HOW TO UPGRADE THE FORCES
The Modi government’s avowed commitment to national security is not just lip service—it means business. We can expect a series of measures to be set in motion. But it’s important in matters of such great complexity to get the roadmap right. Here is one that might help.
The first step to signal that the government means business is to announce an additional capital budget of Rs 10,000-15,000 crore for the current year, with clear directions to the ministry of defence that this allocation will be spent against planned projects; carrying it forward or parking it with PSUs should invite censure. Concurrently, a comprehensive review should be initiated of the entire defence budgeting process.
Barring two exceptions, there has always been a big gap between the expectations/ requirements of the defence forces and actual allocations. The first exception was in the aftermath of the 1962 debacle. The defence budget for the next seven to eight years was raised to about 3 per cent of GDP. As a result, the army got much better equipped and nearly doubled in size during this period. The payoff: we were better placed to handle the Pakistani offensive of 1965 and, six years later, we achieved the spectacular liberation of Bangladesh. The second phase was in the 1980s, when the quartet of Rajiv Gandhi, Arun Singh, K. Subrahmanyam and Gen. K. Sundarji tried to give the forces a new vision and the resources needed to realise that vision. For the goof-ups during this honeymoon period, the blame lies with the MoD and the institutional weakness of the Services headquarters. Two acquisitions during the Rajiv Gandhi years—of the FH-77B Bofors howitzers and the Mirage 2000 fighter jets—played a crucial role in the 1999 Kargil war.
Age, status or education are no certificates of expertise for members of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)/ National Security Council. Quite often, CCS deliberations are held during a crisis. Members need to be well informed. A three-month crash course should be designed on national security and defence strategy for CCS members, under the aegis of the defence ministry and the national security
advisor. This course should include briefings/ visits to services headquarters, defence installations, field formations and forward areas and participation in war games. Refresher programmes should be built into this curriculum.
In the past 70 years or so, the MoD apparatus has remained practically unchanged, a notable exception being the creation of the Department of Defence Production after the 1962 war. The government should review if the MoD charter gives it the organisational wherewithal to discharge its role effectively. In its present form, it carries forward a legacy of exercising control over the armed forces with no real capacity nor any inclination to contribute. The contribution of the Department of Defence Production to indigenisation, self-reliance and value manufacturing has been dismal. Our defence PSUs are possibly the most inefficient globally and the record of the DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) is hardly any better. A wellstructured committee could come up with recommendations to review the MoD charter, its organisation and staffing, in about six months. A key aspect of the review has to be seamless communication and synergies between the MoD and Services headquarters.
The reorganisation of the MoD must be followed up by addressing the much-debated issue of appointing a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). An objective assessment of the arguments for and against the creation of such a position will most likely land in its favour. The politico-bureaucratic reluctance is mainly about maintaining the status quo and the ludicrous fear that a powerful CDS might pose a threat to our democracy.
The Intelligence apparatus and cyber warfare also merit attention. The government should, over its new term, aim to become the best in the world in these two domains. Compared to the likely payoffs, the fund requirements are minimal.
The MoD apparatus has remained practically unchanged in the past 70 years, barring the creation of the Department of Defence Production