Turbulence in the skies
The American aircraft maker, for long considered to be the ‘pinnacle of engineering’ excellence, faces serious safety questions following a mid-air cabin blowout and a safety audit nding issues in the production process
“Mr. Calhoun, what is your message to passengers concerned who are ying in your planes?”
“We y safe planes,” responds Boeing’s President and Chief Executive Ocer David L. Calhoun to the reporter. “We don’t put airplanes in the air that we don’t have a 100% condence in. I am here in the spirit of transparency. Number one, I recognise the seriousness of what you just asked. Number two, to share everything that I can with our Capitol Hill interests,” Mr. Calhoun continues, gesturing a bit grimly to the passageway behind him, “... to answer all the questions because they have a lot of them”.
Indeed, the great American planemaker does have quite a few tough queries to answer.
The “questions” Mr. Calhoun was referring to were the bouncers U.S. lawmakers on Capitol Hill were sure to have bowled to him in a meeting in late January 2024, in a quest to seek reasons as to why a Boeing aircraft, a 737-9 MAX, had had a mid-air cabin blowout weeks earlier.
In January this year, there were two incidents involving Airbus and Boeing-made aircraft, spotlighting the critical issue of safety in the world of aviation — more so in the manner of their occurrence. On January 2, an Airbus A350-900, one of aviation’s most modern jetliners, on a ight from Sapporo to Tokyo Haneda, Japan, and with 367 passengers and 12 crew on board, collided with a Japanese Coast Guard De Havilland Dash 8-300 on the runway just after touchdown.
Even as images of ames consuming both fuselages were being broadcast across the world, a textbook example of the cabin evacuation was also playing out on TV screens, highlighting the advances the aviation industry has made in ensuring passenger safety. Every single soul on the Airbus exited successfully. As day gradually broke after the blaze had been extinguished, aviation investigators were seen scrutinising the accident site, piquing even greater interest as this was a composite constructed craft they were dealing with.
Just a few days later, there was another aircraft incident. On January 5, an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737-9 MAX, on a ight from Portland to Ontario, with 171 passengers and six crew, was climbing out after take-o¤ when one of the cabin windows-emergency exits, the related holding panel and parts of one unoccupied seat separated from the jet. The oxygen masks were released. The crew had to stop the climb, declare an emergency, report depressurisation and eventually manage to carry out a safe landing. There were no major injuries reported but the sharp pictures left behind a trail of bad headlines for Boeing.
Regulatory scrutiny
When the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board stepped in, its initial report concluded that four bolts meant to attach the door securely to the fuselage had not been tted. What followed next was an immediate grounding and inspections of all 737-9 MAX of similar conguration, following which the single-aisle planes gradually returned to service. A safety audit found a series of issues in the production process.
For the American aerospace giant, every day a Boeing-operated ight takes o¤ seems to be one of turbulence, inviting more scrutiny from regulators and also the media (some of the reportage is a bit exaggerated as they are airline operator related). The Boeing 737 MAX manufacturing programme is also one that the company has been trying hard to stabilise after the two crashes involving Lion Air ight 610 in 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines ight 302 in 2019, claiming 346 lives.
The Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, a new control function, was found to have been a key factor, with the company not having been transparent enough in informing operators about the existence of such a system. It also led to accusations of the company having pursued prots over safety.
It is a dark episode in Boeing’s history that resulted in nes, lawsuits and compensation to the tune of a few billion dollars. But, importantly, what it uncovered was the slack role of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in maintaining vigil over the programme and its certication. The aircraft was eventually cleared to return to service after a series of design and training changes, but the worldwide grounding of the plane is an event that has gashed and scarred the manufacturer.
In a report in March, The New York Times cited Boeing employees agging “shortcuts everywhere”. For a company long considered to be the “pinnacle of engineering” excellence, senior employees have found the fall to be distressing.
They pointed out how the after-e¤ects of the COVID-19 pandemic have seen the experience level of the workforce drop, inspection processes to check the work on the assembly line weaken and an adherence to quality standards by suppliers slump even further.
In another report, again in March, the NYT said an FAA audit of the 737 MAX production line “found dozens of issues, with the company not clearing 33 of 89 audits”. One newspaper report read, “Dish soap to help build planes?... “An FAA audit found Spirit AeroSystems using Dawn soap and a hotel key card in the manufacturing process.” A Boeing spokesperson has told The Hindu that the audit process is ongoing and corrective measures are being undertaken.
‘Inaccurate allegations’
There have also been whistle-blower claims on Boeing’s other aircraft families — on the quality and the safety of the Boeing 787 and even the Boeing 777. Boeing has put out information to correct what it calls “inaccurate and a misleading set of allegations” — a clip of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner stress test forms a part of the company’s information package. It has said “the issues raised have been subject to rigorous engineering examination under FAA oversight”. And, it has emphasised that it “encourages all employees to speak up when issues arise and that retaliation is strictly prohibited at Boeing”.
In addition, it has highlighted how other stories continue to link “ight incidents” with “production issues” when these cases should be looked at in the context of production versus maintenance and operations.
Boeing’s problems, to a signicant extent, can be linked to its vital anchor with Spirit Aerosystems, one of Boeing’s major but quality troubled suppliers. It was spun away from Boeing in the 2000s. Boeing is trying to acquire Spirit again in an attempt to set right mounting production and quality woes, and in this, seems to be locked in a race with Airbus, which too has the same intent.
A Reuters report says there could even be a ‘coordinated arrangement [by both manufacturers] to split Spirit’s operations’. This potential deal is being labelled as Boeing’s largest acquisition since the 1990s when it bought McDonnell Douglas.
David Calhoun is to leave Boeing at the end of the year as part of sweeping leadership changes. And with 6,259 unlled aircraft orders — which is the data through March 31 for its aircraft families, the Boeing 737, 767, 777 and 787 — Boeing has much ground to taxi across. But before that, the aircraft maker should know that it needs to be nimble, transparent and conscientious if the tag line ‘If it ain’t Boeing, I ain’t going’ is to ring true again.
The Boeing 737 MAX manufacturing programme is also one that the company has been trying hard to stabilise after the two crashes involving Lion Air flight 610 in 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 in 2019, claiming 346 lives
The Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, a new control function, was found to have been a key factor
A dark episode followed in Boeing’s history that resulted in fines, lawsuits and compensation to the tune of a few billion dollars