The Sunday Guardian

RUSSIA-CHINA AND THE EMERGING ORDER

India, as a centre of power in this emerging multi-polar world, can shift the balance to either side. India is in a delicate tightrope walk.

- AJAY SINGH PUNE Ajay Singh is the author of six books and over 200 articles, including “The Russia-ukraine War”. He is a recipient of the Rabindrana­th Tagore Internatio­nal Award for Art and Literature.

When World War II ended in 1945, it set in place a world order dominated by the five victorious powers— the United States, USSR, the United Kingdom, France and China. This continued for decades till the Soviet Union collapsed spectacula­rly in 1991, leaving the US as the sole superpower with visions of Pax Americana. A few strategic blunders— like the needless invasion of Iraq in 2003, being blindsided by the “peaceful” rise of China, and a calamitous withdrawal from Afghanista­n began a process of decline for the US, which in turn was matched by the rising assertions of China.

Another strategic blunder—that of needlessly expanding NATO right up to Russia’s frontiers brought about the disastrous Ukraine War, which is now a proxy war between the US and its allies and Russia and its allies. As the war goes on, subtle shifts have taken place in the world power equations. For starters, an isolated Russia has turned increasing­ly towards China as an economic and strategic ally. More importantl­y, the war in Europe has diverted the US and the western world to the main threat to the world—china, and shifted attention from the Indo-pacific back to Europe. And it has divided the world into two distinct camps, with shifts in the power equations which could define a new world order.

THE BEIJING-MOSCOW EMBRACE

Before Putin began his war in February 2022, he first visited his good friend Xi Jinping in Beijing. A year down the line, the Russiachin­a “no-limits-partnershi­p, with no forbidden areas of cooperatio­n” is stronger than ever. And the recent visit of Xi Jinping to Moscow in March has only reinforced the bonds and common fears that bring them together.

Both are convinced that the US and the Western world want to contain Russia and China. Both also believe that the US and the West are in terminal decline which can be hastened if they join hands. This “oncein-a-century moment of change” can be seized to bring about a new world order—a multi-polar one with China and Russia at the helm, which can counter US hegemony.

China makes no bones of the fact that it is squarely behind Russia in this war, and the post-war era that will follow. Russia will be the much junior partner, but it is still a situation that suits it. China has not provided Russia with arms—as yet—but may have done so surreptiti­ously. It can use the excuse of US providing arms to Ukraine and Taiwan as justificat­ion to do so. After successful­ly brokering the Saudi-iran deal, it revels in its new role as peace-maker and proposed a Ukraine peace plan that is so loaded in Russia’s favour (by implying that it be allowed to keep all its captured territorie­s) that it found no takers. But now, it is in a situation where China cannot allow Russia to lose—just as the West will not permit Ukraine to capitulate. And with China’s backing Russia will now be able to sustain the war longer, till war-weariness finally overcomes Ukraine, the US and Europe.

For China the war in Ukraine is linked to its core issue—taiwan. The outcome of the war could give China the go-ahead for their own agenda in Taiwan. Its aggressive­ness towards the island has increased and their latest exercise, Joint Sword, in early April was a clear signal of intent. Over 29 ships and 60 aircraft including the Shandong Carrier Group surrounded the island and launched simulated strikes on it. This is the second such exercise in the past six months and could well be a dress rehearsal for the real thing—in fact, any one of these exercises could well be converted to an actual invasion. Experts believe the Chinese invasion could come about by 2027—but the Ukraine war could hasten the timeline to as early as 2024-25. This invasion could well test the limits of US power. If it intervenes, they will suffer huge casualties and as per computer simulation­s, may even lose. Should they choose to stay away, their position in the Indo-pacific

is lost forever, and with it, their mantle of superpower­dom. If it succeeds, China will gain access to the entire South China Sea and the control of Taiwan’s semiconduc­tor chip industry which provides 80% of the world’s chips for virtually every industry in the world. This will give it a strategic and economic strangleho­ld, which will be difficult to shake off.

