BUFFERING CLAIMS
One by one, disengagement at major points of friction between the Indian Army and China’s PLA in Ladakh is reducing tension. But there is concern that the creation of new demilitarised buffer zones along the LAC amount to a further loss of territory on the border with China
TThere are no better places than international conferences to thrash out national differences, even the most intractable ones. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Samarkand in Uzbekistan on September 15-16, anticipation grew about the possibility of a meeting between Chinese president Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines. The two were sharing a stage for the first time since the protracted border stand-off on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh that began in 2020 grievously damaged bilateral ties. The speculation was not without reason: after a breakthrough in corps commander-level talks (the 16th round) on September 8, troops of the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China began disengaging from Patrolling Point (PP) 15 in the fiercely
disputed Gogra Hot Springs area. It seems that though the Chinese were keen to set up a Modi-Xi meeting, possibly to demonstrate a state of normality in ties, New Delhi demurred, for it has been insisting on the pre-March 2020 status quo on the LAC, and felt that the optics emanating out of such a meeting would have been more advantageous to Beijing. Indeed, just a day after the disengagement process started, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, while calling it a “positive development”, curtly added that Beijing will not accept “the status quo created by India’s illegal crossing of the LAC”. Insiders believe the breakthrough at PP15 was aimed at defusing any visible tension that might have existed between the leaders. For the photo op with other heads of state, Modi and Xi stood next to each other, but there were no smiles exchanged or hands shaken. The leaders would have another forum to warm up to each other, but what’s worrying a section of army officers, defence experts and civilians more is the suspicion that the ‘buffer zones’ created at every point of disengagement at the LAC between the armies are on the Indian side of the de facto border, and thus by agreeing to abide by them, India risks losing control over some of its own territory.
Take the latest point of disengagement—PP15 in Gogra Hot Springs, also known as Jianan La. Its highest point, it is believed, allowed Indian patrols access to the entire Galwan Valley and the Depsang Bulge. The PLA is loath to let Indians near it, as they (the Chinese) have constructed a road from the bulge to Jianan La. This is why the Chinese took so long to agree to a troop pullback. It also comes with a rider. Both armies have agreed on an over 3kmlong ‘buffer zone’ or ‘no patrolling area’, meaning neither will venture into it till the matter is resolved.
The demilitarised areas were first created in the Galwan Valley (3kmwide) and Pangong Lake (10 km). Mutually agreed buffer zones also dot the area’s major friction points, from Daulat Beg Oldie on the Chip Chap river to Raki Nala bottleneck, Galwan river (PP14), Kurang Nala (PP15), Gogra Post (PP17A), Pangong Tso North (Fingers 3-8), Pangong Tso South, the Kailash range on the Rezang La and the Depsang bulge (PP8). All these were areas accessible to Indian soldiers and treated as Indian territory till recently, when silent
A SENIOR ARMY OFFICER SAYS DEESCALATION IS NOT POSSIBLE SOON AS THE PLA HAS BUILT PERMANENT CAMPS, INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE LAC
PLA incursions blocked access to some. No-patrol areas at the PLA’s farthest reaches of ingress thus go against Indian interests, giving weight to the concern that the creation of buffer zones has led to India losing control of territory it perceived as its own and had traditionally patrolled as such.
Furthermore, it is feared that the buffer zone at PP15 has cut off access for the Indian Army to PP16, known as Karam Singh Hill—where Indian forces have maintained a post for decades— near the Kugrang Valley. Again, even after the Galwan incident on June 15-16, 2020, Indian soldiers would go up to PP14 on the Galwan river. Now, jawans (and PLA troops) can no longer patrol it, as it’s in the buffer zone.
While military planners claim that the areas would prevent Galwan-type clashes by keeping the opposing armies safely apart, defence experts fear that they have changed the very character of the LAC in favour of China. Lt Gen. Vinod Bhatia, former director general of military operations, says the border is a line of perception and the creation of buffer zones at friction points is the only available option to avoid physical clashes till the issue is resolved. “However, after the Galwan clash, all agreements and protocols on border management were breached by the PLA with its aggressive posturing,” Lt Gen. Bhatia says.
