How to strengthen the election panel
It’s wrong to assume that there is a link between an Election Commission chief’s tenure and his independence. Instead, make changes in the appointment procedure and ensure each CEC gets a minimum tenure of one or two years to enable the officer to usher i
Last week, the Supreme Court (SC), while hearing a batch of petitions questioning the procedure for appointing election commissioners (ECs), made several observations on the independence of ECs, leading to wide-ranging discussions and debates on the issue. While these observations were made more to understand the procedure than comment on the functioning of the chief election commissioner (CEC), a reference was also made to the professional integrity and independence displayed by former CEC TN Seshan (1990-96).
However, it is perhaps not fair to compare Seshan’s functioning with others because he functioned as the sole CEC for quite some time before the Election Commission of India (ECI) became a multi-member body. The SC backed such a broad-based body. There is no doubt Seshan showed remarkable capacity and courage in instilling fear in the minds of political parties and politicians, but many have questioned the former CEC’s dictatorial functioning.
Second, a reference was also made that CECs should have six-year tenure to ensure independence. This, too, may be incorrect. When I was CEC for about 15 months, after having been EC for four years, I did not allow anyone from the ruling party or the Opposition at the Centre and the states to pressure me.
To be fair, many CECs have upheld their independence, notwithstanding a few aberrations. I think independence is a person’s management style and cannot be a function of the tenure of the incumbent. Therefore, to say that a CEC with a truncated term of one to two years will be less independent than a chief justice with a similar tenure of a high court or the SC may not be appropriate. At the same time, some changes could be brought about in the appointment process. A longerterm may enable CECs to bring about crucial changes in management.
In a multi-member ECI, all ECs are of equal rank, and if a person is appointed directly as CEC, ignoring the claims and competence of sitting ECs, the result may not be ideal. Incidentally, there is a lacuna in the existing constitutional provisions relating to removal. While the CEC can be removed only by impeachment, the ECs have not received similar immunity. This needs to be rectified.
In 2004, the poll watchdog suggested that the government consider a change in the appointment procedure of ECs through a collective body, involving a leader of the Opposition and a nominee of the Chief Justice of India, as done for the appointment of chief vigilance commissioner. Such a change, ECI said, would ensure transparency and lend more credibility to appointments. Further, it is advisable at the appointment stage to provide that each member of ECI has a tenure of a minimum of one year, if not two, by spacing the date of superannuation accordingly.
There is also a suggestion to appoint ECs outside the bureaucracy. The idea may be attractive, but such persons must not have a political bias. Considering the bitterness prevailing among political parties, it may be challenging to have a consensus on a candidate. Further, it must be realised that bureaucrats with a good service record will be in a better position to manage the stupendous task of conducting an election, particularly the general election involving a huge voting population.
It may also be argued that a member of the judiciary could be considered for such an appointment. It must be noted that election management is more administrative, involving a hands-on approach to real-time incidents requiring quick action. The bureaucrats are better suited to deal with complex issues, calling for immediate executive action. I want to point out that the SC appointed a retired CEC to conduct the Board of Control for Cricket of India in 2005 after the earlier experiment of nominated retired SC judges could not conduct the election due to a bitter fight among voters who were less than 30. The retired CEC completed the job within the stipulated time.
As of now, the appointments are made from among the retiring or retired senior civil servants with the result that they only function for part of six years (prescribed in the Constitution) since their retirement age is 60. Therefore, I suggest that the government identify officers when they are around 59 and have a panel of such names for consideration through a collective selection process.
ECI’s transparency, integrity and independence can be enhanced by changing the appointment procedure through a collective body, and the selection should be so made that each EC has a minimum tenure of one or two years to enable the officer to bring desirable administrative changes.