Deterring the Dragon
Brigadier (retd) Gurmeet Kanwal on developing India’s military capabilities
Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal, former Director CLAWS, looks at development of India’s military capabilities as a hedge against the Chinese threat along the northern borders. Despite various attempts to improve relationships between the two Asian giants, there are areas of concern which could trigger off a future conflict. Raising of the Mountain Strike Corps is a pragmatic move which will help India upgrade is military strategy and provide genuine deterrence.
China and India, both Asian giants and emerging world powers, have begun to exercise immense influence in international political and economic affairs. As China’s GDP is much larger than that of India, it enjoys a correspondingly greater international clout - at present. Relations between India and China have been fairly stable at the strategic level with political and economic relations between India and China much better now than these have ever been since the 1962 border war between the two countries. Economic relations are much better too than in the past. Mutual economic dependence is growing rapidly every year, with bilateral trade increasing at a brisk pace. Even though it is skewed in China’s favour, bilateral trade has crossed US$ 60 billion and is expected to touch US$ 100 billion soon. The two countries have been cooperating in international fora like WTO talks and climate change negotiations, and there has even been some cooperation in energy security.
Unfortunately, growth in the strategic and security relationship has not kept pace with the political and economic relationship. Despite prolonged negotiations at the political level to resolve the long-standing territorial and boundary dispute between the two countries, there has been little progress on this really sensitive issue. China has a clandestine nuclear warheads-ballistic missiles- military hardware technology transfer relationship with Pakistan that causes continued apprehension in India.
Also, in recent years, China appears to have raised the ante by way of its shrill political rhetoric, frequent transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and unprecedented cyber attacks on Indian networks. This security situation has the potential to act as a spoiler in the larger relationship and will ultimately determine whether the two Asian giants will clash – or cooperate – for mutual gains. Arguably, while the India- China relationship is relatively stable at the strategic level, China’s political, diplomatic and military aggressiveness at the tactical level is acting as a dampener. China’s assertive behaviour regarding India is in keeping with its recent aggressiveness in areas of the East China Sea and the South China Sea. While the probability of armed conflict is low, its possibility cannot be ruled out.
Strategic Relationship: Competition or Cooperation?
On 11 April, 2005, China and India announced a new ‘strategic and cooperative’ partnership after a summit-level meeting between Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao. International analysts were quick to pronounce that the prospects of a more cooperative relationship between these two growing economies had significant global implications. A meaningful strategic partnership would lead to mutually beneficial synergies between Chinese and Indian economies. As India is rapidly emerging as a leader in software development, its knowledge-based industries are attracting the interest of major information technology (IT) enterprises from all over the world, while China has become a leading base for the manufacture of IT hardware. Synergising India’s software capability and China’s hardware strength will arguably produce an unbeatable combination.
The rapidly growing needs of both the countries for energy and their high dependence on oil and gas imports, is forcing both to secure oil equity abroad.
Chinese and Indian oil and gas companies have often been in competition with each other to invest in overseas fields and have driven up prices by outbidding each other. A strategy based on cooperation rather than competition will help both the countries to secure better terms and enable them to share their risks. They could follow a consortium or joint venture approach for bidding and invest in sharing infrastructure costs such as building joint pipelines. Thus far, however, cooperation in this field has been extremely limited.
China and India’s coordinated approach in international negotiations is proving to be mutually beneficial to both. The two countries have been following a coordinated approach in the ongoing WTO negotiations and on environmental issues, which was particularly evident during the 2009 World Climate Summit at Copenhagen. When two countries that
represent more than a third of the global population speak in unison, the world has no option but to sit up and take note. China and India played a calming role in the 2008-09 global financial melt-down that has now begun to peter out. They are likely to work together towards the long-pending reform of the international financial architecture. As both the countries hold substantial foreign exchange reserves, they must increasingly play a greater role in decision-making in the existing Bretton Woods organisations.
Reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC) is yet another area for cooperation. Just as India had played a very positive role in China’s initial membership of the UN and its subsequent inclusion in the UNSC, India expects China to support its aspiration for a seat in an expanded UNSC. This will quite naturally increase Asia’s clout in world affairs. However, so far such explicit support has not been forthcoming. In Asia, China and India should work together for peace and stability and broader regional economic integration to make the 21st century truly Asia’s century. Counter-terrorism is another area in which China and India can cooperate for mutual benefit as both countries are victims of Islamist fundamentalist terrorism emanating from across their borders. In this context, the Hand-in-Hand series of joint military exercises, conducted at Kunming in 2007, at Belgaum in 2008 and after a gap of five years again at Kunming in November 2013, were positive steps in the right direction. Both also need to work together to counter the menace of narcotics trafficking from the Golden Crescent on one side and the Golden Triangle on the other.
