Dramatic shifts chart a new paradigm for Middle East
There is a pursuit of an expansionist and imperialist Iranian policy in Syria, supported by many Revolutionary Guards.
dozen Syrian air defence sites and Iranian targets, including Iran’s drone command centre, Israel sought to make clear there would be a cost if Assad and his Iranian allies provoked Israel again in the near future. By causing heavy damage to Syrian defence infrastructure but not going “all the way” and decimating its air defence units, Israel should be well positioned to deter future incursions into its airspace. It demonstrated that it could demolish Syrian forces if necessary to establish complete air superiority, and by not doing so, gave Damascus an incentive to avoid future conflict.
The first-ever direct strikes on manned Iranian fixtures in Syria also demonstrated what may become an important component of Israeli strategy to deter Iran in Syria: Iranian forces stationed in Damascus are 800 miles from Tehran and only a few dozen miles from Israel, which leaves them extremely vulnerable to Israeli aerial attacks. After Israel’s counterstrike, the Iranian-led axis appears to have backed down. Russia’s statement urging “all sides to exercise restraint” indicated that it was not supportive of Iran’s provocations that might put Moscow’s project of saving the Assad regime at risk.
However, General Amos Yadlin (former head of Israeli Military Intelligence), believes that Russia can play a critical role and that conflict will be inevitable unless Vladimir Putin steps in to prevent it. What form might that take?
Interestingly, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) has just picked up a report from the German media that, in the interests of containing Iran, diplomats might put three proposals to Putin. Firstly, politicalideological recognition of Russia’s parity with the US as a great power, a status Putin is striving to regain. Secondly, recognition of Russia’s continued presence in Syria, which has a military/strategic importance for Russia. Thirdly, Western and Gulf state capital injections for rebuilding Syria in such a way that Russia is the prime contractor, with all the financial benefits that that entails.
There would be several advantages to the West, and, of course, Israel. Firstly, co-operation with Russia in Syria could de-escalate the international crisis that has caused such chaos, particularly with the waves of refugees that are impacting security consequences across Europe. Secondly, it bypasses the problem of cancelling the sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea. Thirdly, and most importantly, a recognised Russian presence in Syria would create significant pressure on Iran, with diminished support of Iran’s policies in the region severely impacting Iran’s expansionist capabilities.
This would also be much welcomed in the capitals of the Sunni Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where recent Israeli missile strikes against the Syrians and Iranians were met with unusually muted criticism. Crown Prince Salman continues to make positive statements about Israel, the latest being that he believes the Israelis have the right to their own state. The Jerusalem Post reported this week that “a Saudi prince” had made a covert visit to Israel earlier in the week, and the speculation is that it might have been the Crown Prince himself. Such a development might be met with some scepticism by a conservative Saudi public, but perhaps less so with the younger generation.
Egypt’s al-Sissi continues to battle ISIS terrorists in Northern Sinai with mixed results. Deadly bombings are taking their toll, notwithstanding the military co-operation between the Egyptian and Israeli forces, which is understood to be functioning well. It is said that Israeli assistance is limited to their (unmarked) drone strikes. There has been increasing tension between Egypt and the Hamas in Gaza, as the former suspects the latter might be playing a destabilising role in Sinai.
Who, a few years ago, could have imagined such a dramatic shift in perceived interests? Such is the Middle East’s new paradigm. Christopher Dreyfus is a former member of Council of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, London.
After Israel’s counterstrike, the Iranian-led axis appears to have backed down. Russia’s statement urging “all sides to exercise restraint” indicated that it was not supportive of Iran’s provocations. that might put Moscow’s project of saving the Assad regime at risk.