The 1971 war: India won the battle, but couldn’t go all the way
On December 16, 1971, India won a famous victory. In a quick campaign, the Indian Army entered East Pakistan, defeated the Pakistani forces, and helped create Bangladesh. Across the country, there have been commemorations to mark the day. Though the one held in New Delhi did not mention Indira Gandhi, make no mistake: It was her victory. It was she who steeled the national resolve, faced down the world’s greatest power, and then sent the army to deliver what was essentially East Pakistan’s coup de grâce.
However, we should know that what we are celebrating is only a partial victory. The adversary lived to fight another day, and has since, through a “sub conventional” war (terrorism), been exacting a heavy price from India. The Indian campaign in the East worked well — it quickly adapted itself to the changing nature of the battle — but in the West, the story was different. India had decided on a number of offensives with which it had hoped to shape a post-war outcome. However, they did not work. The thrust north from Kargil ran up against strong Pakistani defences. The army’s success in the Leepa Valley in northern Kashmir turned out to be illusory. In Chamb, the Indian Army got imbalanced, and the result was defeat and a permanent loss of the area. As for Punjab, the Indian Army launched its main attack there, but soon got bogged down. Another offensive towards Rahim Yar Khan, in the Rajasthan sector, ended in confusion.
There were two significant defensive victories, though. In both, our forces successfully foiled bold Pakistani plans, one to capture Poonch and the other the Jaisalmer airbase. All this, of course, was spectacularly outweighed by the success of the Bangladesh campaign.
But what we won was only the battle and not the war. The failure in the West was responsible for this, but only in part. The real problem was that the Indian plans, which author writer Anuj Dhar revealed, included the liberation of the southern half of Azad Kashmir and the destruction of the Pakistani military machine, were betrayed to the Americans. India and its Soviet allies came under intense American pressure and were forced to accept a ceasefire before achieving their western goals. The gains of the 1971 battlefield were frittered away in Simla. The prisoners were released, and the captured territory returned. Islamabad agreed it would henceforth discuss Kashmir bilaterally, convert the ceasefire line to a “Line of Control” and made a verbal promise, later denied, to transform it into an international border. The loss of its eastern wing did not weaken Pakistan; in fact, it deepened its animosity towards India, propelled its nuclear weapons programme and has led to continuous covert war.
Over the years, the smaller Pakistan Army has maintained a ratio of forces that can restrict any Indian attack. This prevented the Indian forces thrice in the past 20 years from making war on Pakistan. First, in January 2002, in the aftermath of the attack on Parliament House (2001), and the second, after the massacre of military families by terrorists at the Kaluchak cantonment (2002). And the third, after the Mumbai attack of 2008.
It is important to recount this because Pakistan remains a determined adversary. After the “surgical” strikes and the Balakot attack, many people believe that the Indian Army will make short work of Pakistan in the event of war. This may not be true and not just because Islamabad has nuclear weapons and is allied to China, but because its military maintains effective parity with India.
Why does the United States observe Pearl Harbor Day (December 7) as a national day of remembrance, rather than dedicate a day to celebrate its victory in World War II? It is because reflecting on setbacks is as important as celebrating victories. In the case of December 16, it would be useful to remember that while we won a battle for East Pakistan, West Pakistan was let off the hook. The politicomilitary machinery that gave us the splendid victory in the East did not do it in the West, and then again in Simla. And we’re still facing the ramifications of that.