RBI chief seeks more powers to regulate PSBs
■ Exemptions provided to PSBs make it hard for RBI to act against them
In the wake of the PNB scam, RBI governor Urjit Patel has sought making banking regulatory powers neutral to bank ownership as the central bank has only a limited set of powers under the Banking Regulations Act ( BR Act) to effectively supervise public sector banks.
In his first public comments after the PNB scam that has raised concerns over the quality of audit processes followed in state- owned banks, the RBI governor said that its regulatory powers over PSBs were weaker than those over private sector banks.
He said the RBI cannot remove the directors and the management at PSBs as the relevant sections of the law was not applicable to them. Similarly, the section of the BR Act that provides for supersession of a bank board was also not applicable in the case of PSBs.
If we need to face the brickbats and be the Neelakantha consuming this poison, we will do so as our duty; we will persist with our endeavours and get better with each trial and tribulation along the way
— Urjit Patel, RBI governor
“This legislative reality has in effect led to a deep fissure in the landscape of banking regulatory terrain: a system of dual regulation, by the finance ministry in addition to the RBI. Temptation to engage in fraud at the level of employee or employees is always present, in banks ( or in corporations), be it in the public sector or the private sector...,” he said while addressing a seminar at the Gujarat National Law University.
In the wake of the PNB scam, RBI governor Urjit Patel has called for making banking regulatory powers neutral to bank ownership as the Central Bank has only limited set of powers under the Banking Regulations Act ( BR Act) to effectively supervise the public sector banks.
In his first public comments following the PNB scam that has raised concern regarding the quality of audit processes followed in state owned banks, the RBI governor stated that its regulatory powers over PSBs are weaker than those over the private sector banks.
He said that the RBI cannot remove directors and management at PSBs as the relevant sections of the BR Act is not applicable to them. Similarly, the section of the BR Act that provides for supersession of a bank board is also not applicable in the case of PSBs.
“This legislative reality has in effect led to a deep fissure in the landscape of banking regulatory terrain: a system of dual regulation, by the finance ministry in addition to the RBI. Temptation to engage in fraud at the level of employee or employees is always present, in banks ( or in corporations), be it in public sector or private sector. The question then is whether there is adequate deterrence faced by employees from undertaking frauds and enough incentives for management to put in place preventive measures to preempt frauds,” he said while addressing a seminar in Gujarat National Law University.
Responding to criticism regarding the failure of RBI audit to detect the fraud, the governor said it is simply infeasible for a banking regulator to be in the every nook and corner of banking activity to rule out frauds by “being there”.
“In the specific case at hand, the Reserve Bank had identified, based on cyber risk considerations, the exact source of operational hazard – through which we understand now the fraud had been perpetrated. In particular, the RBI had issued precise instructions via three circulars in 2016 to enable banks to eliminate the hazard. It turns out ex post the bank had simply not done so. Clearly, the internal processes at the bank failed in allowing the operational hazard to remain in place in spite of clear instructions to close it,” he said.
Mr Patel added that the exemptions granted to stateowned banks under the BR Act mean that
the regulator that can respond relatively quickly against banking frauds or irregularity cannot take effective action.
In case of private sector banks, he said that the real deterrence arises from market and regulatory discipline, and their confluence. A private bank CEO’s primary concern is whether he or she will be able to raise capital when the need arises or even whether he or she will still be running the bank the next day.
The point is that they could be readily cautioned
through their boards and even replaced by the RBI in case of large or persistent irregularities.
While the original idea behind bank nationalisation was complete government control over credit allocation to the economy, Mr Patel said the situation in India is exactly the reverse with RBI’s regulatory powers over PSBs are weaker than those over the private sector banks.
Meanwhile Mr Patel, invoking mythology, said that the RBI has undertaken the cleaning up of
the country’s credit culture as the Mandara mount in the Amrit Manthan of the economy.
Until the churn is complete and the nectar of stability safely secured for the country’s future, someone must consume the poison that emanates along the way, he said.
“If we need to face the brickbats and be the Neelakantha consuming this poison, we will do so as our duty; we will persist with our endeavours and get better with each trial and tribulation along the way,” he said.
This legislative reality has in effect led to a deep fissure in the landscape of banking regulatory terrain: a system of dual regulation, by the finance ministry in addition to the RBI. — URJIT PATEL