The Indian Express (Delhi Edition)
‘There is anger among youth in Kashmir, engage with them... It is not rocket science’
Lt Gen D S Hooda (retd) talks about the surgical strikes and how they were different from the ones conducted in the past, says there is no consensus on an alternative to AFSPA yet, denies any pressure from the government during operations and asserts that
SUSHANT SINGH: There have been many developments in Jammu and Kashmir over the past two-and-a-half years, both political and in terms of internal security. Where and why, in your opinion, did things go wrong during this period?
In 2014-15, internal recruitment began increasing. More and more locals were joining (militancy). The numbers were not very large, 50-70, but as compared to 2011-12, where the figure was in single digits and most of the recruits were from across the Line of Control, it was high. These local recruits had family and friends in the region and when they got killed, there was more anger. Through 2015, for example, when there would be a search operation, locals would turn up in large numbers. During the attack on the Entrepreneur Development Institute (at Sempore-pampore in south Kashmir’s Pulwama district in 2016), even women came out to stop military operations. So the frustration had been building for some time and it all finally boiled over in 2016.
The way in which the new political dispensation came into the state also contributed to the dissatisfaction. And Pakistan had a very large role to play. We often see the insurgency in Kashmir as an internal one, but it has a huge transnational character — arms, terrorists, funds, support, all of it comes from Pakistan.
They (Pakistan) were seeing a steady improvement in the situation; 2012, in fact, was the best year as far as controlling insurgency and violence was concerned. In 2016, Pakistan made an even bigger attempt to increase infiltration. All of these issues led to what happened in July 2016.
SUSHANT SINGH: Last year, when things were getting out of hand in J&K, you said politicians should step up and do more. Can you elaborate?
Militarily, I think, the situation has largely come under control. We hear of attacks such as the one in Pathankot and tend to think that the situation is getting bad. That is not true. Let me give you some data. I think 2001 was the worst year, and I am not talking purely from a security perspective, when the total casualties — civilians, military and terrorists — exceeded 4,500. In 2012, it was around 120130, which is about 2.5 per cent of the peak levels. For 2016, which is now being considered to be the worst year in the Valley, data shows that (the total number of casualties) is about 5-6 per cent of peak levels. So, yes, we need to ensure that incidents such as Uri and Nagrota don’t happen, but from a security perspective, the situation has been contained to some extent. This, however, does not mean that things are completely under control and nothing more needs to be done. You now need a political approach to deal with the situation.
SUSHANT SINGH: How bad was the September 2016 attack on the Army base in Uri?
It was bad. I was sitting there and getting feedback and the number of casualties kept on increasing — 10,12, 18 — it was quite horrible to hear. One way of dealing with such a situation is to get completely defensive and make sure that the men of your garrison are okay. The other option is payback and that is what happened 20 days later.
SUSHANT SINGH: So the surgical strikes happened 20 days later. Can