SP's LandForces

China’s White Paper on National Military Strategy

At the global level China is concerned about the US which is carrying on its ‘rebalancin­g’ strategy and is enhancing its military presence and its military alliances in this region

- Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd)

At the global level China is concerned about the US which is carrying on its ‘rebalancin­g’ strategy and is enhancing its military presence and its military alliances in this region.

THE RISE OF CHINA as an economic superpower and its economic superiorit­y over the West has impacted upon the world in different ways. The whole world is wondering how China will leverage its economic and political power in the future and this will be indeed one of the most important factors in determinin­g the security dynamics of Asia in the 21st century. It is in this context that the China’s first White Paper on National Military Strategy in May 2015 is relevant and vital for a broader understand­ing of their aims and aspiration­s, and the thrust and direction of their military modernisat­ion.

China’s Destiny

Some western observers seem to suggest that the paper reflects a new Chinese aggressive­ness, especially in connection with tensions in the South China Sea. A detailed perusal, however, suggests that the document is not a response to current events, but rather it is a strategic plan which defines their future thrust areas for acquiring new military capabiliti­es. A close reading of the paper reveals many remarkable aspects. Some of these aspects are explained in the succeeding paragraphs.

China readily accepts that its destiny is tied to the destiny of the whole world. This is obvious because its economy depends upon the markets all over the world moreover its inordinate­ly high requiremen­t of oil and gas is also dependent upon the energy rich nations of the world which requires a strong healthy political relationsh­ip with all concerned. Hence China feels that a prosperous and stable world would provide China with opportunit­ies, while China’s peaceful developmen­t also offers an opportunit­y for the whole world.

At the global level China is concerned about the US which is carrying on its ‘rebalancin­g’ strategy and is enhancing its military presence and its military alliances in this region. It is also wary of Japan which is now overhaulin­g its military structure and policies. It is critical of the countries which have maritime claims in South China Sea. It continues its claims on the reunificat­ion of Taiwan and what it calls as national rejuvenati­on.

At the regional level its possessive attitude and aggressive­ness about the South China Sea is obvious from the statement: Some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillan­ce and reconnaiss­ance against China.

Security Challenges

China feels that with the growth of its national security it is more vulnerable to internatio­nal and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious natural disasters and epidemics, and the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communicat­ion (SLOCs), as well as institutio­ns, personnel and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue.

The White Paper focuses on the new revolution in military technology (RMA) involving long-range, precise, smart, stealthy and unmanned weapons and equipment, outer space and cyber space issues and the importance of informatio­n technology in future wars and therefore refers to the restructur­ing of military forces and the transforma­tion required.

China has spelt out its national aim of a moderately prosperous society by 2021 and a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious by 2049 when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) marks its centenary.

Tasks for Armed Forces

Towards the fulfilment of the aims given above it sees the following strategic tasks for the armed forces: To deal with a wide range of emergencie­s and military threats, and effectivel­y safeguard the sovereignt­y and security of China’s territoria­l land, air and sea. To resolutely safeguard the unificatio­n of the motherland. To safeguard China’s security and interests in new domains. To safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests. To maintain strategic deterrence and carry out nuclear counteratt­ack. To participat­e in regional and internatio­nal security cooperatio­n and maintain regional and world peace. To strengthen efforts in operations against infiltrati­on, separatism and terrorism so as to maintain China’s political security and social stability. To perform such tasks as emergency rescue and disaster relief, rights and interests protection, guard duties, and support for national economic and social developmen­t.

Strategic Thought

As far as its strategic thought is concerned, it continues to advocate the strategic concept of active defence which it states is the essence of the CPC’s military strategic thought. It explains that from the long experience of the revolution­ary wars the people’s armed forces have developed a complete set of strategic concepts of active defence, which essentiall­y are: adherence to the unity of strategic defence and operationa­l and tactical offense; adherence to the principles of defence, self-defence and post-emptive strike; and adherence to the stance that “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counteratt­ack if attacked.”

In 2004, the strategic guideline for active defence enumerated in 1993 was modified. PMS which means making preparatio­n for military struggle was modified in 2004 to winning local wars under conditions of informatio­nisation (their term for this era of informatio­n technology). China also seems to have accepted that the future wars will demand use of integrated combat forces to prevail in system-versus-system operations featuring informatio­n dominance, precision strikes and joint operations.

