Katchatheevu: Foreign Secy. cited security interests to convince Karunanidhi
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) documents shared with BJP State president K. Annamalai recently under the Right to Information Act have no doubt established that the then Chief Minister and DMK leader, M. Karunanidhi, was taken into confidence by the Centre before India signed an agreement with Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) on the Katchatheevu islet in 1974.
While this exposed Karunanidhi’s claim, during his lifetime, that he was not a party to the ceding of
Katchatheevu, the documents also reveal that the Centre cited the country’s security interests and a weak legal case against Sri Lanka to convince him about the proposal to cede the island.
The MEA (Historical Division) document, prepared by its Director B.K. Basu, details the talks held between the Chief Minister and Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh in Madras on June 19, 1974 in connection with the question of Kachchativu (as spelt in the records).
Singh explained to Karunanidhi the relative weakness of India’s case for sovereignty over Kachchativu when compared to that of Ceylon. Although the Raja of Ramnad had claimed that the island belonged to him from time immemorial, “there is no document which establishes his original title to the island”. There was no map in which the island had been shown to be a part of India. But Sri Lanka possessed direct evidence to establish that Kachchativu was included within its territory for several centuries.
Singh told the CM that Sri Lanka, convinced of the superiority of its case, and aware of the shortcomings of India’s case, “maintained a sustained pressure on us to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice for a decision, if we could not settle it bilaterally at an early date”. It wanted the issue to be settled by June 1974.
Karunanidhi asked if the issue could be kept pending for two years. However, the Foreign Secretary cited domestic and external compulsions, favouring an expeditious settlement. Among the domestic compulsions, he said, “in strictest confidence”, that oil structures were reported to have been located in the area, and the Sri Lankan side was presumably not aware of this. If a settlement was delayed and knowledge of the oil strike became available, a settlement will become more intractable, he said.
Among the external compulsions, he pointed to the existence of a “very strong proChina lobby in Sri Lanka”, which was eager to take advantage of any misunderstanding between India and Sri Lanka, and which may be urging them to refer the dispute for arbitration or even go to the World Court to embarrass India.
“Any course other than political negotiations would harm our national interest and would augment influence of other foreign powers such as China and adversely affect our security and economic interests,” he cautioned.
Karunanidhi told the Foreign Secretary that for obvious political reasons, he could not be expected to take a public stand in favour of it, but promised to keep the reaction lowkey.
(For the full report, visit https://thlink.in/Katchatheevu)
The Foreign Secretary cited certain domestic and external compulsions, favouring a speedy settlement.