GUEST COLUMN: MODI’S SHANGRI-LA MOMENT
Shangri-la is the iconic Himalayan monastery in James Hilton’s 1933 novel Lost Horizon, where the survivors of a plane-crash imbibe lessons in pacifism from the presiding Lama. The Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) has a less exotic provenance (it is named after its permanent venue, a Singapore hotel) but its aims are no less lofty. Conceived by the International Institute for Strategic Studies as a ‘Track 1.5’ meeting ground for senior defence leadership of the region, the dialogue now receives official backing of the Singapore government and the tacit support of the US.
Since its inception in 2001, no Indian prime minister has ventured to address the SLD, and the ministers, occasionally deputed to do so, have disappointed the discerning audiences with anodyne orations. A great deal of curiosity has persisted across the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) about India’s position on various issues of critical regional interest. Prime
Minister Narendra Modi made up for all that with his crisp, focused and illuminating keynote address that clearly spelt out India’s key policies, positions and initiatives vis-a-vis the volatile hemisphere that encompasses China, India and the ASEAN as well as the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
A hundred years ago, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan had described the Indian and Pacific Oceans as future ‘hinges of the world’s geopolitical destiny’, because control of this region could enable a nation to influence political developments in Eurasia. For this reason perhaps post-World War II, a new entity—the Asia-Pacific—was created to facilitate the entry of the US into Asia and to strike economic and military linkages with it. For over six decades, peace, stability and prosperity in the AsiaPacific were underwritten by the naval forces of the Hawaiibased US Pacific Command.
This pax Americana was shattered by the rise of an assertive China and neither the US pivot to Asia nor the subsequent rebalance has served to restore regional equilibrium. The Asia-Pacific concept seemed to have outlived its utility and a substitute was sought to encompass new developments in Asia’s emerging geopolitical landscape. Among these were the concurrent rise of China and India, their competition for energy, markets, influence and maritime access, the overlapping interests of states located on either side of Malacca Straits, and the emergence of non-traditional maritime threats that recognise no maritime borders. Above all, it seemed that American security interests demanded that the region, extending from the US west coast to the African east coast, be viewed as a single contiguous theatre—the ‘Indo-Pacific’.
Against this background, Modi’s peroration conveyed India’s position on critical issues in a forthright language. Highlighting India’s civilisational and historical connections with the Southeast Asian Suvarnabhumi (of Indian folklore), he underscored the critical importance of the oceans to India and declared India’s commitment to a rule-based order that relied “on the consent of all, not on the power of the few”, and spoke about the “equality for nations” as part of India’s commitment to the liberal international order. In affirmation of India’s commitment to its ‘strategic autonomy’, he referred to his recent ‘informal summits’ with the Chinese and Russian heads of state while upholding India’s global partnership with the US. In a thinly veiled reference to China’s aberrant conduct, Modi spoke disapprovingly about “assertion of power over recourse to international norms” and upheld “freedom of navigation, and unimpeded commerce”. In an oblique but telling reference to the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative), he mentioned that connectivity initiatives, “... must empower nations, not place them under impossible debt burden”.
In contrast with Modi’s circumspection, US Defence Secretary Jim Mattis in his speech the following day made direct references to China, conveying stinging rebukes. Beijing’s recent attempts at coercing Taiwan, and blatant militarisation of the augmented South China Sea reefs also invited retaliatory US measures. While China was peremptorily ‘disinvited’ from the biennial ‘RIMPAC 2018’ naval exercise, Mattis announced the re-naming of the US Pacific Command as the ‘Indo-Pacific Command’. By way of explanation, he said, “We need to recognise the growing significance of the Indian Ocean...and of India itself...I wanted to ensure that the title reflects the reality.”
These words will, no doubt, be music to Indian ears. But no matter how earnestly Modi wishes away “great power rivalries”, India has to find a modus vivendi with China. National interests remain supreme in international relations. So, ‘Greeks bearing gifts’ must be treated with caution.
No matter how earnestly Modi wishes away “great power rivalries”, India has to find a modus vivendi with China