Another T’gana man who tried to save tehsildar dies

the court committed an error by granting Hindus title to the disputed site by elevating a “mere look at the central dome” as equivalent to possessory title.

The court had ruled that the Muslims offered no evidence to indicate they were in exclusive possession of the inner courtyard before 1857.

However, the court did not appreciate that the structure in question had always been a mosque and had been in exclusive possession of the Muslims.

On the question of namaaz in the Babri Masjid between 1528-1856, the court disregarded the rule of presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Under the said provision, the Court may presume the existence of events which are likely to have happened in the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business. The petitioner has submitted that once the Babri Masjid was constructed in 1528, it was in the common course of natural events and human conduct that the Muslims started praying in the mosque. A mosque is a place for namaaz and hence it is inconceivable that a prominent mosque constructed over an area of 1500 square yards was not used for namaaz during the Muslim rule between 1528-1856.

The court had granted title of the disputed site to the Hindus based on their better claims of possessions.

However, the rights of Hindus were only prescriptive rights (rights which have become valid because it has existed for a long time) and cannot be equated to possessory title.

The last suit filed in the case was Suit no. 5 which was filed by parties claiming to act on behalf of Ram Lalla. It was filed on the ground that the Hindu parties were becoming impatient due to the delay in deciding the dispute.

A case based on ‘impatience’ ought to be dismissed at the threshold as impatience can never be a cause of action, it has been argued.

The SC relied on travelers’ accounts and archaeological findings.

This was despite the court acknowledging that travelers accounts were not conclusive and archaeological findings could not be the basis of deciding a title dispute. Further, despite noting that only the facts after the annexation of Oudh in 1856 would be considered for adjudicating the dispute, the Court proceeded to rely upon the facts prior to 1856.

The Court equated wanton acts of destruction and trespass committed by the Hindu parties to acts of assertion of claim over the disputed site.

The court failed to appreciate that Babri Masjid was a waqf property.

Evidence was not appreciated by the court evenly. Precedence was given to oral testimonies of the Hindu parties vis a vis the contemporary documentary evidence of the Muslim parties.

HYDERABAD: Days after woman tehsildar Ch Vijaya Reddy was burnt alive in her office at Abdullapurmet in Telangana’s Ranga Reddy district, the office attendant who had tried to rescue her died at a hospital in the early hours of Monday, doctors said.

K Chandraiah (52), who had suffered 60% burns in the incident and had been undergoing treatment at Apollo-drdo Hospitals, suffered a sudden cardiac arrest. “We kept him on a ventilator and tried to resuscitate him, but his pulse dropped rapidly and he breathed his last at around 4 am,” a doctor said.

Chandraiah’s body was shifted to Osmania General Hospital for a post-mortem. His family, along with revenue employees, staged a dharna at the hospital, demanding compensation for the family from the state government before they were removed by the police.

Chandraiah is the fourth person to have died in the November 4 incident. Thirty-eight-year-old Vijaya Reddy, who was set ablaze by a farmer Kura Suresh, had died on the spot.

Her driver Kamalla Gurunatham (27), who had sustained 80% burns while trying to rescue her, died a day later. Three days later, Suresh, who had also sustained 65% burns, succumbed to his injuries in hospital while undergoing treatment.

The Supreme Court had awarded the disputed site to the Hindus on November 9. The petitioner has submitted that the relief granted by Supreme Court virtually amounts to a direction to destroy the Babri Masjid. Had the Masjid not been illegally demolished on December 6, 1992, the implementation of the present order would have required the destruction of an existing mosque to make space for a proposed temple. The Court in its judgment had acknowledged the crimes committed by the Hindu parties in 1934, 1939 and 1992. In 1934, the domes of the mosque were damaged. In 1949, the mosque was desecrated by placing idols below the central dome. In 1992, the mosque was demolished. Despite this, the SC rewarded the crimes by allowing relief to Hindu parties. In granting title of disputed site to Hindu parties, the court disregarded the basic principle that no person can derive benefit out of an illegality. The court erred in disregarding the settled principle of law that a tainted cause of action cannot be sustained and relief granted based on that. Since the court acknowledged in its judgment of November 9 that Babri Masjid was demolished in violation of the court’s order, complete justice can be done in this case only by reconstruction of the Babri Masjid. Thus, it is claimed that by ordering Muslims to be given 5 acres of land at an alternate site, the Court incorrectly applied Article 142. The court held that the Hindu parties could prove claims of possession to the disputed site better than the Muslims. This was based on Hindus having exclusive possession over outer courtyard while the inner courtyard continued to be contested. The petitioner has claimed that