RETURN OF THE RAJAPAKSAS

The Rajapaksa clan has dominated Sri Lankan politics for a decade-and-a-half now, and the election of Gotabaya Rajapaksa to the country’s presidency restates that reality. The Rajapaksas are people’s politicians—they speak the tongue of the Sinhala street. Their capacity to outmanoeuvre opponents is well-known. If precedent is a precept, Gotabaya, like his brother Mahinda before him, will pursue a nationalist policy that favours the Sinhala majority on the domestic front and constantly tests Indian mettle with the China card under the guise of strategic independence and national sovereignty. Gotabaya’s swearing-in against the backdrop of the ancient heritage sites at Anuradhapura also expressed a triumphalist Buddhist identity for his nation—a signal, perhaps, against any minority aspirations, whether Tamil or Muslim.

The new president, like his predecessors, will make his first visit abroad, to India, later this month. The challenge is to look beyond such beginnings and ensuring that the two countries build relations respectful of each other’s sensitivities—whether strategic, economic, security-related or concerning minorities. India is Sri Lanka’s only neighbour in the physical, geographical sense, and their relationship is structured both by the island nation’s crucial nearness, as seen through the dynamic of domestic politics within India, and by its strategic location in the emerging contours of the Indo-Pacific.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has greeted Gotabaya warmly on his electoral success and spoken about working together for “peace, prosperity and security in our region”. The reference to security should not be missed. Chinese president Xi Jinping says he looks forward to working with Gotabaya to enhance “political mutual trust, docking our development visions” and deepening “practical cooperation within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative”. The “docking” of development visions of China and Sri Lanka is both interesting and intriguing. India, be watchful.

India needs to convey that we are not competing with China in Sri Lanka, but that we have a solid, sustainable rationale to have excellent relations with each other for our mutual well-being. This is the wavelength of understanding we must establish with the Rajapaksas despite past misgivings about their India policy. Our capacity to deliver quickly on development and infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka must be augmented manifold. But this will also entail a more receptive and cooperative environment within the Sri Lankan establishment. Economic diplomacy also has to be infused with much more strategic reassurance to the Sri Lankans that they are not going to be put at a disadvantage by such cooperation with India.

The ties between Indians and Sri Lankans endure through this all. This is a symbiotic compact nourished by shared cultural traditions, religious beliefs, linguistic origins, ethnicity and a natural affinity that endures despite political suspicion, the China factor and the big versus small neighbour syndrome. Peninsular India, its four southern states in particular, represents a natural catchment area for the development of closer India-Sri Lanka relations, just as much as the nearness of India should facilitate both sides on the ethnic divide in Sri Lanka to seal a closer integration of interests and developmental and governance goals, which, in turn, can build solid mutually beneficial ties with their only neighbour, India.

The Easter Sunday bombings this April in Sri Lanka strengthened the urge among a large majority of Sri Lankans for a strong political leadership that would not squander national interest. In the eyes of those who voted them back to power, the Rajapaksas provide that kind of leadership.

One important lesson from the Easter tragedy is that there is scope for far closer cooperation between India and Sri Lanka to prevent such attacks, through greater security and intelligence coordination and alignment. Pluralistic, diverse sets of communities and religious groups inhabit both countries, which entails that both have to resist the scourge of religious extremism and radicalism unremittingly. At the same time, the atrocities committed by a few should not become a trigger for exclusionary tendencies exercised against minorities because the lessons of the past, as in the roots of Sri Lanka’s civil war, are important cautionary pointers for the future. ■

Gotabaya Rajapaksa will pursue a pro-Sinhala majority policy at home. While dealing with India, he will use the China card