Areas of Concern
In the Indian perception, there are several major areas of concern that are limiting the growth of the bilateral relationship. The foremost among these is the “allweather” friendship between China and Pakistan that is, in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s words, “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans”. The Indian government and most Indian analysts are convinced that China has given nuclear warhead designs, fissile material and missile technology as well as fully assembled, crated M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan, all this widely reported in the international media. China and Pakistan also have a joint weapons and equipment development programme that includes Al Khalid tanks, F-22 frigates and JF-17 fighter aircraft. China’s military aid has considerably strengthened Pakistan’s war–waging potential and enabled it to launch and sustain a proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir and in other parts of India. By implication, therefore, this is also China’s proxy war on India.
Other contentious issues include China’s continuing opposition to India’s nuclear weapons programme; its deep inroads into Myanmar and support to its military regime; its covert assistance to the now almost defunct LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in Sri Lanka; its increasing activities in the Bay of Bengal; its attempts to isolate India in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) while keeping India out of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and its relentless efforts to increase its influence in Nepal and Bangladesh. China’s efforts to develop port facilities in Myanmar (Hangyi), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), the Maldives and at Gwadar in Pakistan – Baluchistan are seen by many Indian analysts as forming part of a ‘string of pearls’ strategy to contain India and develop the capacity
to dominate the northern Indian Ocean region from around 2015-20. Although at present the Indian Navy dominates the northern Indian Ocean, a maritime clash is possible in the future as the PLA Navy begins operating in the Indian Ocean – ostensibly to safeguard its sea lanes and protect its merchant marine traffic. Hence, China’s moves are seen by Indian analysts as part of a carefully orchestrated plan aimed at the strategic encirclement of India in the long-term to counter-balance India’s growing power and influence in Asia, even as in the short term China engages India on the political and economic fronts.
China and India are both nucleararmed states and it is in the interest of both to ensure that strategic stability is maintained and that the risk of accidental or unauthorised nuclear exchanges is obviated. This would be possible only if negotiators from both the sides get together to discuss nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs). However, China’s insistence that it cannot discuss nuclear CBMs and NRRMs with India “as India is not a nuclear weapons state recognised by the NPT” is proving to be a stumbling block. China’s official position is that India should cap, roll back and eliminate its nuclear weapons in terms of UNSC Resolution No 1172. That is unlikely to happen. India has been recognised as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology and has been given a backdoor entry into the NPT through the NSG waiver and the IAEA safeguards agreement. India has also signed civil nuclear cooperation agreements with France, Russia and the United States. It would be in the interest of both India and China to discuss nuclear CBMs and NRRMs so as to enhance strategic stability in Southern Asia. It is also in China’s interest to enter into a nuclear trade agreement with India as India is rapidly emerging as a large market for nuclear fuel and nuclear technology.
India realises that its growing external relations with new strategic partners are causing some concern in China. China has viewed with obvious suspicion India’s willingness to join Australia, Japan and the US in a ‘quadrilateral’ engagement to promote shared common interests in South East Asia. China also wishes to reduce what it perceives as the steadily increasing “influence” of the USA over New Delhi. China is surely aware that the US is several years ahead of Beijing in recognising India’s potential as a military and economic power, having greatly increased its cooperation with India in both spheres. China fears that the growing US-India strategic partnership is actually a “loose alliance” and that the two countries are “ganging up” against China. China should study India’s track record whence it must be clear that India is unlikely to ever form a military alliance with the USA – unlike Pakistan, which is a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the US and is also China’s “all weather” friend ! India has always pursued an independent foreign policy and cherishes its strategic autonomy. It will be recalled that India steadfastly supported the Non- aligned Movement (NAM) for several decades during the Cold War and has never entered into a military alliance with any country. The USA is an Asian country in the strategic sense and it is necessary for India to maintain good relations with it. It is also India’s largest
trading partner and has a large Indian Diaspora. There are major convergences of interests between India and the US. Hence, India’s newfound strategic relationship with the US need not come in the way of India-China relations, which have their own strategic imperatives for India.
