An elusive grand bargain

Imperatives for the US and China to engage are real. So are the contradictions between Washington and Beijing

WHEN THE JOE Biden administration described its China strategy as “responsible competition”, many analysts in India and beyond dismissed it as mission impossible. The administration insisted that it would cooperate with China where possible and challenge it where it must. President Biden also affirmed that he would do the utmost to prevent the vigorous competition with China from becoming a dangerous conflict. This, in turn, has involved an element of sustained high-level engagement.

For many in the Indian strategic community, maintaining a balance between competition and cooperation is unsustainable. They worry that the engagement track will prevail at the expense of America’s friends and partners and in favour of Beijing. To be sure, as a power far away from Asia and facing no direct threats from China, there will always be reasons for the US to find an accommodation with China. As the world’s largest economies with massive interdependence and as leading military powers, their imperatives to engage are real. So are the contradictions between Washington and Beijing.

The growing sense of economic threat from China and the prospect that Beijing is trying to nudge America out of Asia has brought Washington together on the idea of pushing back. This is one of the few things that Democrats and Republicans agree on — the difference is on how hard to push back. Sections of the Republican Party scoff at the idea of engagement and insist on rolling back Chinese influence and ousting the Chinese Communist Party from power. While uncertainty about how Trump might deal with China is real, for now, the story is about Biden’s “responsible competition” with China. Several current developments involving the US and China give us a sense of this strategy.

Let’s first turn to the dynamic of engagement. Last week, we saw a long telephone call between Biden and the Chinese leader Xi Jinping. This is part of the high-level communication between the two sides that began in Bali at the end of 2022 on the margins of the G20 summit. President Xi visited the US to attend the San Francisco summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum last November when the two sides announced the intent to stabilise the bilateral relationship, open up military contacts and initiate talks on regulating artificial intelligence and counter-narcotics.

This week, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen is on an extended tour of China. Considered a strong supporter of free trade and positive economic engagement with China, Yellen is trying to convey a twin message to Beijing: That the US is interested in a mutually beneficial economic relationship with China, but will not countenance Beijing’s attempt to dominate emerging technology sectors such as solar panels and electricity vehicles. She is also suggesting if China continues to build excess capacity in these sectors, the US will be compelled to impose new tariffs.

Let us now turn to the other side — competition. This week President Biden is hosting the Japanese Prime Minister on a state visit to the White House. Fumio Kishida is the third leader of the Quad to receive this special welcome under the Biden presidency. The two other state visits were from South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and French President Emmanuel Macron. The short list of state visits indicates the continuing strategic importance Biden attaches to the Indopacific, despite the war in the heart of Europe.

Biden’s summit with Kishida will unveil a range of measures to deep en the military technological partnership between the US and Japan. This would involve greater integration of the military structures of the two nations, more intensive defence-industrial collaboration, and wider advanced technology cooperation.

Under Kishida, Japan has emerged as the lynchpin of Biden’s Indo-pacific strategy and has promised to significantly raise its defence budget and develop new capabilities to deter China, North Korea, and Russia. The new and assertive security role of Asia’s secondlargest economy marks Tokyo’s pivot away from entrenched post-war pacifism and an important structural change in post-war Asian geopolitics.

Beyond strengthening the bilateral security partnership with Japan, the US wants Tokyo to become a part of the AUKUS initiative — the planned advanced technology partnership between Australia, the UK and the US — unveiled in 2021. The first pillar of the AUKUS arrangement involves the transfer of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines from Washington and London to Canberra. Japan, with its strong anti-nuclear orientation, will not be part of it.

But Tokyo is likely to emerge as a valuable addition to the second pillar of AUKUS, which is looking to jointly develop advanced military technologies. These include hypersonic, underwater, cyber, AI, and quantum computing technologies. Japan is expected to bring its excellent scientific and technical skills and manufacturing prowess to develop and retain the lead over China.

Drawing Japan into AUKUS is part of the Biden administration’s strategy to look beyond bilateral alliances and draw its friends and partners into a range of overlapping minilateral institutions. India is familiar with the Quad arrangement that brings India into regional collaboration with Australia, Japan, and the United States. Minilateralism is now becoming part of the Asian security landscape amidst the inability of the regional multilateral mechanisms led by the ASEAN to cope with the changing regional geopolitical dynamic.

The new approach is about building a web of Asian security networks that pool the region’s military resources, enhance deterrence and ensure peace. The US, for example, is asking Japan to expand its security assistance to countries in the Indopacific including the Philippines. It has nudged South Korea to expand advanced technology cooperation with India. The recent visits of External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar to Seoul, Tokyo, Singapore, Manila and Kuala Lumpur have seen India stepping up its own bilateral engagement in East Asia.

Last year, Biden hosted a summit with Japanese and South Korean leaders to encourage stronger trilateral strategic collaboration and encourage Seoul and Tokyo to set aside their nationalist disputes over history and territory. The Biden administration has also set up the so-called “Chip Four” alliance that brings the world’s major producers of semiconductors — Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and the United States.

Following the bilateral summit with Kishida, Biden is hosting a trilateral summit with the President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. Biden and Kishida are expected to offer strong support to Marcos, who is standing up to China in the disputed South China Sea. The US is also reinforcing these coalitions by encouraging its Asian friends to develop partnerships with each other with or without direct US participation.

The new approach is about building a web of Asian security networks that pool the region’s military resources, enhance deterrence and ensure peace. The US, for example, is asking Japan to expand its security assistance to countries in the Indo-pacific including the Philippines. It has nudged South Korea to expand advanced technology cooperation with India. The recent visits of External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar to Seoul, Tokyo, Singapore, Manila and Kuala Lumpur have seen India stepping up its own bilateral engagement in East Asia.

The US strategy in the Indo-pacific is about strengthening its allies, building new partnerships, constructing minilaterals, and promoting independent cooperation between its Asian partners. China’s focus instead is on reviving bilateral ties with the US and getting Washington’s endorsement of Beijing’s primacy in Asia.

While Washington actively courts China’s large neighbours, Beijing has yet to make nice to them on political or territorial issues. America’s vigorous competition with China delivers greater agency for Beijing’s neighbours, including Delhi. Beijing’s quest for a grand bargain with Washington for a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia is leaving its neighbours out in the cold. For now, at least, there is little evidence that the Chinese leadership is rethinking its Asian strategy.

C R Sasikumar