SPLIT DOWN THE MIDDLE
THE BJP FEARED ITS HARD NATIONALIST PLANK WOULD BE AFFECTED IN 2019. HENCE THE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE ON ALLIANCE PARTNER PDP
In a ‘pre-emptive strike’, the BJP pulls the plug on the PDP and the alliance government in Kashmir
It was past noon on June 18 when Amit Shah, then in Guwahati, made a brief call to Ram Madhav, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s general secretary responsible for Jammu & Kashmir. “We need to discuss Kashmir,”he said. “Please call all our ministers [in J&K] to Delhi. I am coming [back] tonight and will hold a meeting.” Up in Srinagar, tipped off that her BJP colleagues were headed for the national capital, Mehbooba Mufti made several calls, but everyone was tightlipped. The next day, the chief minister was clearing pending files in her secretariat office in Srinagar when her chief secretary, Bharat Bhushan Vyas, informed her of the call from Governor N.N. Vohra’s office.
Even as the saffron leadership was informing the governor that it was withdrawing from the ruling alliance, Madhav, flanked by senior party leaders, including a number of ministers from the state, spelled it out to the press in Delhi: “It has become untenable for the BJP to continue in the alliance government in Jammu & Kashmir,” he declared, laying the blame for the collapse of the three-and-a-half-year-old coali- tion government on the People’s Democratic Party (PDP).
The entire exercise was carefully designed to ensure Mehbooba and her party did not have the slightest opportunity to prepare or pre-empt the BJP’s move. Even Sajjad Lone, the Jammu Kashmir People’s Conference legislator who made it into the government as a minister on the BJP’s insistence and is considered close to the party’s top national leadership, admitted there wasn’t a whisper of what was coming.
That the PDP-BJP partnership would end had been more or less a foregone conclusion for some time now. But the surprise is in its timing and the fact that it was the BJP, and not the PDP, that finally opted to pull the plug.
Consider the contrary voices emanating from the two alliance partners. In July 2017, in the wake of the Lashkare-Taiba’s dreadful attack, killing eight Gujarati and Maharashtrian pilgrims on their way home from the Amarnath shrine, Madhav, at least publicly, remained optimistic about the coalition. “Our efforts will be to ensure that the government completes its full term,” he told india today in Delhi.
Months later, when Mehbooba rather unceremoniously
sacked her finance minister (and intermediary with Delhi) Haseeb Drabu in March this year, it was widely viewed as a “strong signal” to the BJP as well as an attempt to salvage the PDP’s diminishing credibility in the Kashmir Valley. Back then, senior PDP leaders displayed none of Madhav’s conciliatory tone, stating instead that “the party (PDP) has lost credibility because of this alliance”. Drabu’s replacement as finance minister, Syed Altaf Bukhari, said, “There will be no compromise on our party ideology and we will not hesitate to call it a day if the situation arises.”
So why was it Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Shah who decided that it was time to step away?
Madhav told reporters in New Delhi that the decision was taken in the interest of the nation. “Keeping in mind the larger national interest of India’s integrity and security, keeping in mind the fact that Jammu & Kashmir is an integral part of India, in order to bring control over the situation prevailing in the state,” he said. The BJP general secretary cited the “unenthusiastic response (from the militant and separatist camp)” to Delhi’s unilateral ceasefire through the holy month of Ramzan; the deteriorating security scenario and concerns about protection of basic fundamental rights of life and free speech; and the daylight murder of Rising Kashmir editor Shujaat Bukhari in the heart of Srinagar city as an indicator of the deterioration and the extent of radicalisation.
Earlier, on June 19, at a meeting with the ministers from Kashmir, Shah reportedly said that continuing the “failed” coalition with the PDP would prove “disastrous” for the BJP at the national level. The party chief told them the PDP top leadership (Mehbooba) had failed to reciprocate the support from the Centre, including the May 16 announcement of the unilateral ceasefire.
Insiders reveal the decision to force governor’s rule in J&K had been unanimously endorsed by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) leadership. Discussed in considerable detail at a meeting in Pune in May, senior Sangh functionaries said, “The leadership was unanimous that continuing the alliance would result in the demoralisation of the BJP cadre throughout the country.” They were convinced that “the BJP’s nationalist plank would have been completely punctured, had the alliance been carried through till 2019”.