In an article entitled Warning to the Indian Government (posted on the website of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies on 26 March 2008), Zhan Lue, a Communist Party member, warned India not to “walk today along the old road of resisting China” as the People’s Liberation Army is now well-entrenched in Tibet and will not repeat its mistake of withdrawing after a border war as it did in 1962. He extolled the virtues of the PLA’s newly developed capabilities and went on to advise India “not to requite kindness with ingratitude.” This surprisingly sharp attack in a scholarly journal did not appear to be an isolated piece of writing. Another Chinese scholar advised his government to engage with India’s neighbours so as to “break India into 26 parts”. In the wake of the Tibetan unrest in India and across the world earlier during 2008, anti-India rhetoric in the Chinese media had been ratcheted up several notches. Analysts in India believe that such scurrilous writings could not have been published without the express sanction of the Chinese authorities as almost all Chinese media are state controlled. This type of rhetoric certainly sets back efforts at any reconciliation and mutual understanding.
In turn, it should be accepted that China is concerned about the situation that might develop when the Dalai Lama passes away. Despite all the raving and ranting against him, the Chinese government is acutely conscious of the fact that the present Dalai Lama’s is a voice of moderation and accommodation. They know that there could be a major uprising in Tibet when he passes away as the Tibetan youth will no longer feel constrained to respect his cherished desire for peace and harmony and are likely to resort to violent attacks against the Han Chinese people and officials and state property.
Despite India’s remarkable restraint over the past 50 years, the Chinese are not sure of how India will react to a post-Dalai Lama rebellion in Tibet. In fact, the Chinese have always harboured a fair deal of ill will against India for providing the Dalai Lama with a sanctuary – even though India has forbidden him from any anti-China political activities from Indian soil and the Dalai Lama has honoured the restraints imposed on him by his hosts. A senior Chinese interlocutor told this analyst at a bilateral think tanks’ dialogue at Bangkok in October 2009 that relations between China and India would flourish very well if India was to hand over the Dalai Lama to China, even at this belated stage. The depth of Chinese resentment with India for providing shelter to the Dalai Lama can be gauged from this. Since such a course of action would be completely out of character with India’s civilisational and spiritual values, handing over the Dalai Lama is simply out of the question. China would, therefore, do well to put this issue aside and move forward in developing its relationship with India.
A major area of concern to India is the rapid development of Chinese military
infrastructure in Tibet. The Gormo-Lhasa railway line is now fully operational. The rail network is proposed to be extended towards Shigatse and then even into Nepal. China has recently developed a road network of 58,000 km and five new air bases in the territory. New military camps have come up close to the border with India. Telephone and radio communication infrastructure has been considerably improved. China has been practicing the rapid induction of airborne divisions into Tibet. Some Indian analysts have estimated that China is now capable of inducting – and sustaining about 25 to 30 divisions in Tibet in a single campaign season. Short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), some of them nuclear tipped, are also known to be deployed in Tibet. Surely, all these developments are not for sustaining Tibet’s fledgling economy!
The continuing improvement of military infrastructure in Tibet does not augur well for future peace and stability between the two nations in light of the unresolved territorial and boundary dispute.
Of all the areas of concern that have dampened relations between the two countries, it is the long-standing territorial and boundary dispute which is the most disconcerting. The genesis of the territorial dispute is well known and not repeated here. Since well before the 1962 border war, China has remained in occupation of large areas of Indian territory. In Aksai Chin in Ladakh, China is in physical possession of approximately 38,000 square kilometres of Indian territory since the mid- 1950s when China surreptitiously built its alternative route from Tibet to Sinkiang through this part of Aksai Chin. In addition, in March 1963, Pakistan incredibly ceded 5,180 sq km of Indian (J&K) territory in the Shaksgam Valley of the Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir ( north of the Siachen Glacier and west of the Karakoram Pass) to China under a boundary agreement that India does not recognise. Through this area, China built the Karakoram highway that now provides a strategic land link between Sinkiang, Tibet and Pakistan.
In India’s north-east, China continues to stake claims to about 96,000 sq km of Indian territory that includes the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh even though the territory has always been part of India in contemporary history. In terms of physical area, Arunachal Pradesh is over three times the size of Taiwan. Sun Yuxi, the then Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, had in fact publicly reiterated China’s claim just before President Hu Jintao’s visit in November 2006. The ambassador thus single-handedly ensured that his President received a cold shoulder in Delhi and the visit turned out to be inconsequential. Since then, Chinese interlocutors have claimed several times that the ‘Tawang Tract’ is part of Tibet because one of the Dalai Lamas was born there. Chinese scholars visiting New Delhi always hint that the merger of the Tawang Tract with Tibet is non-negotiable. China’s often stated official position on such issues is that the reunification of Chinese territories is a ‘sacred duty’. The concern exhibited by the Chinese authorities for a former Dalai Lama is curious as they lose no opportunity to revile the living Dalai Lama !
