Thwarting China on control of sea lanes

THE COURSE FOR INDIA is to constructively engage with China, to further develop its naval capabilities for sea control and engage with other major powers in the Indian Ocean to achieve this objective. It is important also that in tying itself to the shoe-

It is heartening that India is now responding, albeit haltingly and uncertainly, to the need to spruce up its naval defences through strategic alliances and by bolstering its own naval preparedness. The avowed new China policy of cutting down on its land army and investing heavily instead on naval and air defences was indeed a wakeup call for India.

Yet, even now, India has been largely reactive, not pro-active. When visiting US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently suggested that the US and India partner to build road connectivity in the sub-continent and port connectivity in the Indo-Pacific, as an alternative to the Chinese One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, he was reflecting the Indo-US joint view. But India is essentially muted in public on the issue of countering China just as much as the US is on intervening on behalf of the SouthEast Asian states in the South China Sea dispute.

The key point of Tillerson’s engagement was that India and the US should join hands in providing a rule based and transparent funding alternative to the OBOR in the region. In this context, he pushed for road connectivity in Bangladesh and Afghanistan so that even Pakistan is inclined to participate in the move. This is unrealistic considering Islamabad’s extreme indebtedness to Beijing.

In Japan its foreign minister, Taro Kono, proposed a top-level dialogue with the U.S., India and Australia to work on promoting free trade and defence cooperation across a stretch of ocean from the South China Sea, across the Indian Ocean and all the way to Africa.

A bold initiative on this is the need of the hour but will Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe move purposefully on this when Donald Trump meets him in Japan on November 6 and will the US react meaningfully is the moot question.

Time is indeed running out and the Chinese are fast undertaking more construction and reclamation in the South China Sea to re-assert their claim over the waterways and hit world trade. There are reports that the Chinese are all set to deploy jet fighters in the contested Paracel islands .

That China has expansionist designs which dictate its maritime policy can hardly be surmised decisively but all of Southeast Asia fears that strongly. India and China have the added common imperative of trade. China imports 82 per cent of its energy requirements, in the form of oil and gas, through the Indian Ocean. Thirty per cent of its sea trade, worth some US$300 billion each year, is shipped through the Indian Ocean.

As for India, it imports 70 per cent of its oil and gas energy requirements and depends on free access to sea routes for its trade to ensure its continued economic development. One of the key conditions for India’s continued economic growth is that the choke points in the Indian Ocean region must remain free and open to international trade.

India’s projected answer to the Chinese access to Gwadar port in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan economic corridor---the proposed development of Chabahar port in Iran--- is not shaping up, with US-Iran relations touching their lowest ebb under US President Donald Trump.

The Chinese, on the other hand, are going ahead in ‘encircling’ India through the ‘string of pearls’ by not only developing a deep-sea port at Gwadar, together with an oil refinery complex, which is being connected by a road-pipeline project with Xinjiang province in China but also building ports at Sittwe and Kyaukphu in Myanmar, connected to Yunan in China by a rail-road-waterway pipeline. Finally, a canal system across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand is planned to cater for 20 per cent of the energy flows to China.

To increase its strategic reach in the Indian Ocean, China has also developed additional ports with naval access facilities at Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Marao in the Maldives, and Kyaukpya, Hianggyi, Great Coco, Mergui and Zadetkyi in Myanmar. All this would not only bolster Chinese trade but also give Beijing a foothold in the Indian Ocean with serious potential of disrupting Indian trade.

Mercifully, with the American naval superiority nowhere near being surpassed India has to bet on the US and its strategic interests to thwart any Chinese designs on the hinterland states in the Indian Ocean and its own trade interests.

If Japan and Australia too become part of the axis against China, and Tokyo succeeds in roping in UK and France too, the Chinese could face a tough challenge. But the Americans especially under Trump tend to be fickle and weigh everything with the narrow yardstick of US self-interest, which could be tricky considering that everything is not black or white.

The course for India is to constructively engage with China, to further develop its naval capabilities for sea control and engage with other major powers in the Indian Ocean to achieve this objective.

It is important also that in tying itself to the shoe-strings of the West, India must not ignore the Russians who have stood by this country through thick and thin in the past.

The Russians have been gravitating towards Pakistan in recent times and it is incumbent on New Delhi to ensure that a China-Russia-Pakistan axis does not get concretized to the strategic detriment of India.

The challenge for the Modi government is stupendous indeed. Fending off China has to be the highest priority and for that strategic alliances are a must. There is indeed no room for complacency in the wake of Chinese muscle-flexing.

The author is a political commentator and columnist. He has authored four books.