One immediate provocation for the breakdown, BJP leaders say, was Mehbooba’s insistence on continuing the Ramzan ceasefire as a confidence-building measure. Union home minister Rajnath Singh, despite opposition from defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman as well as the army and other security forces engaged in the Valley, had, on May 16, gone ahead and announced a month-long pause in anti-terrorist operations, alongside a renewed offer of talks with all stakeholders, including the Hurriyat separatists.
But a month on, it was plain that the militants had spurned the gesture. While there was a reduction in stonepelting protests by the Valley’s youth, the month of Ramzan reported 62 terror-related incidents, including 22 grenade attacks and 23 instances of indiscriminate firing by the
The RSS was convinced “the BJP’s nationalist plank would be completely punctured” if the alliance in J&K continued till 2019
militants. The month preceding the ceasefire had seen only 25 such incidents.
With the separatists also setting impossible preconditions to come to the dialogue table, the RSS leadership was aware that the ceasefire served only to politically benefit Mehbooba and the PDP. The BJP’s image of a nationalist party that refuses to compromise with anti-India separatists had taken a beating. “Extending the ceasefire without any tangible positives would have hurt the party nationally,” says a BJP leader.
But what perhaps clinched it for Shah were the killings of Shujaat Bukhari and Rashtriya Rifles soldier Aurangzeb, two days before Eid, on June 14. Evidently designed to puncture any notion that peace—however temporary—had returned, the attacks had their intended impact—bringing even more pressure on New Delhi to eschew any notion of extending the truce.
Former deputy chief minister Kavinder Gupta accuses Mehbooba of pursuing too “soft” a line on dealing with terrorism in J&K. The BJP leader faults the chief minister for cancelling cases against 11,000 stone pelters—first-time offenders and juveniles—and repeatedly attempting to register FIRs against army and paramilitary personnel. Many BJP leaders in Jammu cite Mehbooba’s concerted attempts to book army soldiers, including an officer who opened fire in Shopian on January 27, killing three youth amid a large mob of stone throwers.
Many in the BJP believe Mehbooba’s continual attempts to shield and soft-pedal cases against hardliners, including Jamaat-e-Islami cadres who had supported the PDP’s bid for power in the 2014 assembly polls, were responsible for the upsurge in militancy, particularly local recruitments. Even in the wake of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani’s killing in July 2016, they point out, instead of trying to get a handle on the deteriorating situation, the CM and senior PDP leaders began a curious blame game. Mehbooba claimed she was not aware of the encounter involving Wani, and PDP MP Muzaffar Baig insisted the security forces had deliberately kept the information from her. In fact, Baig had even suggested that standard operating procedures that could have resulted in Wani being captured alive weren’t followed.
Analysts, too, agree that the PDP’s soft-pedalling on separatists and militants in trying to win back its massively alienated constituency in south Kashmir contributed to the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the Valley. This is perhaps what Madhav meant when he said it was “untenable” to continue the alliance.
Keeping the ceasefire going was clearly not an option, particularly in view of the upcoming Amarnath Yatra, when close to 300,000 Hindu pilgrims are expected to make the annual pilgrimage to the cave shrine over 40 days starting June 28. Securing the pilgrims, security officials say, would have been impossible without giving security forces complete freedom to take pre-emptive action against hostile elements. “The absence of a government that oftentimes became an obstacle to information-sharing between the state police and army and paramilitary forces will naturally lead to better efficiency in tackling the terrorist threat,” says a former army officer who held a key appointment in the Valley until recently.
So what then is the road ahead in Jammu & Kashmir? In the immediate instance, with all the main political parties—the National Conference, Congress and even the PDP—rejecting the possibility of any alternative alliance, the state appears destined for another extended phase of governor’s rule. This, incidentally, will be the eighth time since Independence that Delhi will directly rule the state. The first was in March 1977, when the Congress, then
headed by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, withdrew support to Sheikh Abdullah’s minority regime. And the last was in January 2016, when Mehbooba vacillated for three months before taking charge following her father’s demise.
Shortly before she addressed the press in Srinagar on June 19, Mehbooba informed Governor Vohra that “we (PDP) don’t want to explore any other alliance”. But she did defend her government’s record and achievements, saying that cases against 11,000 youths had been dropped and that attempts to revoke Article 370 had been thwarted. “The alliance was about dialogue, unilateral ceasefire and making sure the prime minister has an open route to talk to Pakistan,” she insisted. Yet for all the apparent suddenness of the end, there was little rancour from the departing CM, who said she was “not shocked by the BJP’s move”.