An inherently destabilising situation stems from the omission that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China ( implying de facto control after the 1962 war), is yet to be physically demarcated on ground and delineated on military maps. The LAC is quite different from the disputed 4,056 km long boundary between India and Tibet. The un-delineated LAC is a major destabilising factor as patrol face-offs are not uncommon and could even result in armed clashes between patrols. Incidents such as the Nathu La border clash of 1967 and the Wang Dung standoff of 1986 can well recur. Such incidents have the potential to escalate into another border conflict similar to the war of 1962.
Even after over 16 meetings of the Joint Working Group and the Experts Group, it has not been possible for the two countries
to exchange maps showing the respective versions of the LAC claimed by the two armies in the contentious Western (LadakhAksai Chin) and Eastern (Arunachal Pradesh) sectors. Discussion of the varying positions can begin only after marked maps are first exchanged. The only positive development has been that maps have been exchanged for the least contentious Central Sector, that is, the Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh borders with Tibet where no fighting had taken place in 1962. This clearly shows how intractable the challenge is.
Early in 2005, India and China had agreed to identify “guiding principles and parameters” for a political solution to the five- decade old border dispute. Many foreign policy analysts had then hailed this as a great leap forward but some years down the line, the two countries are still stuck with the principles and a solution is nowhere in sight. In fact, even the sanctity of the principles accepted by the two sides is in doubt as China has violated the agreed principle that “settled populations will not be disturbed” while arriving at an acceptable solution by so vociferously laying its claim to Tawang. This is not the first time that India has signed a “feel-good” agreement with the Chinese. The Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) signed with the Chinese in 1993 and the agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the military field signed in 1996 were expected to reduce the operational commitments of the army from having to permanently man the difficult LAC with China. However, it has not been deemed possible to withdraw a single Indian soldier from the LAC so far.
In fact, despite the 1996 agreement on CBMs, several incidents of Chinese transgressions of the LAC at Asaphi La and elsewhere in Arunachal Pradesh and in Ladakh have been periodically reported in the Indian media and discussed in the Indian Parliament. Defence Minister A K Antony stated in the Rajya Sabha in midMay 2012 that China had violated the LAC over 500 times since January 2010. India refers to such violations as “transgressions” and not “intrusions” as intrusions have a sense of permanence about them. The PLA Border Guards have even intruded across the Sikkim border with Tibet in Area ‘Finger’ but were pushed back. This is a settled portion of the border and is
marked by recognisable landmarks. While no violent incident has taken place in the recent past, there have been occasions when Indian and Chinese patrols have met faceto-face in areas like the two ‘fish-tail’ shaped protrusions in the north-eastern corner of Arunachal Pradesh. Such meetings have an element of tension built into them and despite the best of military discipline the possibility of an armed clash can never be ruled out. An armed clash in which there are heavy casualties can lead to a larger border incident that may not remain localised.
The PLA has been flexing its muscles through an aggressive border management policy to stake claim to disputed areas in all the three sectors – western (Ladakh), middle (Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh) and eastern (Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh). Armed motorised boat patrols in the strategically- located Trig Heights and Pangong Tso Lake in eastern Ladakh have also been intensified by the PLA since 2009. Chinese troops damaged a 200-feet long stonewall in Yangtse area of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh in 2011, which was subsequently re-built by India after lodging a strong protest with China. India hopes “that the new bilateral boundary coordination mechanism, which became operational after being inked during the 15th round of border talks between India’s National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon and his Chinese counterpart Dai Bingguo in January 2012, will help prevent border flare-ups between the two armies”.
In the Western sector, the Ladakh-Aksai Chin area, the LAC is even more ambiguous because the paucity of easily recognisable terrain features on the Aksai Chin makes it difficult to accurately co-relate the ground with map. Both sides habitually send patrols up to the point at which, in their perception, the LAC runs. These patrols leave ‘tell-tale’ signs behind in the form of burjis (piles of stones), biscuit and cigarette packets and other similar markers in a sort of primitive ritual to lay stake to territory and so assert their claim. While the government invariably advises caution, it is extremely difficult for commanders of troops to advocate a soft line to their subordinates. There is an inherent contradiction in sending armed soldiers to patrol what they are told, and believe are, Indian areas and then giving them orders that they must not under any circumstances fire on “intruding” Chinese soldiers. This is the reason why it is operationally critical to demarcate the LAC on the ground and on the map. Once that is done, the inadequacy of recognisable terrain features can be overcome by exploiting GPS technology to accurately navigate up to the agreed and well-defined LAC on the ground and avoid transgressing it, even unintentionally.
