BRINKMANSHIP ON THE BORDER
While the country’s attention has been focused on the struggle to contain the COVID-19 virus, incidents on the India-China border have thrown the more familiar challenge of safeguarding our extended frontiers. On May 5 and 9, there were clashes between Indian and Chinese patrols in the Sikkim and Ladakh sectors respectively, which fortunately did not go beyond fisticuffs and pushing and shoving. They were defused through the intervention of military officers as per the bilateral consultative mechanism set up in the wake of the face-off in 2017 at Doklam, which is at the trijunction of the borders of India, Bhutan and China. There have been subsequent reports of another stand-off in the Galwan area in Ladakh, the scene of similar tensions a few years ago. In their public statements, the governments on both sides have played down the incidents. Two things stand out, however. One relates to the timing of the incidents, and the other to the unusual level of physical violence reported. There were also reports of the Chinese swiftly deploying helicopter sorties and the Indian side flying fighter planes in the vicinity of the skirmishes, indicating a willingness to risk escalation.
Chinese aggressiveness on the border is part of a pattern of China pushing its advantage on territorial claims while the raging pandemic occupies the attention of its adversaries. We are witnessing such behaviour in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits too. A Vietnamese fishing vessel was sunk and an Indonesian vessel was rammed, with several sailors taken prisoner.
In the case of India, these incidents appear to be warning signs. China has been unhappy about a decision announced by the Indian government that closes the automatic route for Chinese FDI into India. The measure itself was justified, but it need not have been made China-specific. Although the Indian government has refrained from joining the American-led chorus of blaming China for the spread of COVID-19, it has been less than subtle in laying out the welcome mat for western and Japanese investors wishing to shift production bases and supply chains away from China in the wake of the pandemic. This could have been done without linking it to an anticipated exodus from China, which may not even materialise. There may also be a warning against India extending support to Taiwan’s participation in the WHO as an observer, which is being strongly pushed by the US and its allies.
On the handling of the incidents, one is unable to make a considered assessment since details available are sparse. However, a display of willingness to escalate may be good tactics, denying the Chinese a hitherto low-risk form of political signalling. This carries forward the change in India’s border management approach, which was first adopted in Doklam in 2017. The willingness to confront must be accompanied by a readiness to consult and resolve. It would be in neither side’s interest to let matters get out of hand.
The trijunction between India, Nepal and China at the Lipulekh Pass has also been in the news with the inauguration of the Pithoragarh-Lipulekh Pass highway on May 8. The pass, which Nepal claims, has always been part of Indian territory and was one of the passes identified for border trade and traffic in the 1954 India-China Agreement for ‘trade and intercourse’ between India and Tibet. Nepal has protested that the highway runs through its territory and has raised the issue with both India and China. The Indian Army chief has hinted at some other country instigating Nepal to raise the issue. One should note that China’s formal position on the listing of the various passes in the 1954 agreement does not constitute an agreed border alignment between the two countries. If pressed by Nepal, it could take the position that the use of the pass does not imply endorsement of India’s position. We should watch this space carefully.
Shyam Saran is a former foreign secretary and Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research