Former chief minister and National Conference leader Omar Abdullah, too, discounted any possibility of reviving his January 2015 offer of supporting a PDP-led government along with the Congress. “That was a one-time offer,” Omar said, insisting the only way ahead was the imposition of governor’s rule to pave the way for normalcy and fresh elections at the earliest. The Congress was similarly inclined. Ghulam Nabi Azad, also a former CM, said, “For us (Congress), there is [now] no difference between the BJP and PDP. Governor’s rule is the only option.”
However, the ‘early elections’ Omar hopes for may not be on the cards for quite a while. Consider this: the byelection to south Kashmir’s Anantnag Lok Sabha constituency has been hanging fire for more than two years since Mehbooba vacated the seat to take over as chief minister in April 2016. It was countermanded in April 2017 following widespread violence in the bypoll in Srinagar, where eight civilians, including a 15-year-old schoolboy, were killed, and a mere 7.1 per cent of the votes were cast.
While it has been suggested that the Anantnag byelection was put off indefinitely only because Mehbooba was unwilling to face the prospect of defeat in what has long been a PDP bastion, security officials admit that holding elections in the state won’t be easy. The post-2016 upsurge in militancy was confined to the four southern districts of Kashmir—Anantnag, Pulwama, Shopian and Kulgam. Army officials point out that the scourge has now spread to hitherto relatively peaceful districts such as Bandipora, Kupwara and Baramulla and even Srinagar city.
But there’s a third possibility that is being whispered about in Srinagar and Jammu. Back in 2016, Mehbooba had been against succeeding her late father until firm assurances were given on promises made in the common governance agenda. Unhappy with her demands, the BJP leadership had reportedly succeeded in weaning away,
Security officials admit holding elections in J&K won’t be easy. The last bypoll in April 2017 saw much violence; only 7.1% votes were cast
some claim, as many as 22 of the PDP’s 28 legislators to form an alternative front and a fresh alliance minus Mehbooba. While the move was then pre-empted by Governor Vohra who advised PM Modi and Shah that toppling Mehbooba could result in greater instability, things may work out differently now. While there’s no indication that the BJP will try an alternative alliance, PDP leaders say there will be pointers in whether or not the governor decides to dissolve the assembly. “Give it a few months, our party may be all too ready to split,” says a senior PDP hand.
“A muscular policy will never work to address the situation on the ground. Kashmir is not enemy territory, and with or without us (PDP), things will never change on the ground without the healing touch,” Mehbooba’s parting advice at her news conference in Srinagar, is unlikely to be heeded by the BJP, now in total control from Delhi.
On the very day the BJP withdrew support, J&K Police Special Operations Group (SOG), army and paramilitary soldiers gunned down three Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) militants. The first post-ceasefire encounter in Tral in southern Kashmir’s Pulwama district witnessed security forces deploy heavy calibre weapons to blow up a village house where the militants had holed up. The dead included Qasim, JeM’s newly appointed operational chief in the Valley, and two locals—Adil Ahmad and Danish Ahmad— both recently recruited by the militant outfit.
Army officers say governor’s rule will see a drop in stone-pelting incidents and an increase in operations against militants. There is, however, uncertainty about whether this will be accompanied by a drop in fresh recruitments to militant ranks.
Former northern army commander, Lt General D.S. Hooda, however, cautions against using governor’s rule as an opportunity to pursue a purely military approach. “There should definitely be changes to the Kashmir policy. The internal situation has definitely worsened in the past three years. We need to tread carefully and not assume that a more muscular policy will succeed,” he says, advising simultaneous political and social engagement.
Meanwhile, Madhav, in conversation with india today TV, said, “We are not abandoning Kashmir. We have sacrificed our state government. We will take forward the agenda of Kashmir.” He also reiterated the BJP’s multi-pronged plan to restore Kashmir—neutralise the terrorists, further dialogue and encourage engagement with the Kashmiris. Pakistan, he said, wasn’t part of the BJP’s equation on resolving Kashmir. Madhav said, “We don’t like Kashmir being hyphenated with Pakistan.” An important part of the engagement with the Valley, he said, would include an active implementation of the Rs 80,000 crore developmental package announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in November 2015.
Back in 2016, the BJP had apparently weaned away many PDP legislators in a bid to form an alternative front. Will they try it again?