Former foreign secretary Shyam Saran says that the September 8 joint statement does not say much about what this disengagement really means and its implications. “If direct confrontation between the two forces has been ameliorated to some extent, that is certainly a welcome move. But the major cause of concern is the rapid build-up in rear areas[10-20 km behind the LAC], including new bases in Xinjiang and Tibet that have been set up. We really do need to take a comprehensive view on what really is happening,” Saran adds.
Both armies have around 50,000-60,000 troops, as well as tanks, artillery pieces and missile systems deployed along the 832kmlong undemarcated LAC. Military experts opine that for the two nations to get back to the old status quo, disengagement needs to be completed at all flashpoints, with troops returning to their March 2020 positions. While the official claim is that efforts are on to de-escalate all remaining friction points, the standoff at Demchok, where the opposing armies are in a tense stand-off, could prove to be tough to wind down. Here, the PLA has blocked Indian patrols from going any further.
Lt Gen. Rakesh Sharma, former corps commander of the Leh-based 14 Corps, which looks after eastern Ladakh, says that in the past 10 years, scuffles have increased between the two sides while patrolling, in spite of clear protocols in place for avoiding such incidents. Ever since Xi took over as president, he says, the Chinese have been more aggressive, with the PLA refusing to return to its original starting points after incursions, as witnessed in 2013 in Depsang, 2014 in Chumar and 2018 in Doklam. “The Chinese refused to go back despite protocols like banner drills, leading to scuffles. And, these fights always had the possibility of escalating into something more serious, which happened in Galwan and Pangong Tso,” Lt Gen. Sharma says, adding that now the calculating Chinese are insisting on buffer zones to avoid a conventional or limited conflict. The Indian military, he says, never liked the idea of having these demilitarised zones due to a lack of faith in the PLA.
However, in the last few talks to resolve the standoff, in which central government officials participated, the Chinese proposed buffer zones. They have now become a feature of any disengagement negotiation. In the past, too, the Chinese sought to have buffer zones on the undemarcated border. In 1959, the Chinese offered a 20km-wide zone on either side of the LAC, with former Chinese premier Zhou Enlai writing about it to PM Jawaharlal Nehru. But India rejected it as a matter of policy. This time around, India has agreed to the Chinese demand for buffer zones at every friction point.
“It suits the Chinese to keep the Indian military under pressure by not demarcating the LAC and retaining geostrategic
pressure across the borders and stretching India,” says Lt Gen. Sharma. A senior army officer says full de-escalation does not seem to be possible in the near future because the PLA has built permanent camps for its formations, created infrastructure and effected demographic change through the construction of border villages, which are being populated by migrants from Xinjiang. “Changing the status of these demilitarised areas is not going to be easy, and they will be part of the LAC for some time,” he says.
Besides the military, the locals too are concerned. Konchok Stanzin, who represents Chushul in the Ladakh Hill Development Council, laments that the creation of the latest buffer zone has effectively blocked local citizens’ access to PP16. He fears that this could in turn threaten local communities’ rights to their traditional grazing land in the Kugrang Valley, turning it into another patch of disputed territory. Stanzin says disengagement affects around 150 nomad families in the Chushul region, with a majority of pasture land being converted into no-patrol zones. “After each disengagement, a buffer zone was created in Indian territory. We are relenting to Chinese demands by giving them free access to our territory. Grazing grounds, which are already scarce in Ladakh, have been given away,” Konchok says, adding that the policy is contrary to the government’s desire to settle villagers in border areas to counter Chinese designs at the LAC. He also alleges that an overly defensive Indian army restricts the use of pasture land for nomads, while the Chinese do the opposite—use their villagers to transgress into Indian territory. “Nomads on the Indian side can be the eyes and ears of the army, they should not be restricted,” Konchok adds.
Ultimately, the buffer zones on the LAC are meant to be a step towards resolving the long-pending border dispute between India and China. They must not be allowed to be instruments for an expansionist PLA to grab more territory. ■