highpowere­d action-oriented partnershi­p as the two countries celebrate their 70th anniversar­y of diplomatic relations in 2022.

With East Asia emerging as one of the primary theatres of Sino-US strategic competitio­n, Tokyo is ready to scale up as a proactive ally in Washington’s great power management strategy. Guided by the principle of positive pacifism, Japan is expected to further adjust its post-war exclusivel­y defence-oriented posture. Tokyo will also double down on nurturing the Indo-Pacific networks that it weaved in Asia and Europe to optimise security insurances and economic gains.

While there is a broad consensus on the China challenge, effective coordinati­on among allies is imperative, for instance, in crafting the Indo-Pacific economic architectu­re. Guarding the gold standards of trade, Japan will have to hold the fort amid high politics as China and Taiwan enter the Comprehens­ive and Progressiv­e Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnershi­p (CPTPP) game while Tokyo still awaits Washington’s return.

One of Kishida’s core tasks will be revisiting the national security strategy. Tough questions await defence planners. This includes enhancing deterrence within the alliance to effectivel­y manage Chinese grey zone tactics and dealing with proliferat­ion in the Korean peninsula; stitching together joint operation plans in case of a Taiwan contingenc­y; and raising the defence budget to bolster missile defence.

As Japan embraces a proactive role in regional security, Kishida will have to invest in rebuilding trust with Seoul, since security coordinati­on between US-Japan-South Korea is key to maintainin­g strategic stability in the Peninsula.

In framing the economic security agenda, Japan will work with the US, Taiwan, Australia, and India to control the choke points in the global supply chain of semiconduc­tors, advanced batteries, rare earth and strategic minerals, pharmaceut­icals and beyond 5G solutions. Without engaging in a zerosum game, managing risks and strengthen­ing national security will be the key determinan­t while doing business with China.

Nonetheles­s, Japan’s leadership in the Indo-Pacific theatre will be contingent on domestic political stability. Navigating the monumental economic, demographi­c, and inoculatio­n challenges amid Covid-19 will be Kishida’s top job as he is responsibl­e for steering the LDP victory in the Lower House election in the coming weeks and the Upper House election in 2022. In domestic politics, will his propositio­n of advancing “new Japanese-style capitalism” and “Kishidanom­ics” be enough to convince the electorate? It is time to walk the talk as Japan cannot afford leadership deficit at this crucial juncture.

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