The PLAAF vs IAF over Tibet : A Capability Assessment

The Indian Air Force surely appreciates the PLAAF’s continued introduction of newer aircraft types and upgradation of A2/AD capabilities. While continuing to acquire newer air superiority fighters, such as the Su- 35 from Russia, China’s domestic aeronautical research efforts have yielded dramatic gains with new aircraft, sensors, weapons, and signature reduction advances, which will have the IAF face more serious challenges from the PLAAF. Despite induction of the Rafale and more Su-30MKIs in the coming years, the IAF does not have ‘adequate’ number of fighter aircraft to simultaneously protect the western and north-eastern borders. Compared with the PLAAF, which is likely to have 800 plus 4th/5th generation types in service by 2020, the Indian Air Force has been limited by the ‘Government Authorised Establishment (GAE)’ of 42 squadrons by 2027, against a ‘wish list’ of 60 squadrons for a two-front war.

In case of any major operations/full scale war with India, the PLAAF will be expected to defend the skies over its area of responsibility and along with elements of the PLA rocket Forces (PLARF), take the war into Indian territory, neutralising Indian military bases and infrastructure in the North East, Jammu & Kashmir and other parts of continental India. The IAF thus faces a formidable challenge, wherein it will need to fight a highly mobile and technologically imposing war to safeguard its limited bases, while dominating the skies, supporting offensive and defensive Indian Army operations in WTC. Nonetheless, Terrain, Technology & Training, will assuredly give IAF an edge over the PLAAF in Tibet and southern Xinjiang, counterbalancing numerical superiority of the PLAAF, at least for some years to come.

The Tibetan plateau is rightly referred to as roof of the world, with an air density of 20-30% compared to sea level (SL). The high- altitude nature of Chinese airfields in Tibet, along with prevalent extreme climatic conditions seriously restrains the performance of aircraft, which reduces the effective payload capacity and combat radius by an average of 50%. Significantly, the PLAAF’s Su- 27/ 30/ J- 11/ J- 10s also face a reduced look-down radar detection capability in the mountainous terrain, leaving the PLAAF’s meaningful early warning capability limited to medium and high altitudes. This is not helped by the five ground based Radar Regiments deployed in Tibet and South Xinjiang, which face the same detection issues and are unable to cover the entire Indo–China border. Operating from airfields located near sea level elevations in plains, the IAF has no such restrictions and will effectively undertake deep penetration and air superiority missions in the Tibetan Autonomous Region with full complement of payload and fuel. The IAF Su-30MKIs and Mirage 2000s, along with soon-to-be inducted Dassault Rafales, have a technology edge over the existing Chinese combat jets deployed in the WTC. Operating under the IAF’s Integrated Air Command & Control System, supported by multimission types like the Phalcon AWACs, small groups of Su- 30MKI/ Mirage 2000 will be able to counter larger PLAAF forces, confining the Chinese to anchored ground based radar cover around key communication nodes. While the IAF shares Russian- supplied weapon heritage with the PLAAF, combat efficacy of home-produced Chinese weapons is yet to be tested in combat.

Most combat will take place beyond visual ranges, with the PLAAF preferring low level, snap up ambush nests over Tibet, compared with more aggressive patrols by the IAF to saturate the A2/AD network of the Chinese. Incidentally, the soon-to-be deployed MBDA Meteor Active guidance BVR missile carried by IAF Rafales, will offer a multi-shot capability against long range manoeuvring targets in a heavy ECM environment, with ranges exceeding 100 km. This will give an edge to the IAF, that is until operational induction of the recently tested VLRAAM missile and PL-15 in the PLAAF, the success of which will largely depend on increased availability of LR detection assets. Electro Optical & NCTR identification protocols will need to be revised, considering common emission characteristics of the Sukhois on both sides, which may cause IFF issues. Terrain hugging fighters, masked by innumerable mountain valleys of TAR, will be a major factor for the both sides, delaying crucial early warning to the defenders.

C4ISR missions conducted by the PLAAF will rely majorly on unmanned platforms of varied capability. Any PLAAF offensive sweeps into India will need to be backed by great concentration of multi capability platforms and a drawn-out logistical chain which will be difficult to sustain over longer durations. However proliferating UCAV drone operations can be expected, with swarm– based saturation attacks against the IAF’s point defence systems and C3I networks. The balance will tilt towards the Chinese once the stealthy J- 20 becomes operational, backed by increased number of AWACS and refueling types based on the Y-20 platform, which has a good high altitude operational capability. The IAF however

is expected to maintain its combat edge in multi mission training at least till 2030, with autonomy of effort, unlike Chinese air crew who are still largely dependent on a ground control AD environment. The IAF focusses much more on experience in air combat and varied weapon delivery, backed by exposure at multinational exercises, to maintain a ‘qualitative’ edge over its foes. Though the Chinese have started training towards combat scenarios associated with newer training modules, including flying under challenging environmental conditions and combat autonomy, the resultant honing of aircrew standards will be only visible after 2030.

