Afghanistan : a grave unfolding crisis
The region of the historical Great Games, the land of the Hindu Kush, is on edge once again, with a grave crisis unfolding, portending a bleak future, importantly for Afghanistan’s integrity itself. Continually reeling with political instability and senseless Taliban-perpetrated violence, notwithstanding more than a decade of a formidable US and International Security Forces’ (ISAF) military presence in Afghanistan, the hapless fratricidal conflict-afflicted country faces stormy times with the impending, perhaps ill-timed, withdrawal of the US and the ISAF in 2014.
For years, the principal player in this region, the United States, essentially not having achieved its strategic objective of effectively ‘cleansing’ this region of the Al Qaida and other fundamentalist Islamic terror conglomerates, is looking eagerly to vacate Afghanistan, thus leaving behind a volatile restive nation to its fate. This does not, at all, speak highly of the world’s sole super power, notwithstanding the military fatigue and financial burden the USA has undergone in its 12 years of presence in this violent expanse. Nevertheless, the US can take comfort for what it achieved in the early part of the decade when it had ousted the fundamentalist Taliban regime from Kabul in 2001 and later eliminated Al Qaida supremo Osama bin Laden in 2011 who had clandestinely hidden in the garrison town of Abbottabad in Pakistan since 2005. That the US endeavoured, rather unsuccessfully, to usher in stable democracy and peace in Afghanistan before its proposed inglorious exit, will remain historically one of America’s grave failures just as Vietnam was in the mid-sixties, and more recently, Iraq.
With the draw-down of the US troops and the ISAF in 2014 from Afghanistan, perhaps leaving a small ‘training contingent’ and some air effort, teams to operate US drones, a security detail and some logistics and maintenance detachments, the US forces will be in no position to provide any worthwhile security to the Karzai regime or any government civil or military installations. Thus
the situation will be ripe for the formidable Pakistani-supported Taliban, Pashtun warlords such as Gulbuddin Hekayatmar, the Haqqani network and remnants of Al Qaida foot soldiers to create mayhem not only in Kabul but especially the eastern and southern portions of Afghanistan to fill in the political and security vacuum respectively created by President Hamid Karzai’s relinquishing his Presidential post and the US withdrawal. Thus, surmising that Pakistan and the Talibani cohorts are eagerly awaiting US forces’ departure, will be an understatement !
Time is now running out for Afghanistan and India, as the leading South Asian power, has to take the initiative to stabilise this violent, albeit strategic, expanse.
It is indeed paradoxical that most nations that have a direct stake in Afghanistan’s future have, by and large, conflicting objectives. The US now only wish for a near trouble-free exit with their heavy equipment and minimum of ‘bodybags’, the Russians looking for some enhanced military sales to some future dispensation in Kabul, the Chinese, in their unending quest for resources the world over, are currently eyeing the huge mineral deposits of Afghanistan, while the Iranians plan to restore their Shia influence in Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, the Pakistanis are unabashedly looking ahead to planting an absolutely pliant regime in Kabul which can acquiesce to Pakistan’s eternal ‘strategic depth’ conundrum and also, importantly, keep India totally out of reckoning, even in development projects in impoverished Afghanistan. That Pakistan will leave no stone unturned to prevent India from even cementing its soft power forays in Afghanistan should be factored in not only by the Indian government but also by the large number of out-of -reality peaceniks in this nation.
India, which is respected by a majority of Afghanis, in keeping with its inborn ancient pacifist and reactive inclinations, appears not showing any signs of a proactive approach in its future Kabul policy, post the US withdrawal in 2014. The prospective shape of Afghanistan, after 2014, is going to be a litmus test for India’s foreign policy in the immediate future. Afghanistan as a nation is of much strategic significance for India. No personality in recent times has summed up Kabul’s importance to India than the Afghan Ambassador in Delhi prior to his President, Hamid Karzai’s visit to India in May 2013 stating unreservedly and reminding India that “it is critically important that the two countries…… deepen and talk more substantive issues beyond training and other soft issues.” He further added rather succinctly that “… investment in the security and development in Afghanistan means the safety and security of India.”
President Karzai during his May 2013 visit had brought a ‘wish-list’ for defence equipment to discuss with the Indian government. Nevertheless, it will be in India’s interest that whatever it can do to reinforce Kabul’s security must be done speedily and effectively within the frame-work of the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Treaty 2011. Without dispatching any ‘ boots on the ground’, India must sell/ donate some lethal arms and equipment including helicopters, T- 72 tanks, BMP infantry combat vehicles, heavy machine guns, 105mm light artillery, tactical bridging, mines and mine clearing equipment, heavy machine guns etc to bolster the muchneeded combat capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In actual fact, it is the ANSF’s capabilities that will become the centre of gravity for Afghanistan’s survival.
As India continues with its humanitarian and economic uplift endeavours in Afghanistan, it also needs to beef up the security of its development and infrastructure projects by dispatching additional para-military units for guarding them as they are constantly under threat from Taliban attack.
In addition, though newly elected Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif may not be able to immediately pursue a peaceful and reconciliatory policy towards Afghanistan and India owing to strong pressure from the Pakistan Army and the fundamentalist ‘tanzeems’ in Pakistan, India should endeavour to balance both bilateral and trilateral relationships between these three nations which have a common stake in fostering peace and stability in the region.
Time is now running out for Afghanistan and India, as the leading South Asian power, has to take the initiative to stabilise this violent, albeit strategic, expanse. Afghanistan must not be allowed to be engulfed into a civil war, which some strategic analysts rightly fear. With President Karzai’s cooperation and consent, India must vigorously keep open its communication channels with the Pashtuns of diverse hues and revive its old linkages with the erstwhile Northern Alliance, the Uzbeks and the Hazaras.
Notwithstanding Pakistan’s likely machinations to establish a pro-Islamabad fundamentalist regime in Kabul, India must move with determination and alacrity on a multitude of fronts embracing the diplomatic, economic and military to help ensure a peaceful and smooth transition in Kabul, post Karzai’s, and the US, departure from Afghanistan in 2014.