Xi’s actions will impact international relations
The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) anointed Xi Jinping as the leader of the party and hence, of China, for an indefinite time. Moreover, the Politburo’s supreme standing committee is now stacked with Xi’s acolytes and proteges. China is now the world’s second-largest economy and aspires to be a superpower, rivalling the United States (US). So, what happens in China cannot be expected to stay in China.
The idea of collective leadership so assiduously cultivated and implemented by Deng Xiaoping has been abandoned in favour of one-man rule. Xi has cleverly used the adverse geopolitical environment and the unfavourable economic situation that China faces to his advantage, arguing that stability and national security should trump everything else. Therefore, the securitisation of domestic and foreign policies is a reality after the Chinese party congress.
How could this impact the rest of the world? For one thing, whether it is Taiwan or Ladakh, Xinjiang or Tibet, China will see it not so much from a political point of view, but through the prism of national security. Viewed this way, China may be expected to become assertive, even belligerent, in its relations with other countries. That said, there is no reason to believe China will adopt a onesize-fits-all approach in its dealings with other powers.
The most important relationship for China is that with the US. This is mainly due to China’s conviction that the only country its equal is the US. Accordingly, an olive branch was held out by Xi after his recent anointment. He said that China is willing to work with the US to find ways to get along for mutual benefit. This conciliatory step may be seen in the light of the recent US National Security Strategy, unveiled in October, which states unambiguously: The PRC (China) is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.
By describing China as the most significant geopolitical challenge, the US was serving notice on China. Xi has certainly taken note and hence the olive branch. But make no mistake, China will be hard as nails when negotiating with the US on what it believes is its core interests. The recent meeting between US President Joe Biden and Xi, on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali, should be seen against this backdrop.
The other notable feature is that of Russian President Vladimir Putin among a handful of international leaders congratulating Xi on his anointment. Following that, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi (who has since been promoted to the Politburo) called Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov to say that China would continue to support Russia as a major power. This could be interpreted as China doubling down on its no-limits partnership with Russia.
It runs counter to those who entertained the hope that Xi will distance himself slightly from Putin after his coronation. There is a lesson in this. In today’s China, ruled by Xi, there is no room for coursecorrection, much less for admission of mistakes. In time, as Russia becomes more and more of a junior partner dependent on China, can we be sure that Russia will continue to stand by India?
Where does that leave China’s ties with the rest of the world? China has a hierarchical view of the international order, so other powers will either have to kowtow to China when it comes to its core interests or be prepared to face its wrath. This applies particularly to the European Union, Australia, Japan and India.
The Association of South-East Asian Nations and the Republic of Korea do not take on China frontally, so they will continue to manage the relationship the best they can. For India, the signs are ominous. If China starts seeing the border dispute with India as a matter of sovereignty, then there are even lower chances of it getting resolved on a mutually acceptable basis. The alternative is that China will continue with its current policy of “nibble and gobble” when it comes to disputed territory. India will need all its wherewithal to resist this.
While India has to contend with an assertive China abroad, at home, it is a fair guess that nationalist sentiment will reign supreme in that country. Xi will persist with his zero-Covid strategy, with the campaign against the tech companies, with the commanding heights of the State in the Chinese economy and with the war against inequality in the garb of common prosperity. Considering there has not been much domestic backlash against the consolidation of the one-man rule in China, Xi will have his way on most of the issues mentioned.
In a world characterised by what the French philosopher Edgar Morin so presciently described as a polycrisis, China’s actions will touch every aspect of international relations. China is living up to the fact that we live in interesting times.