Create True Capability

The continuously dwindling strength of the combat fleet has been a matter of concern for the IAF since the beginning of the last decade

THE CANDID ADMISSION BY Air Marshal B.S. Dhanoa, Vice Chief of the Air Staff (VCAS), Indian Air Force (IAF), while briefing the media on March 10 this year just prior to the commencement of Exercise Iron Fist at Pokhran in Rajasthan that the strength of the fleet of combat aircraft in the IAF was not adequate to execute a full air campaign in a scenario of a war simultaneously on two fronts. Coming on the eve of a demonstration by the IAF of its firepower and operational capability, the public statement by a senior functionary of the IAF was regarded by some as being inopportune and ill-timed as it had the potential to undermine the exercise the IAF was about to embark upon. While the statement by the VCAS did raise eyebrows, the fact of the matter is that the VCAS, who is responsible for operations, was downright honest in stating a brutal fact which incidentally has not been a closely guarded secret for some time now. The VCAS cannot be faulted for his observation.

The IAF has been authorised by the government to increase the strength of its fleet of combat aircraft from the existing 39.5 squadrons to 42 squadrons. However, unfortunately, the number of combat squadrons is steadily dropping with the MiG-21 and MiG-27 series being retired from service. As stated by the VCAS, currently, the strength of combat squadrons in the IAF stands at 33, its lowest in recent times. If no inductions are made and soon enough, in another five years or so, the strength of the combat fleet will dwindle further to 25 squadrons or down to less than 60 per cent of its authorised strength. The plight of the IAF has been further worsened by the fact that the serviceability of the fleet of Su-30MKI has been around 50 per cent as against the required level of 75 per cent. To a large extent, this is attributed to the inadequate product support available from the Russian original equipment manufacturer Sukhoi over which the IAF does not appear to have any influence or control. The Indian aerospace major the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) that manufactures the Su-30MKI at Nasik, has also not been of much help, repeated assurance notwithstanding.

The continuously dwindling strength of the combat fleet has been a matter of concern for the IAF since the beginning of the last decade when it initiated a case for the procurement of 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), the equivalent of six squadrons. This platform was envisioned to be a fourth- generation combat aircraft and was being sought by the IAF from foreign sources primarily as the Indian aerospace industry was not in a position to supply the type of combat aircraft in the numbers required by the IAF. There was also a provision to order another 63 platforms taking the total to nearly 200 or equivalent of nine squadrons. The effort by the IAF to obviate erosion of operational capability through the procurement of the MMRCA for which the Rafale from Dassault Aviation of France had been identified as the preferred platform, unfortunately ran aground after 14 years of struggle and the tender was cancelled. The alternative course of action initiated personally by Prime Minister Narendra Modi for obtaining just 36 aircraft or two squadrons, through a direct deal with the French Government has not been moving forward at the desired pace either as there are some knotty issues again in the deal. The IAF appears to be helpless and once again in trouble in respect of its operational capability.

As for the nation’s indigenous capability to meet with the requirement of combat aircraft, the track record of the Indian aerospace industry has so far not been very inspiring. The HF 24 project of HAL in the early 1960s had recorded a reasonably high degree of success. Unfortunately, the aircraft was retired from service quite prematurely in 1985. Besides, the Indian aerospace industry has failed to build on the experience gained in the HF 24 project as has been amply evident in the way the indigenous light combat aircraft (LCA) Tejas project has been managed so far. Over three decades have gone by since the project for the development of the LCA Tejas was launched and despite the huge investments made in the project over the years, there is still no certainty of the time frame in which this indigenous platform will be available to the IAF in terms of quality and numbers required. The project to indigenously develop the advanced medium combat aircraft, a fifth-generation platform, was initiated in 2008, but continues to remain a distant dream.

It ought to be evident that the IAF will continue to suffer perennially from serious deficiencies in its fleet of combat aircraft unless true capability to design, develop and manufacture such platforms indigenously or in collaboration, is built by the Indian aerospace industry.