In Defence of HAL

“HAL being knocked out of the the IAF’s Rafale acquisition programme at the last minute – and for reasons best known to the authorities – is astonishing to say the least” opines GS Jamadagni, former GM (Quality Assurance) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. who re

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) turned 78 in 2018 and has always been regarded as ‘backbone’ of the Indian Air Force. Two-thirds of the IAF’s combat aircraft inventory are from HAL, which currently manufactures the Tejas 4th generation light combat aircraft, incorporating advanced avionics and weapons as also the heavier Sukhoi Su-30 MKI fighter aircraft of Russian- origin, currently from raw materials, with major upgradation of the Jaguar strike fighter and Mirage 2000 air superiority fighter underway.

In the area of design & development, HAL has to its credit many indigenous programmes ranging from gliders, basic piston-engine trainers (HT-2, HPT-32), jet trainers (HJT-16 Kiran Mk I and Mk II), supersonic fighter ( HF- 24 Marut), agricultural aircraft (Basant) and has also

to its credit a number of aircraft upgrade programmes. Aircraft types manufactured over the decades began with the Vampire, then the Gnat, Jaguar, MiG-21 variants and MiG-27, and all these have served long, in peace and war with the Indian Air Force.

As a nation we have to be proud of these accomplishments. Unfortunately, in the

recent past, HAL has been unduly blamed and - it seems - systematically tarnished on the basis of myths, wrong notions and false charges.

Design, production and technological capabilities of HAL should have been factored before the PSU was “knocked out” from the MMRCA programme, being tarnished in the process as being an industry “not capable of producing the Rafale.” The government is instead buying 36 Rafales in flyaway condition from its original equipment manufacturers Dassault Aviation. The fact that two thirds of the aircraft in IAF are from HAL’s factories is surely testimony enough to HAL’s manufacturing capability.

All these years, HAL was the major partner in the IAF’s induction of new aircraft and weapon platforms. The government seems to have ignored HAL’s track record and its contributions to the nation’s defence by preventing what is its own Company from participating in the national programme to acquire French-origin Rafale fighters for the Indian Air Force.

Rafale sans HAL

HAL being removed from the IAF’s Rafale acquisition programme at the last minute and for reasons best known to the powersthat-be, was astonishing ! Rafales being built abroad and supported in India without HAL’s involvement and support are akin to a chariot without a horse. Any start-up Indian company certainly cannot replicate HAL’s capability which has been built over eight decades.

Political battles apart, this decision is a matter of serious concern in the larger interests of the nation. In an article that appeared in The Indian Express ‘Don’t ground the Rafale’ written by former CAS Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy, various reasons were given: the first one was refusal of Dassault Aviation to take responsibility for the output of HAL and, secondly, insistence of the IAF for the manufacturer to provide guarantees because of what was said to be “the unsatisfactory performance of HAL in the past.” Finally, that the estimated man-hours required to produce aircraft at HAL would be three times the man hours taken at Dassault Aviation.

While the first insinuation is a myth, the second one is based on incorrect notions, and the third is a matter of industrial reality. The actual situation is contrary to what has been perpetuated as one will see from the following facts.

While the negotiated price per aircraft is closely guarded under the “secrecy clause” of the contract, “poor performance” has been unfairly alluded to HAL, which is unfortunate and has become a subject of open debate, which has harmed its global image and seriously damaged the Indian aviation industry in its entirety. The image and credibility of India’s public sector undertaking, including its “jewel in the crown” HAL, has become suspect in the global aviation sphere. This is a matter of serious concern and warrants immediate and corrective measures to be instituted.

Now let us also consider impact of the outright purchase of Rafales without any local manufacturing or product support. The programme will entail enormous life cycle costs which will surely drain the defence exchequer. Apart from the national imperative of keeping HAL’s extensive facilities engaged, as also the strategic aim for achieving self-reliance being promoted in the ‘Make in India’ drive, HAL as a major partner of the Rafale programme would have benefitted from transfer of technology, apart from providing spares support over the Rafale’s life cycle of 35-40 years.

Track Record

Since its foundation in December 1940, HAL has grown from strength to strength and is now a world-recognised entity with 11 research and development centres, 20 production units and a work force of 29,300, HAL being ranked as 34th amongst the top 100 global aerospace industries. HAL has produced or overhauled over 3500 aircraft, both indigenous and under licence and some 5,015 aero engines. The turnover of the company during 2017-2018 was Rs.18,284 crore. In the last five years HAL’s contribution to the exchequer has been Rs.30,429 crores (dividend including taxes paid to the Central and state governments) and the PSU has made a (cumulative) profit of Rs.16,884 crores.

The real causes

But back to the present situation. It has been repeated again and again that the IAF had insisted on a “guarantee” from HAL because of what it said, was “unsatisfactory performance” in the past. This is a myth being perpetured by an unfortunate mindset that ‘videshi is achha and swadeshi is kachha’. Unless that mindset is uprooted, self-reliance in defence aviation will forever remain a dream.

An important flashback: In 1993, the government had constituted a committee on fighter aircraft accidents ( COFAA) headed by Dr APJ Abdul Kalam, then Secretary Defence R&D. The committee was to recommend remedial measures to reduce such aircraft accidents. Data of the Technical Defect (TD) accidents presented in the report clearly brought out that the rate of TD accidents (number of accidents per 10,000 hours of flying) on fighters, trainers, helicopters and transport aircraft of HAL origin was half that rate of accidents involving aircraft of non-HAL origin, of comparable technology and vintage, as is tabulated in the following paragraph,

Accident rate by aircraft type :

HAL MiG-27 : 0.50 RAC MiG-23 : 0.95 HAL Jaguar : 0.30 RAC MiG-29 : 0.62 HAL Kiran : 0.17 PZL Iskara : 0.42 HAL Cheetah / Chetak : 0.05 MIL Mi-8 : 0.18

Thus firmly established was that accident rate of HAL-made aircraft was far lower than those imported. I rest my case !