In this light, the Chinese intransigence in not being willing to exchange maps showing the alignment of the LAC in the Western and the Eastern sectors is difficult to understand. In 1988, China’s leader Deng Xiao Ping had told visiting Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that “the territorial dispute is a problem left over from history and it should be left for future generations to resolve”. Early resolution of the dispute is in the interest of both the countries as it will end the suspicions and hostility of the past and free both the countries to shape a more friendly future for mutual benefit. China and India must resolve the territorial and boundary dispute on the basis of historical records, geography, security parameters and interests of the people who live in the area. Meanwhile, it is in the interest of both the countries that peace and tranquility should continue to prevail on the border.
Previous agreements on resolution of the territorial dispute and those designed to build confidence include the Agreement on Maintaining Peace and Tranquillity Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, 7 September 1993;
the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures ( CBMs) in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, 29 November 1996; the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, 11 April 2005; the Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in India-China Border Areas, 11 April, 2005; and, the Agreement on Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, 17 January 2012. The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), the latest in the series, was signed during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Beijing in October 2013.
The BDCA commits the two sides to “periodic meetings” of military and civilian officers and to exchange information – including information about military exercises, aircraft movements, demolition operations and unmarked mines. It emphasises the avoidance of border patrols “tailing” each other and recommends that the two sides “may consider” establishing a hot-line between military headquarters in both countries. However, this agreement too substantially falls short of removing the anomalies and impracticalities of the previous agreements that have not worked well as it does not address the root cause of the ongoing tensions, that is, the non-delineation of the LAC.
Raising the Mountain Strike Corps
As long as the territorial and boundary dispute with China remains unresolved, though the probability of conflict is low, its possibility cannot be ruled out and India must prepare for such a conflict. With its present military capabilities and defensive strategy, India is well poised to defend its territory against Chinese aggression. However, that is not adequate to deter aggression. India must upgrade its military strategy against China from dissuasion to deterrence. Only having a capability to take the war into Chinese territory will deter the adversary from initiating another border war. Such a capability is essentially provided by strike formations of the army combined with the ability of the Indian Air Force to dominate the skies over Tibet to give army commanders the freedom to inflict punitive damage. The Indian Army needs at least two Mountain Strike Corps to take the war into Chinese territory – one each for Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.
On 17 July 2013, the Cabinet Committee on Security ( CCS) finally approved the army’s proposal for raising such Strike Corps for the mountains. Though the approval came after considerable delay, it is a pragmatic move that will send an appropriate message across the Himalayas. It will help India to upgrade its military strategy against China from dissuasion to genuine deterrence as the Mountain Strike Corps, in conjunction with the Indian Air Force, will provide the capability to launch offensive operations across the Himalayas so as to take any future war into Chinese territory.
First of the new Mountain Strike Corps (XVII) will comprise two infantry divisions and will be supported by three independent armoured brigades, three artillery brigades to provide potent firepower, an engineer and air defence brigade each, an aviation brigade and units providing logistics services. The Corps will cost Rs 64,000 crore to raise and equip over a period of five to seven years. Approximately 90,000 new personnel will be added to the army’s manpower strength, including those in ancillary support and logistics units. The army has already raised the 56 and 71 Mountain Divisions and deployed them in Arunachal Pradesh to fill existing gaps in the defences. Some elements of these Divisions will act as readily available reserves for the new Strike Corps to add weight along the axis of attack and exploit success. These Divisions will also be employed to secure launch pads for offensive operations across the Himalayas. Hence, these must be seen as playing a significant supporting role for the Mountain Strike Corps.
As the territorial dispute with Pakistan over Jammu & Kashmir is also in mountainous terrain, there is very high probability that the next conventional conflict India will again break out in the mountains. Since the war will be fought under a nuclear overhang, particularly with Pakistan, there is a fair possibility that it will remain confined to the mountains so that it does not escalate out of control to nuclear exchanges. Hence, it was time for India to pivot to the mountains in its quest for building military capacities and it is creditable that the government has given the go ahead to raise this new Mountain Strike Corps.
