Strategic Implications of Nuclear Submarines

Nuclear propelled attack submarines provide a variety of options to deliver kinetic effect with devastating results. In the Indian context, where naval forces will engage essentially in supporting the war on land, the ability of the SSN to deliver precision strike on land targets from long standoff ranges and the ability to affect battle space manoeuvre from the sea will provide the armed forces a vital advantage even on land. nuclear doctrine was enunciated which comprised two major elements; no first use (NFU) and ‘credible minimum deterrence.’ The official nuclear doctrine was finally published in 2003. These two elements became the pivots of our nuclear posture. The doctrine also enunciated that Indian nuclear forces will be deployed to ensure survival against a first strike…with adequate retaliatory capabilities for a punishing strike which would be unacceptable to the aggressor. In 2004, the Indian maritime doctrine translated this into the maritime domain stating, “To achieve strategic deterrence, it is vital for a nation to possess nuclear submarines capable of launching missiles with nuclear warheads.” The Indian Maritime Military Strategy released in 2007, clearly articulated that “the most credible of all arsenals in a second strike is the nuclear-armed missile submarine”.

The launch of the Arihant in July 2009 and the news that it would be put to sea for trials in early 2012 could not have come a moment too soon as it would provide the vital and most effective third leg of the nuclear triad and would thus validate the NFU policy. NFU is an option that only China has promulgated amongst all other nuclear powers. For us it is significant that Pakistan has not done so. Such intent needs to be treated with great caution. It is therefore essential that our second strike capability is not only invulnerable but also lethal enough to effect deterrence. India is in the unique and unenviable position of having nuclear armed neighbours on both sides. Both of these have an adversarial relationship with us and an unholy nexus between themselves. Both also have a proliferation record which is not above suspicion and this introduces an element of uncertainty in the regional security calculus. Our defences therefore have to be robust enough to deter any aggressor and we should have the ability to take the fight to the enemy across the entire spectrum of conflict. The nuclear powered strategic ballistic missile submarine provides us that capability.

Maritime Security Concerns

The Indian Ocean Region is going to occupy a centre stage in the 21st century. While global business will be conducted across its waters and it will be home to some of the most dynamic economies in the world, it will also remain a veritable tinderbox riven by political instability, ethnic conflagrations, violent internecine struggles and some of the most impoverished nations on earth. A large number of civil insurgency, inter- and intra-state conflicts and deeply suspicious neighbours characterise this entire region from its western to its eastern extremes. The French, in their 2008 white paper, described this region as an arc of instability.

India is a major stakeholder in the Indian Ocean. It is the largest and most powerful country in the region and thus has an important role to play. It is one of the few politically stable democracies in the IOR with a national posture broadly aligned with the acceptable global legal framework.