The PLAAF really cannot sustain the ‘Large Area’ defence CONOPs doctrine in Tibet, and will be forced to revert to a ‘Vital Area / Vital Point’ (VA/VP) defence strategy, with focus on short term campaigns. It realises this gap in functional capability, choosing to ingest the A2/AD environment with modern S-300, HQ-9 and HQ-12 SAMs, all of which pose grave danger to the IAF although they are reliant on early detection for success. Major SAM complexes have been identified in Xinjian and TAR, which guard the likely ingress routes of the Indian Air Force. These effective SAM nests would be countered with multi-tier saturation attacks by IAF, using standoff weapons like the potent BrahMos supersonic cruise missile and precision attack munitions. On the other hand, PLAAF’s aviation units, operating out of Yunnan province and interdicting the Brahmaputra valley, or via an interdiction of the Indus valley by air forces based in Xinjiang and long range raiding Special Forces dropped in the Brahmaputra valley will always remain a threat. Also, the H-6K bomber fleet, operating out of other Theatre Commands, will pose a serious threat with standoff cruise missiles like the CJ-20.

To pre-empt such situations, the Indian Army and the Air Force would need to allot high priority for its networked air defence, as has been done in the west against Pakistan. Undoubtedly, the IAF and its infrastructure is vulnerable to mass strikes by tactical SRBM/ IRBMs at the disposal of the PLA Rocket Forces, which considering the PLAAF’s operational restrictions in Tibet, could lead the key strike effort over India. While efficiency of the PLARF will be worn down with operationalisation of the Indian ABM shield by 2025, the PLARF’s DF-11/15/16 missiles deployed in Tibet and protected by bomb proof tunnels in the Himalayas, will present a clear and present danger to India, remaining a priority target for the IAF’s offensive air and deep strike missions in Tibet.

Unlike other Theatre Commands, the PLAAF’s ability to maintain strategic long term superiority in Tibet will remain diminished for the next 10 years. Beyond 2025 however, PLAAF will be a majority 4th/ 5th gen air force. Reinforced by an extended all-weather infrastructure capability in Tibet, newer generation Chinese warplanes will end any technical asymmetry with India, while imposing a clear numerical ascendency in the Western Theatre Command.

Air Power Balance

While the effect of restructuring and reforms is yet to be seen, the PLAAF has made meaningful progress towards achieving the near-term Wide Area Dominance capabilities needed for its mission set in the next 15 to 20 years, largely in form of better technologies, and systems. From fighter aircraft/ UAVs ( Stealth & UCAV Drone swarms), to associated avionics and weapons systems, China is closing the technology gap with the West and the Russians. Conflict score cards have noted that the PLAAF has consistently moved from failure assessments to reaching near parity levels with the United States in any conflict over Taiwan. Doctrine and training issues remain the largest weight on the PLAAF’s capability, which aims at building initiatives across multiple arenas. Outcome of these will be visible in the years to come. Meanwhile the planned development of China’s fifth- generation fighter force will bolster the underway modernisation of the PLAAF in a big way. These types, which could enter service as early as 2019, will significantly support China’s existing fleet of fourth-generation aircraft towards gaining regional air superiority in meaningful manner.

Recent muscle flexing by North Korea and the strained THAAD deployment in South Korea, US Navy FONOPS in the South China Sea, as well as the Doklam stand off with India have inadvertently pumped up the Chinese military towards a posture of combat readiness in the region. As Chinese fighters scramble to patrol these ‘hot spots’, the PLAAF is getting more formidable, projecting aggressive ability, being effectively used as an instrument of Chinese projection and statecraft by the CCP, while actively helping to dramatically change the power balance in some of the most security sensitive areas of the world.

Sameer Joshi is an ex- IAF fighter pilot with more than 5000 flying hours on military and civilian aircraft. His interests range from study of military history and modern warfare tactics, to research & development in Aerospace & Defence technologies. Besides flight operations, Sameer works on development of Stratospheric long endurance unmanned platforms and micro satellites.

His earlier article ‘Red Star over Syria’ published in the Vayu Aerospace Review, was selected for Special Award at the Paris Air Show 2017.