In any future war that the armed forces are called upon to fight in the mountains, gaining, occupying and holding territory and evicting the enemy from occupied Indian territory will continue to remain as important military aims. While these will be infantry predominant operations, no war plan will succeed without achieving massive asymmetries in the application of firepower to destroy the enemy’s combat potential and infrastructure. Therefore, Army- IAF operational plans must be fully integrated, must be jointly evolved, meticulously coordinated and flexible enough to be fine-tuned to exploit fleeting opportunities and to take advantage of the enemy’s reactions during execution. This is especially so in the mountains where the military aims and objectives are inherently limited in scope because of the terrain. Both the Services must work together to create the capabilities that are necessary to take the battle well into enemy territory during any next war in the mountains.
As artillery batteries and regiments cannot be moved and re-deployed easily,
operations in the mountains place a premium on battlefield air support. Operational mastery over air- to- ground strikes can influence the outcome of tactical battles in the mountains extremely favourably. Firepower ratios can be enhanced to levels necessary for achieving overwhelming superiority only through major upgradation in the availability of artillery guns, rocket launchers and missiles and offensive air support. A contract for the acquisition of 144 howitzers of 155 mm calibre has been hanging fire for long and needs to be expedited. The new artillery units that will be raised must be equipped with short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) that can engage targets deep inside Tibet from deployment areas in the plains. Precisionguided munitions ( PGMs) need to be acquired in large numbers both by the artillery and the IAF to accurately destroy important targets such as communications centres. The government must also hasten the acquisition of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment.
The peculiarities of terrain and the lack of sufficient road communications, particularly lateral roads that connect the road axes leading to the border, will place heavier demands on helicopter lift for the movement of reserves within divisional and brigade sectors. At the operational level, only an ‘air assault’ formation can turn the tide through vertical envelopment and enable deep offensive operations to be carried out when employed in conjunction with Special Forces. An air assault brigade group inducted across the LoC or LAC by helicopters after the IAF has achieved a favourable air situation can seize an objective in depth. Ideally, each of the Infantry Divisions of the strike Corps must have an integral air assault brigade to provide the requisite airlift support. Airmobile operations can also play a major role in influencing the course of the war. During Operation Parakram in 2001-02, an almost complete Brigade Group was airlifted to Kashmir Valley to enhance the reserves available in XV Corps for offensive operations. In addition to attack helicopters, which will provide sustained firepower support, a large number of utility helicopters will be required to support offensive operations across the Himalayas, comprising both medium- and heavy-lift helicopters.
The successful launching of operations by the Mountain Strike Corps will of course depend on the availability of good infrastructure, including double-lane roads with all-weather capability and suitably placed logistics nodes. Unfortunately Indian plans to upgrade the infrastructure in the frontiers bordering China have not been progressing at an adequate pace. In fact, there have been inordinate delays also because of the lack of environmental clearances and other non-military reasons. Simultaneous to the raising of the new Strike Corps being equipped and trained, the government must make vigorous efforts to speed up completion of these infrastructural projects, otherwise, the army will have a new Strike Corps but not able to launch and sustain it effectively.
In summary, it is of concern that the military gap between India and China is growing steadily, with the PLA modernising at a rapid pace thanks to the double-digit annual growth in the Chinese defence budget while India’s military modernisation plans continue to remain mired in incredible red tape. Chinese armed forces have surged ahead of India’s in many areas of defence modernisation and the gap is slowly becoming unbridgeable. China’s defence budget with growing annually between 16 and 18 per cent. In a decade or two, China may were attempt to force a military solution to the territorial dispute with India, perhaps after “settling” the Taiwan issue and India forced to accept an unequal settlement because of its military weakness.
China’s negotiating strategy on the territorial dispute is to seemingly stall resolution of the dispute till they are in a much stronger position in terms of comprehensive national strength and then dictate terms. The rapidly blossoming strategic partnership between China and Pakistan is also a major cause for concern. During any future conflict with either China or Pakistan – even though the probability is low – India may have to contend with a two-front situation as each is likely to collude militarily with the other, a situation for which the Indian armed forces are not prepared. It is in India’s interest to strive for an early resolution of the territorial dispute with China so that India has only one major military front to contend with.
But overall, as two large countries with a shared border and a long history of peaceful co-existence, the governments of China and India have a responsibility to discharge towards their own people and the people of Asia: both can and must work together in the interest of peace, stability and the future prosperity of Asia. Healthy competition for markets can have positive spin offs as long as it is conducted in a spirit of cooperative security. China must not hold resolution of the territorial dispute hostage to its successful integration of Tibet with the national mainstream. Once the long-standing territorial dispute is resolved, there is no reason why the dragon and the elephant cannot dance together.