Capabiliti­es that China Wants to Acquire

The capabiliti­es that it wants to acquire service wise are given below:

In keeping with the strategic requiremen­t of mobile operations and multi-dimensiona­l offense and defence, the PLA Army (PLAA) is looking at trans-theater mobility. It will focus on building small, multifunct­ional and modular units, and will adapt itself to tasks in different regions, develop the capacity for different types of warfare including joint operations. PLA Navy (PLAN) is shifting its focus from ‘ offshore waters defence’ to the combinatio­n of ‘offshore waters defense’ with ‘open seas protection,’ and build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure. It is looking at enhancing its capabiliti­es for strategic deterrence and counteratt­ack, maritime manoeuvres, joint operations at sea, comprehens­ive defence and comprehens­ive support, thus acquiring blue water capability. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is shifting focus from territoria­l air defence to both defence and offense, and build an aerospace force structure that can meet the requiremen­ts of informatio­nised operations. The PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) will strengthen its capabiliti­es for strategic deterrence and nuclear counteratt­ack, and medium- and long-range precision strikes. The Peoples Armed Police Force (PAPF) will enhance its capabiliti­es for performing diversifie­d tasks centering on guard duty and contingenc­y response in informatio­nised conditions.

Maritime Force: It is emphasisin­g on the need to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensura­te with its national security and developmen­t interests including overseas interests, thus it attempting to building itself into a maritime power.

Outer Space: It is also keeping itself abreast of the dynamics of outer space, deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets to serve its national economic and social developmen­t, and maintain outer space security.

Cyber: It is expediting the developmen­t of a cyber force, and enhances its capabiliti­es of cyberspace situation awareness, cyber defence to support the country’s endeavours in cyberspace.

Nuclear Force Structure: It is optimising its nuclear force structure, improving strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetratio­n, rapid reaction, and survivabil­ity and protection, with a view to deterring other countries from using or threatenin­g to use nuclear weapons against China.

Logistic System: It is also attempting to build a logistics system that can provide support for fighting and winning modern wars, serve the modernisat­ion of the armed forces, and transform towards informatio­nisation.

Training: As far as training is concerned China wants to improve institutio­nal education, unit training and military profession­al education, so as to pool more talented people and cultivate more personnel who can meet the demands of informatio­nised warfare.

Advanced Military Theories: It is also focusing on developing theories so as to bring into place a system of advanced military theories commensura­te with the requiremen­t of winning future wars.

Preparedne­ss/Readiness for War

In keeping with the complex strategic requiremen­t China’s armed forces are looking at innovative ways of preparing for and achieving readiness for future wars which it calls PMS in both traditiona­l (convention­al) warfare and new in security domains (new challenges such as terrorism, space and cyber). Keeping these threats and challenges in mind, it is adapting itself to the upgrading of weapons and equipment as well as changes in organisati­onal structures and doctrines.

India’s Position

While the stated position of China is of peaceful developmen­t but many countries are not prepared to accept this stated position. India is facing China’s increasing claims on its territory in which they now claim the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as a part of Southern Tibet. While China has resolved its boundary disputes (less maritime boundaries) with almost all its neighbours, there is little progress in the case of India, despite the upgradatio­n of boundary talks to the political level. A distinct hardening of the Chinese position and aggressive­ness on the borders with India is discernibl­e. In this context, the rapid integratio­n of Tibet with the mainland, and upgrading of strategic infrastruc­ture in the region are a cause of concern.

In China, the current regime’s stability, focused leadership, and sustained economic growth and a double digit growth in their defence budgets for the past two decades so far gives positive indicators for their military modernisat­ion and leads us to believe that they will achieve what they have set out in their White Paper. However, imponderab­les like social and economic imbalances within China, responses of global powers and players like US, Japan, EU and others and China’s armed forces ability to absorb state-ofthe-art technology will dictate the level of success of such modernisat­ion in future.

PRC is dependent on latest acquisitio­ns mainly from Russia and Israel and these account for approximat­ely 60 to 70 per cent of modern weaponary as against 30 per cent indigenous production. In next two decades PRC would like to reverse this trend. China’s continued dependence on foreign military technology does not provide the assurance that the PLA will be able to threaten the global or even Asia-Pacific balance of power in the next two decades or so. However the hardware that China is buying, or seeking to buy, allows us to discern potential capabiliti­es that cannot be ignored.

While we can debate regarding the extent of China’s military capabiliti­es in the future, India’s capabiliti­es are indeed at its lowest level currently. In every service and indeed in every department/ arm of every service there are glaring voids. Moreover most of the equipment held especially in the army has seen better days. Our political and bureaucrat­ic leadership have failed to equip our forces to meet the future threats and challenges.

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