THE LIMITS OF U.S. POWER

Both Russia and China are convinced that the US is in decline and will soon lose its pre-eminence in world affairs. To some extent they are right. The US seems to be tiring of the Joe Biden’s blank cheque to fund the Ukraine war (estimated at around $80 billion now). With elections due in 2024, their engagement will reduce. A new incumbent in the White House—especially if it is Trump—could completely upend the

policy to advantage Russia. And even though the US prides itself on having strengthen­ed NATO, with Finland having joined (and Sweden soon to follow) and an increase in defence budgets of its prime members— European unity is fraying with the long war. Leaks reveal the US role in provoking and nurturing the war, and fingers are pointed towards it in the blowing up of the Nord Stream gas pipelines, which directly impacted European energy security. There is growing talk of preserving Europe’s “strategic autonomy” free of US influence. The recent visit of French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to Beijing, show that European allies are veering away from the US’ hard stance and willing to engage China, and even seek its help in ending the war.

More and more nations

are also moving away from petrodolla­rs and are purchasing oil in other currencies like the yuan, ruble, euro and even the rupee. The decline of the dollar as global currency is a good thing and reduces the strangleho­ld it had on world economies.

The US pulled out of Afghanista­n ostensibly to focus on the Indo-pacific. By doing so, not only did they lose prestige, they also ceded strategic space in Central Asia to China and Russia. Nor could they shift to the Indo-pacific, when their attention was completely diverted towards the European war. And China— coupled with the actions of Russia in Europe—may just decide to test the limits of western power by an action in the Indo-pacific—most probably Taiwan. Should they be able to pull it off, it could signal the irreversib­le decline of US and the rise of a multi-polar world tilted strongly towards China.

THE EMERGING DIVIDE

The Ukraine War has firmly divided Europe into a Russia versus the rest (barring a few equally isolated allies like Belarus). In doing so, it has created another iron curtain across Europe and sent Russia squarely towards China. The Russiachin­a embrace, though not formal, has solidified into an alliance which will draw other nations with similar grouses towards it—iran, North Korea, perhaps even Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. On the other side would be the US, Europe, South Korea, Japan, Australia, India and a host of others. It will be an ideologica­l, economic and strategic divide, that polarizes the world.

India, as a centre of power in this emerging multipolar world, can shift the balance to either side. It is significan­t that the recent Foreign Policy Concept released by Russia, identifies China, Russia and India as the “emerging powers of notable influence” and proposes strategic and economic ties with them. Incidental­ly, China has also endorsed this document, which seems to imply wooing India from the western camp towards their own. And of course, the US has identified India as the “defining partnershi­p” to counter China.

India is in a delicate tightrope walk. Although there has been a visible US tilt over the past decade or so, we must maintain our strategic autonomy and freedom of choice. And while we side with the US and the West in the concept of democratic values and a rulesbased order, we should not dilute our relations with Russia (although our ties could be impacted by their dependency on China). The most delicate balance would be with China. Its actions in Ladakh and Arunachal show that it will only increase its transgress­ions. Also, as we emerge economical­ly and strategica­lly, we will be seen as rival and potential threat (much as China perceives the US viewing it). It will thus take a deft mix of diplomacy and deterrence to stave them off. Developing alliances like Quad and AUKUS, and increasing strategic ties with other power centres—japan, the EU, Australia and Israel—will help us to hold our own.

The Ukraine war has brought about changes in the power structure of the world. It is quite likely that Russia will keep its military gains and then simply present a fait accompli. Then the line between Russia and the rest of the world will be drawn. China could use that to draw its own line in Indo-china. That will set the stage for another power struggle that encompasse­s both Europe and Asia, and lead to the emergence of a new global order. India could be one of the power centers of that order. But how well we play our cards, and how strongly we hold our own will help determine that.

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 ?? ?? A teacher of Gurukul school of art makes a painting on “One year Ukraine-russia war”, in Mumbai on 23 February. ANI
A teacher of Gurukul school of art makes a painting on “One year Ukraine-russia war”, in Mumbai on 23 February. ANI

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