The next big step in India’s digital story
The country’s digital public goods infra is the envy of the world. But to become a global digital power, India should now focus on standards
When historians look back at the Narendra Modi era of governance, they will arguably rank the creation and deepening of India’s digital public infrastructure as the most remarkable achievement of the Bharatiya Janata Party (Bjp)-led dispensation.
Running with the digital identity mechanism pioneered by Nandan Nilekani under the United Progressive Alliance government, Modi’s political vision has ensured that India today can take pride in a democratic, inclusive, open public digital architecture.
From the financial inclusion of citizens in remote geographies to direct cash transfer to the most vulnerable, from the unified payment interface accounting for billions of transactions a month to the digitisation of citizen services across domains, from the mushrooming of a vibrant start-up ecosystem leveraging this digital depth to pioneering health initiatives from insurance to vaccination over digital platforms, India’s story is the envy of the world. For a State that has perennially struggled with finding effective mechanisms for social welfare delivery, and linking it to growth possibilities, this has been an exhilarating innovation.
But what next? This was a key focus of the conversations at the Carnegie Global Tech Summit held last week in Delhi, co-hosted by Carnegie India and the ministry of external affairs.
India’s goal is to take this story globally. And New Delhi hopes to use its perch as the G20 president to do so. But what should this entail in real and operational terms? Three features stood out from the summit.
One, there needs to be clarity on conceptual goal. Why does India want to export its model? Is it as a digital counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative? Is it to spread India’s soft power and win accolades? Is it to create economic possibilities for
Indian companies who can help others develop similar products? Is it to be the centre of the world when it comes to setting standards and norms in an era when tech and geopolitics are closely intertwined? Or is it all of the above and can these goals be reconciled?
Two, it would be wise for India not to position the digital public infra story as something that can counter the Big Tech model of the West. You don’t want to have a powerful corporate constituency in western capitals undermining your model. Instead, focus on the complementaries.
Take two examples. UPI became a platform not just for Indian fin-tech companies but also global ones to expand their financial reach in the Indian market. Or take the Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC) platform, the next big thing. Meant to connect the smallest kirana store on an Indian e-commerce platform, this will help small Indian capital (which also happens to be the BJP’S core base) adapt to the digital age. But it does not mean that global e-commerce giants need to panic. ONDC will expand the market and all players will benefit.
And three, the most challenging element is what India’s ambassador to France, Jawed Ashraf, candidly articulated at the summit — the nuts and bolts of operationalising this model. Ashraf is unique for he was at the helm in setting the stage for the UPI interoperability partnership with Singapore and pushing digital collaboration with Paris. He also, in 2015, worked with the UN broadband commission to take an Aadhaar-like model to 20 African countries. It didn’t work because the Indian system wasn’t quite ready, but these experiences have given him a sense of what other countries need.
Ashraf pointed out that digital sovereignty matters to all countries, all states want data under their control, and all political leaders need to own the model for it to be effective. And this requires India to be humble, to avoid hubris, to stop talking down to countries about its achievements and instead be open and collaborative about what it can offer.
And the offer can take three forms.
One, the government can tell partners that its agencies will share and build the underlying architecture for digital identity, e-payment interface, and all other digital verticals that a particular country may want. This may not find enough takers given the question of trust and sovereign control of what is proprietary architecture; it will also impose a burden on the Indian State for which it doesn’t quite have the capability.
The second option is letting autonomous foundations and international financial institutions collaborate and pick and choose elements of India Stack (the moniker for the application programming interfaces or APIS, a set of codes that allow different digital public verticals to speak to each other), raise finances for it, and take it to different partner countries.
The third model is what may be the most realistic for G20. Instead of merely a recognition of India’s achievements or an acknowledgment in the declaration, India can propose a centre for excellence on digital public goods.
This can set principles and standards and catapult India as a norm entrepreneur in the domain. On privacy, for instance, it can draw from the idea of consent dashboards embedded in the Data Empowerment and Protection Architecture, a mechanism already being discussed between India and France.
The philosophical convergence, Ashraf argued, was key — the tech can come later. Once the principles are adopted, this independent centre, housed in India, can potentially work with partners. India will still be recognised as the leader in the domain. Indian companies may still get opportunities. But partners will feel that they have agency in the process and be more willing to collaborate.
India’s achievements are real. Talking about them is good. But the diplomatic challenge is both avoiding coming across as a relentlessly self-promotional country and recognising the concerns of others. That will truly make India a global digital power in a domain that has the potential to transform lives.