AN INDO-PAK ICEBREAKER AT SCO?
Pakistan finds itself trapped between a rock and a hard place. Left to its own devices, its preferred option for dealing with India would still likely be to continue the policy of using state-sponsored terrorists to ‘soften’ India. This, in Pakistan’s calculations, would force India to come to the negotiating table in a weakened position. So what explains the change of approach, the new desperation to seek dialogue?
In the run-up to the just-concluded Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan premier Imran Khan reached out to his Indian counterpart at least
three times in the space of a couple of weeks after the BJP’s electoral victory—first in a tweet, then a phone call and finally, on June 7, a letter. The letter renewed Pakistan’s offer to hold a dialogue to resolve contentious issues, including J&K and terrorism. The Pakistan foreign minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, has also written a letter to India’s new foreign minister, S. Jaishankar, conveying much the same. The Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman reiterated that Islamabad was ready to hold fresh talks with New Delhi “if India is ready to do so”.
The sober reality of Pakistan’s new tack is that it feels constrained to re-engage with India for at least three reasons. There is pressure from the US, with the White House spokesman making it clear that the onus for sustained peace in South Asia is on Pakistan, and it must put the terror groups out of business. PTI quoted a US official as stating: “The United States is looking for sustained and irreversible steps that shut down their operations.”
Meanwhile, the Asia-Pacific Joint Group (APG) of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), in a meeting held in China in May 2019, identified several weak points in Pakistan’s anti-money laundering/ terror financing architecture and practices where further
Despite global pressure to do so, Pakistan is not likely to actually jettison its jihadi architecture
improvements were required. Of 27 action points, the FATF reported as many as 18 being incomplete and demanded actionable steps against eight proscribed outfits including the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jamaat-udDawa (JuD). An overall reassessment is due by September 2019, by which time Pakistan needs to demonstrate compliance or risk being put on the FATF ‘blacklist’.
Finally, Pakistan’s economy is in dire straits. According to its Economic Survey, released on June 10, GDP growth in 2018-19 slowed to 3.3 per cent against a projected 6.2 per cent and the previous year’s 5.5 per cent; industrial growth was down to 1.4 per cent against a targeted 7.6 per cent and
4.9 per cent in 2017-18. A widening fiscal deficit, massive revenue collection shortfalls and the depreciation of the Pakistan rupee by nearly 45 per cent since December 2017 have led to inflationary pressures and an increase in the country’s debt-servicing cost. A further glaring sign of the economic downturn is that defence expenditure during the next fiscal year is slated to remain unchanged.
Despite all these pressures and impending action at the FATF meeting due next week (June 16-21), in Orlando, US, Pakistan is unlikely to actually jettison the jihadi architecture it has created over decades. As in the past, it will take a few cosmetic steps, like stopping Hafiz Saeed from leading the Eid prayers in Lahore, prosecuting a few minor functionaries, and making a show of taking over some madrasas and charities of the jihadi organisations. But as soon as the international community seems reassured, it will return to business as usual. Pakistan will probably wager that the FATF will not go the distance and put it on the ‘blacklist’. After all, it requires only three countries out of 36 to block such a move.