Is coercive consensus enough?

While pygmies running Pakistan traffic halfbaked inane ideas of saviour- hood, one can feel sand slipping through the fingers. Some events slap you out of the otherwise benevolent complacency that helps you sleep better in troubled times. The assassination of Sabeen Mahmud was one such event. This is the latest reminder of how abusive the relationship is between the state and citizens.

The Pakistani state urgently needs to undergo a behavioral change and reimagine its relationship with its citizens as one of care and compassion. That it is loath to do. A false narrative has been sold to Punjab- dominated Pakistan that a strongman with a big hammer and the will to use it indiscriminately can transform this blighted land into heaven. The approach to statecraft that cultivated violent non- state entities as assets and state institutions as a means of coercion as opposed to service delivery is still in play.

While a functional state must retain its monopoly over violence, the use of violence by the state must always be subject to rules. Just because non- state entities don’t abide by rules doesn’t entitle the state to follow suit. The need for legitimacy and proportionality in the use of violence by the state can never be overemphasised in relation to its own citizens. If the use of force by the state isn’t according to rules, the distinction between state and non- state violence disappears. Then it is simply a fight between two mafias.

The dilemma of the vocal citizen opposed to violence of all sorts is that s/ he doesn’t know who to fear more: the state or non- state actors. It is open hunting season in Pakistan for this endangered species. If you’re against religiously inspired savagery, the Tehreeki- Taliban Pakistan or one of its cousins can kill you. If you’re against sectarian violence, the Lashkar- i- Jhangvi or one of its cousins can kill you.

If you contest the state’s version of “patriotism”, chances are you are also opposed to the TTPs, LJs, obscurantism and state oppression. In such case anyone can kill you: state assets reaffirming the coercive notion of patriotism and the need for freethinking citizens to acquiesce; terror outfits and obscurantists settling scores with critics; foreign shadowy agencies settling scores with our state agencies. But here is why holding the state responsible is justified. It is the state’s obligation to uphold citizens’ right to life and liberty and bring to justice terrorists and criminals, whether indigenous or foreign- funded. The obligation doesn’t end by merely pointing out that enemies are fishing in troubled waters.

There is a contraction of civil liberties during wartime. But how will the required subsequent expansion take place if you literally kill all dissenting voices? The state is a suspect in Sabeen’s murder because Pakistan has a wellentrenched tradition of shooting the messenger. If Mama Qadeer’s talk at Lahore University of Management Sciences had not been stopped and it wasn’t common knowledge that the ISI is averse to giving him airtime, would people still wonder about the state’s role in Sabeen’s death?

Is there any contradiction in opposing the state’s kill- and- dump policy while also opposing violent Baloch separatists killing Punjabis and other settlers in Balochistan? Or in supporting Zarb- i- Azb against the savage TTP while also supporting due process of law for terrorists captured alive in military operations? Or in supporting a law- enforcement operation against militants, extortionists and criminals in Karachi while opposing any scheme to dismantle MQM as a political party?

The hammer is a useful tool. But our problems are more complex than nails. The Army is certainly the most powerful, disciplined and effective institution in Pakistan today. But is that enough for a stable and prosperous Pakistan? The Army can use its hard and soft power to marshal temporary coercive consensus on certain issues or slap a veto in relation to others. But those are the limits of its power.

What it can’t do single- handedly is foster a genuine conformist consensus among citizens. That limit is manifest in all military operations. What is Pakistan’s Balochistan policy beyond killing as many separatists as possible? Where is our plan to mainstream Fata once the fighting is over? Will leaked JIT reports, Saulat Mirzas and halfwit SSPs be sufficient to erode the genuine public support the MQM enjoys amongst Karachi’s Mohajir community?

Castigating as traitors those suspicious of the state’s role in attacks on Sabeen Mahmud ( or Saleem Shahzad or Hamid Mir) or in relation to missing persons, doesn’t help. If the citizen isn’t sure whether the state is the protector or the perpetrator, who is to blame, the citizen or the state?