Will Modi’s Kashmir policy heal or alienate?

While management of the Pakistan factor in Kashmir will be complex and long drawn out, given various external factors at play, the domestic situation in J&K is where Delhi is the principal actor and Modi 2.0 has greater political traction than in 2014. Th

The global terror financing watchdog, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), in its June 21 meeting, admonished Pakistan for not demonstrating “a proper understanding” of the compliance expected regarding terror financing. Consequently, Pakistan will remain in the ‘grey’ list.

For India, the challenge of terror-related violence continues. While Jammu and Kashmir Governor Satya Pal Malik claimed terrorist activities had declined in J&K and the situation had improved “a lot,” Kashmir valley was racked by violence, resulting in the death of an army major and five paramilitary personnel, while eight were injured in a car bomb explosion near Pulwama. Condemning these attacks, Malik noted: “Whenever successful attempts are made by the security forces to conduct peaceful elections or continuous elimination of terrorists, the masterminds of terrorists from across the border order them to carry out fidayeen (suicide) attacks on forces.”

The proxy war in J&K is taking a heavy toll of precious lives. While 62 security personnel were killed since January this year, nine more lost their lives after Narendra Modi assumed office for a second term, taking the toll to 71. J&K was placed under Governor’s rule on June 20, 2018 when the uneasy PDPBJP coalition collapsed and, after six months, this was converted to President’s (central) rule. A year has passed without any sign that the local political process will be resurrected meaningfully, through state elections, and the sullen impasse continues.

The Kashmir issue remains intractable since it became bitterly contested in October 1947 and continues to dominate the India-Pakistan relationship, from the Jawaharlal Nehru-Ayub Khan period of the 1950s, to the Narendra Modi-Imran Khan phase now. Kashmir valley is part of the composite state of J&K, the Muslim-majority demography of which shapes the state’s domestic politics, while the Delhi-Srinagar relationship is the primary political vector.

Pakistan’s attempt to wrest the state by use of force – overt and covert - has been an abiding feature and has transmuted from a direct war (1947-48; 1965) to a proxy war through terrorism and infiltration, beginning 1990, that included the Kargil conflict 1999. The Pulwama terror attack in February 2019, followed by the Balakot retaliatory air strike by India, is the new punctuation.

The perception that India will not be cowed down in the event of a another terror attack was conveyed unambiguously by Modi during his campaign rallies. An anonymous call to the Indian mission in Islamabad regarding another terror attack in Pulwama may be part of a new Pakistan where forces are often outside the civilian government’s control.

While management of the Pakistan factor in Kashmir will be complex and long drawn out, given various external factors at play, the domestic situation in J&K is where Delhi is the principal actor and Modi 2.0 has greater political traction than in 2014. The immediate challenge for the Modi government will be to ensure the safe conduct of the Amarnath yatra that begins on July 1. This annual pilgrimage has been targeted by jihadi terrorists in the past, most recently in 2017, when eight pilgrims died.

Paradoxically, the Amarnath yatra used to be a symbol of Kashmir’s pluralism and religious harmony. The local Muslim population ensured the safe conduct of Hindu pilgrims. Tragically, the millennial demography of Kashmir knows only the trauma and divisiveness of the last quarter century and the last year has led to a further degree of aridity in the local socio-political environment.

Modi, with the emphatic mandate he obtained for the BJP in the 2019 elections, is at a critical cusp by way of his political legacy. Can he build on the former prime minister (Atal Bihari) Vajpayee template of first assuaging local Kashmiri sentiment, its related cynicism and alienation and then encouraging a resurrection of the domestic political process by announcing state elections?

Or will he choose to go down the muscular, security-led approach and focus only on eliminating terrorism through hard power, to the exclusion of smart and softpower initiatives of which Kashmir is in dire need?

Losing 71 lives in half the year is a stark reminder of the price being paid by the Indian soldier. Political sagacity lies in ensuring that the tricolour-draped coffin does not become the leitmotif of Modi 2.0.