India must change its policy on Tibet
India must signal its change in strategy by reversing at least partially its unconditional recognition of Tibet as Chinese territory.
Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s timely and high profile visit to the border village of Kibithoo in Arunachal Pradesh on 10 April to inaugurate the “Vibrant Villages” programme that emphasises development and his categorical assertion that “no one can encroach on even an inch of our territory” are a confident, robust and in your face rejoinder to China’s surreptitious attempts to stake its claim on Indian territory by publicising new names for places in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh; it adds a degree of panache to India’s traditional low key China policy.
Despite recent efforts under Prime Minister Narendra Modi to shore up our defences along the Indiatibet border with new infrastructure developments and increased deployment of armed forces, our China policy falters for it suffers from a fatal, psychological flaw; an approach that is more reactive than proactive; a quandary that has us scurrying all the time to defend our position in lieu of putting our enemy on the backfoot.
We may take immense moral pride in the fact that we have never coveted other nation’s territories. But in the world of hard realpolitik, this hyper exhibition of morality counts for little except for brownie points in our own minds. There is no tangible benefit; it provides no negotiating leverage. Additionally, appeasement has been the guiding mantra of our foreign policy; another crippling tendency. India has consistently bent over backwards to mollify
China in order to sustain good relations. For example, in 2018 prior to an informal meeting between PM Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, Indian officials were directed not to attend the celebrations organised by the Tibetan government in-exile marking 60 years of the Tibetan uprising against China, forcing the event to be moved out of New Delhi to Dharmsala. India’s response to China’s endless shenanigans over the years has been muted or low key.
Brahma Chellaney, the strategic expert rightly sums up this self-defeating attitude (Don’t Underestimate China’s Game Plan for Arunachal Pradesh, Open, 7 April 2023): “MEA has yet to grasp that timely communication is critical for foreign policy in an era in which social media and mass media increasingly help shape narratives. It invariably is slow to respond to China’s info war, psy-ops or lawfare. At times it even fails to respond.”
India’s restraint and appeasement have produced no dividends. Appeasement rarely produces results. In fact, it emboldens one’s foes to push further and further, extracting more and more concessions. Moreover, India cannot be under the erroneous delusion that India’s civilised approach will deter a
military response: when the time is ripe China will launch a military offensive to further its strategic interests or to stamp its dominance over the region by humiliating its archrival India, regardless of our attitude.
Therefore, in tandem with attaining some degree of military parity with Chinaa must, India must open up a vigorous diplomatic offensive that discomfits China. The key to this is Tibet: China’s Achilles heel.
Tibet has been a distinct entity separate from China for the greater part of its history dating back to at least the 6th century when the Yarlung dynasty established the historical Tibetan Empire. China’s claim to Tibet rests on the period between 1720 to 1912 when Tibet was forcibly occupied by the Qing dynasty.
However, even during this time frame the exact relationship between the Qing Empire (the forerunner of modern China) and Tibet is a matter of debate. Tibet continued to enjoy a fair degree of autonomy with significant power vested with the Dalai Lamas. At times it was referred to as a vassal state but never considered an integral part of China.
A series of tripartite trade treaties between Britain, Tibet and China executed from 1890 to 1908 also underline the ambiguity in relations between China and Tibet: a Tibetan representative was present on most occasions attesting to the semi-autonomous nature of Tibet. And in 1904, Britain and Tibet signed a bilateral trade agreement without any Chines presence.
With the fall of the Quing Empire in 1912, uncertainty over Tibet’s sovereignty ceased to be an issue. Tibet became an independent nation till 1949 when it was overrun by the People’s Liberation Army following the Communist Revolution.
To validate its occupation, China forced the local Tibetan government to sign a treaty on 23 May 1951 called the Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet or otherwise known as The Seventeen Point Agreement. As per China this agreement was later ratified by the 14th Dalai Lama.
However, after fleeing to India in 1959, the Dali Lama averred: “The agreement which followed the invasion of Tibet was also thrust upon its people and Government by the threat of arms. It was never accepted by them of their own free will. The consent of the Government was secured under duress and at the point of the bayonet… Even the Tibetan seal which was affixed to the agreement was not the seal of my representatives but a seal copied and fabricated by the Chinese authorities in Peking and kept in their possession ever since.” (Text of the Dalai Lama’s Statement of June 20, 1959, at Mussoorie, India, The Sunday Statesman, India, June 21, 1959; The New York Times, June 21, 1959.)
China’s claim to Tibet is a dubious one; a fraudulent one facilitated by military might and coerced agreements; not a cultural or historical bond.
Why is Tibet’s status so important for India? This is because all of China’s boundary disputes with India stem from the corollary that Tibet is a part of China. Question this basic premise and the logistics of the boundary dispute collapse like a pack of cards.
However, India has failed to capitalise on the Tibet card. In 1954, when India signed the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India (also called the 1954 Sino-indian Agreement, or the Panchsheel Agreement), India in effect accepted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet because for the first time in history Tibet was referred to as the Tibet region of China in that document.
That treaty expired in 1962. Nevertheless, India reiterated its acceptance of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as a part of the People’s Republic of China, during Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003. Again it was a surrender carte blanche; there were no caveats, no bartering.
With close to 100,000 Tibetans living in exile in India along with the Dalai Lama for over 60 years, India has every right to question China on this issue. India must signal its change in strategy by reversing at least partially its unconditional recognition of Tibet.
At the outset, this volte face may appear like pure semantics or even foolhardy, quite removed from the ground reality. wherein a powerful China physically occupies Tibet and its army stands eyeball to eyeball with our jawans. However, in international statecraft, diplomatic posturing is sometimes as important if not more important than military posturing.
An outright rejection of China’s claim to Tibet is not warranted but subtle gestures (like giving more prominence to the Tibetans in India and issuing separate visas to residents of Tibet as China once did with J&K residents) and statement couched in enough ambiguity to cause China some discomfiture should suffice; in effect playing by the same rules that China adheres to.
All along it has been India that has been dancing to a narrative scripted by China. It is time to turn the tables.