Unraveling more myths

Apart from such statistical data culled from the COFAA report, more examples are recalled from the writer’s experience to bust the unfair blame on HAL.

Ground flame-out of R-11 engines : Over a span of just one month there were 12 incidents of ground flame outs. HAL was blamed for poor quality in the process of engine overhaul. It was established that actually maintenance lapses resulted in fuel contamination.

Inability of Type 77 aircraft to recover from nosedive position : There were two such accidents in quick succession where pilots were unable to move the stabiliser servo booster from the nosedive position – but they ejected safely. Quality of the overhaul at Nasik Division was subjected to vigorous scrutiny. It was established that these accidents were because of maintenance lapses at the air force station where there were omissions in routine checks on inlet filters.

Failure of 4th stage compressor disc of R-29 engine of MiG-27 : Bursting of 4th stage compressor disc on ground was yet another case where shadows were cast on the quality of discs manufactured at HAL. Russian experts while giving ‘clean chit’ to the quality of discs manufactured at HAL, established that the failure was because of skipping of an operational drill during taxing. The problem was eliminated after pilots followed the prescribed SOP.

Fatal accident of its Avro aircraft: There was fatal accident of an aircraft where the entire crew and IAF musicians band of 28 were killed. There were indications of ‘Fire Warning’ and ‘Auto feathering of propeller’ prior to the accident and the IAF laid blame on quality of the engine overhaul. HAL was not in agreement as post- accident investigations were contrary to this theory. HAL then referred the case to BAE Systems for their independent opinion with a brief narrative of the sequence of accident and findings of the court of inquiry. The conclusion was that this tragic accident had not happened in manner narrated by the COI but was due to maintenance and operational lapses.

Jaguar accident/incident due to failure of hydraulic system: There were two identical failures of the Jaguar hydraulic system in quick succession when pilots could not lower the undercarriage and consequently had to abandon aircraft. The

IAF pronounced that it was because of quality lapses during aircraft overhaul. BAE Systems after investigating the second incident pronounced that it was due to IAF’s operational and maintenance lapses which resulted in these failures. Independent investigations then continued by HAL established that the component failure was due to ‘Low cycleHigh load’ fatigue. After initial reservation, BAE Systems eventually accepted that the cause was because of design deficiencies in the brake body of the combat slat motor. Eventually the OEM was held responsible which was finally accepted.

Summing up, in all the five cases cited above, maintenance, operational lapses and poor quality of the components supplied by the OEM were cause for the unfortunate situation and not HAL’s quality as was made out by the IAF. There are many more such examples.

Incorrect calculation of man hours

HAL has also been blamed for `high’ manhours (thrice that of the OEM) required to produce an aircraft. However, comparisons cannot be between ‘oranges and apples’. If self- reliance is the nation’s primary objective, a critical should be the acquisition of ‘technology’ while costs should not be the main criteria. In any major programme of the type and complexity of the Rafale, transfer of technology is of paramount importance. Decisions based on comparing just man-hours/cost will take us off on a tangent without appreciating the strategic intent.

Comparison of man hours of the OEM and the licensed manufacturer is not fair. In France, Dassault Aviation would surely have outsourced a large percentage of the work content and therefore its own man-hours would become relatively less. It is also an accepted fact that industrial productivity in tropical countries, including India is lower than in their Western counterparts.

Anyway, since HAL is required to give fixed price quotations for each batch of aircraft on order, the IAF gets the benefit of ever reducing man-hours owing to the learning curve phenomenon even as the production proceeds.

However, more important than productivity is the life cycle cost. The OEM’s cost of spares support over the product life cycle for 30-40 years will inevitably soak up the IAF’s allocated finances. HAL’s pricing would certainly be more cost-effective over the Rafales’ life in service.

In this package procurement of 36 Rafales, Dassault Aviation has promised 75% serviceability of the fleet but this should be looked at holistically. Serviceability of the fleet is not only joint responsibility of the operator (IAF) and the OEM but role of the operator is vital in ensuring expected level of serviceability, which in fact is much more than that of the OEM. If lower serviceability is attributed to operational and maintenance lapses, the OEM would certainly disown their commitments. This aspect needs careful analysis.

Carry out damage control – now !

The original RFP in 2007 for procuring 126 MMRCAs had a condition that the OEM take responsibility for HAL’s share of work but further, the IAF insisted on such a guarantee from the OEM because of “unsatisfactory performance of HAL in the past”. Such a condition, based on prejudices and misconceptions, has caused serious damage to HAL’s credibility and is completely against the essential objective of India’s self-reliance in defence aviation.

Inclusion of such a condition in an international contract and further insistence of the OEM’s guarantee is a serious slur on HAL, jointly committed by the IAF, senior MoD bureaucrats and perhaps politicians of that time. Need of the hour today is to institute a damage control exercise and giving HAL its rightful place. The Company’s intrinsic capabilities and its potential contribution cannot be ignored. Non-inclusion of HAL at the initial stage has created a situation where the IAF will continually have to go back to direct purchases to meet its future requirements.

Damage control will have to be initiated sooner rather than later, with the Government initiating action at the highest priority and enter into another inter- governmental agreement to have future Rafales, if any, required by the IAF manufactured by HAL under license. The process of ToT has to start at the earliest to ensure continuity in deliveries of future Rafales.

The Government of India must take serious relook at ways to protect the interests of HAL. If all the wrongs committed on HAL are not corrected in time, all expertise built in-country over eight decades will be wasted away for lack of continuity even while the nation faces challenging tasks.