A ‘No-Limit’ bromance that is not just a bilateral matter
aving met each other over 40 times in the past 11 years, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping are justi ed in calling each other “old friend”. Yet, their Summit in Beijing (May 16-17, 2024), ostensibly to mark the 75th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic relations, stands out, arguably, as among their most consequential meetings. Given their geostrategic and geoeconomic hefts, their “no-limit” bromance is not just a bilateral matter. It concerns the world at large including India, which has a signi cant yin-yang relationship with both.
HThe phases of Russia-China ties
Over the past two centuries, Russia-China relations have passed through at least ve phases. During the 19th century, Czarist Russia took advantage of a weak China to expand to the Paci c, and the Soviet Union continued to hold these territories. A decade of “Comintern brotherhood” followed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, but the bonhomie was upended by ideological and geopolitical di¡erences, triggered, in part, by the Chinese attack on India, in 1962. Russia and
China had armed clashes in 1969 over the Ussuri River border dispute.
The fourth phase commenced in 1972, with United States President Richard Nixon’s dramatic visit to Beijing, aimed at weaning China from the Russia-led Eastern Bloc. In a paradigm shift,
China tilted towards the West which supported Deng Xiaoping’s “four modernisations”, believing that “prosperity would make China a more liberal society”. Despite China’s violent suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, the West continued to lavish China with investments, technology transfer, market access and diplomatic support over the next three decades, transforming China into the “World’s Factory.” Meanwhile, Moscow-Beijing ties withered as the Soviet Union imploded and the Russian Federation, its successor, shed most of its Central Asian Republics which became an arena for geo-political competition with China.
The current phase began in 2012, when China’s growing assertiveness alarmed the U.S. into launching a “pivot Asia”, unveiling hard-lined policies to stem China’s rise and gradual economic decoupling. Growing friction with the West led China to return to Russia and the two famously declared after the Beijing Summit in February 2022 that their ties had “No Limits”. Within weeks, Mr. Putin launched a “limited military operation” against Ukraine. The West responded angrily with hundreds of sanctions on Moscow to cripple Russia economically. This western blockade impelled Moscow further towards China which was also under economic pressure from the same quarters. Over the past two years, their convergence against the West has triggered a quantitative and qualitative surge in Russia-China ties. Their trade reached $240 billion in 2023, having grown 26% over 2022. Russia is now predominantly dependent on China as a market for its energy exports and a source of critical inputs, such as sanctioned items and those required to pursue its Ukraine war. Russia was the largest crude supplier to China with volume averaging 2.1 million barrels a day in
2023. However, despite decoupling attempts, China traded $575 billion with the U.S. in 2023, more than twice its trade with Russia. In comparison, India’s 2023-24 annual trade with the U.S. and China was $118 billion each; it traded $66 billion with Russia.
The message in the joint statement
Against this backdrop, the 7,000-word Joint Statement issued after the Putin-Xi Summit was conspicuously silent on bilateral economic, nancial and military ties. This taciturnity could have one of two diametrically opposite motives: it was either to avoid invoking western opprobrium and sanctions or to paper over their mutual disagreement. It is relevant to note that during a Beijing visit in April, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met President Xi to reportedly warn against helping Russia militarily. The joint statement also omits any India-speci c issues, including the United Nations reforms, and con nes treatment of Europe to a sanitised version of the Ukraine conict.
In contrast, the text reserves the choicest invectives for the U.S., accusing it of pursuing “dual containment” (of both Russia and China, calling it “unconstructive and hostile”) and an “Indo-Paci c Strategy” with “a negative impact on the peace and stability of the region”. With its stark polarity, the Joint Statement is a clear sign that the two strategic partners have gone on an anti-U.S. o¡ensive.
The Beijing Summit’s likely impact needs analysis in both the short and long terms. In the short run, it may lead to intensi ed, albeit understated, bilateral cooperation, particularly in the supply of the dual-use materials needed by Russia for its Ukraine campaign. In return, China may seek better terms for Russian raw materials, mining rights in Siberia and access to Russian know-how on a range of critical technologies such as avionics, nuclear power and space. China may also seek greater Russian acquiescence for its dominance over Central Asia.
Beijing may even have cynical motives for quietly supporting Russia: the continuation of the Ukraine war keeps a beleaguered Russia dependent on China and the U.S. preoccupied with eastern Europe, giving China the freedom to bully Asia.
In the longer run, the summit may have an even more profound fallout. While China would want to continue its pro table economic engagements with both Russia and the West, the inherent contradictions may eventually make this pursuit untenable.
On May 17, the U.S. State Department spokesman curtly told China, “You cannot have it both ways.” The continued western pressure may force it to play the Russian card in a high-stakes global poker. This, coupled with the Middle Kingdom’s incessant quest for global dominance, could usher in a new Cold War aimed mostly at creating a credible alternative to the U.S.-dominated post-Second World War global eco-political architecture. The early contours of the incipient China-driven global construct, such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the 109-member Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the 147-country, $1 trillion outlay Belt and Road Initiative are already in place and just need ramping up. It could thus presage the opening overture of a new global polarisation.
The impact on India
The Beijing Summit would have far-reaching implications for India, presenting it with both challenges and opportunities. To begin with,
India needs to carefully and objectively examine the depth and durability of the current phase of the ties between Russia and China, given their erratic past. Both have strong leaders, even as Russia’s GDP is currently less than one-seventh of China’s. This coupled with the Ukraine war and the sanctions makes Moscow less than an equal partner, perhaps for the rst time in their bilateral history. Moscow’s potential vulnerability to China’s hegemony could concern India given its still overwhelming dependence on Russia for defence supplies particularly as it has border tensions with China. India being Russia’s largest defence market, Moscow has an interest in retaining it. However, the reliability of Russian supplies may become subject to Chinese pressures.
While India has several reservations about the existing global architecture, it is by no means certain that Beijing’s alternative would suit India better. New Delhi’s best bet would perhaps be to press for a higher pro le in the existing global order commensurate with India’s size and potential.
In retrospect, during the last Cold War, India largely pursued the high moral ground often eschewing its core national interests. Instead of focusing on its socio-economic development and the realpolitik it required, it adopted a doctrinaire approach to Non-Alignment and Third World solidarity. The rest is history and those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
The incoming global polarisation is likely to be di¡erently nuanced with greater ux, driven mostly by the geo-economics and quest for new technologies. Unlike the rst Cold War, India is now a major global player with hard-earned “strategic autonomy” providing it with real options. India should leverage its strengths judiciously, and adopt a sharper and nimbler approach. As new opportunities dawn, it needs to be clear-headed about its core long-term national goals, adopt a commensurate strategy and pursue it with single-mindedness.
The recent summit in Beijing between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping has both short and long-term implications