FLEXING ITS MISSILE MUSCLE
Both India and China are beefing up their nuclear capabilities but unwilling to talk about it, leading to mistrust between the two countries
DDAYS AFTER INDIA TESTED ITS AGNI-V INTERCONTINENTAL ballistic missile—a 5,000 km range missile that can reach Beijing and deep beyond—in December last year, China’s secretive People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) conducted an equally significant test. But one that was meant to be under the radar. In January, diplomatic circles in Beijing were abuzz with rumours that the PLARF had carried out its first-ever test of a Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV)—launched on a DF-5C intercontinental ballistic missile—carrying as many as 10 warheads, a capability many experts thought China didn’t possess.
The reported test was seen as significant as it suggested that China, which is thought to possess some 260 nuclear warheads—more than twice India’s estimated 120 but a small fraction of US’s 7,000—was moving towards a rapidly expanded stockpile, as a 10-warhead MIRV capability would require.
The tests pointed to what many experts say is the elephant in the room and an increasing source of mistrust in India’s ties with China. Both sides are rapidly acquiring conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities, even if China’s arsenal still dwarfs India’s. But what is remarkable, and a source of concern for experts, is that none of this figures in talks between the countries at any level. The reason, according to Chinese officials and experts, is that Beijing still views India as an ‘illegal’ nuclear weapons state, and talking would ‘legalise’ India’s status.
China’s secretive second artillery corps, which has for five decades controlled the Chinese army’s conventional and nuclear missiles, has prided itself on operating in the shadows. It took nearly two decades for the corps, set up in 1966, to even be officially acknowledged in public. But in recent months, the force, known in China as ‘Er Pao’, has quietly begun to step into the light, in keeping with the muscle-flexing posture Beijing has struck under President Xi Jinping.
After the MIRV test was leaked, the artillery corps, which was renamed PLARF in January last year as part of Xi’s military reforms, released a first-ever video of its troops handling a DF-16 medium-range ballistic missile. The Chinese media pointed out the missile could reach all of China’s neighbours, from Japan to India and the Philippines. The same month, photographs of the DF-41, an advanced intercontinental ballistic missile, being deployed in China’s northeastern border, near Russia and North Korea (bringing the US’s West Coast within reach), were released. Other leaks suggested the missile may have also been deployed in
Xinjiang, bordering India and Central Asia.
These developments, for a unit that has prided secrecy above all else, followed an unusual September gathering of the PLARF. As part of Xi’s reforms, the second artillery corps was elevated to an independent fourth service alongside the army, navy and air force. The same month, Xi addressed its leaders, reminding them they were China’s “core strategic deterrence”.
The PLARF’s transformation has implications for India. It is often associated with China’s nuclear arsenal, but the country’s few hundred warheads are only a fraction of the several thousand conventional missiles under its command. The PLARF’s deployments are scattered around several ‘bases’, with much of its focus on the eastern coast and Taiwan.
The 56th base covers north and west China, including the Tibetan Plateau. Images accessed by Col Vinayak Bhat (retired), an expert on the Chinese military and satellite imagery, and shared with india today, show several deployments in Tibet close to the Indian border. The images show likely launchpads; some were tested as recently as in 2013 and had clear post-launch markings. There are launchpads in Shigatse (Xigaze), Xaidulla and Gongga, all possibly storing medium-range DF-series missiles that could reach India. Images show Gongga earlier stored HQ-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) but more recent images from 2014 showed HQ-9 SAMs. “The Xaidulla facility, which seems to show 10 underground tunnels, is 250 km from Leh and 850 km from Delhi, so this is very relevant for India,” says Col Bhat.
Perhaps the most striking of the satellite images is what appears to be a full-scale model of eastern Ladakh and Aksai Chin—for artillery training—in the Helan Shan mountains in northern China. Every little detail of the region, including the Pangong lake and five other water bodies, has been reconstructed in northern China for its troops to prepare for a potential conflict with India.
Experts say one reason why the PLARF is flexing its muscles now is its recent technical progress. The Pentagon’s 2016 report on China said the PLARF was “developing and testing several new classes and variants of offensive missiles, including a hypersonic glide vehicle” that travels at five to 10 times the speed of sound and can evade any missile defence system.
Particularly, the MIRV test could also signal a move towards an expanded arsenal. Shen Dingli, a leading expert on China’s nuclear deterrence, says: “It is regretful, but in its official eye, to match China’s great power status, the country needs to have a more robust nuclear deterrent, including MIRV capability.” Srikanth Kondapalli, an expert on Chinese military and professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi, adds: “Estimates say China has less than 300 warheads, but 10 MIRV means China would need more.”
India and China do not have a strategic nuclear dialogue. This is because China doesn’t recognise India as a nuclear weapons state since it’s a non-signatory to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). “I have no problem with such a dialogue,” says Shen. “However, the official line is India is not a ‘legal’ nuclear weapons state per the NPT, so China is not in a position to talk about it. Any China-India work on their nuclear relationship would legitimise India’s nuclear status quo and violate China’s own commitments.” This position explains China’s response to India’s fourth test of Agni-V in December. Beijing slammed the test and invoked the 1998 UN Security Council Resolution 1172, a non-binding resolution calling on India and Pakistan, after their nuclear tests, to also cease tests of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. “China’s view is that such a test violates the UN resolution and is, therefore, illegal,” says Shen. “China will not talk to India as that will make India’s illegal moves legal.”
In this uneasy silence, the fear is both countries are likely to only imagine the worst as they pile up their arsenals.
China does not recognise India as a legitimate nuclear weapons state because it has not signed the NPT