The Battle for Kushtia
2021 marks 50th anniversary of the decisive action in (then) East Pakistan when both history and geography were made. This is the first of a series of articles on battles fought in the words of those who led from the front. In this account, Major General Pramod K Batra (retd) writes about the ‘Battle Honour, a Tactical Blunder and Historic Moment’ when he was commanding ‘A’ Squadron 45 Cavalry deployed in West Bengal under 4th Mountain Division. Also: Desert Knight-21; Exercise Kavach and AMPHEX-21; Exercise Yudh Abhyas; Tropex 21; Arjun Mk.1As; Dutch helicopters Snowbound!; Tatoi Tecnam in Greece; Portuguese Chipmunks.
December 2021 will mark a half century after the decisive action in (then) East Pakistan when both history and geography were made. The blitzkrieg advance into the riverine country that was to become the new nation of Bangladesh and total surrender of Pakistan’s forces there, was surely the ‘finest hour’ for the Indian Armed Forces. This is the first of a series of articles on battles fought, in the words of those who led from the front. In this account, Major General Pramod K Batra (retd) writes about a ‘Battle Honour, a Tactical Blunder and Historic Moment’ when he was commanding ‘A’ Squadron 45 Cavalry deployed in West Bengal under 4th Mountain Division. In his words,
Iwas fortunate to command A Squadron of PT-76 tanks (Chariots of the Lesser Gods) during the Bangladesh War 1971. A brief introduction to this tank would be appropriate for Vayu readers. This tank was essentially designed by the Russians for operations in continental Europe to cross network of rivers/canals. PT stands for Plavushi Tanka, meaning a tank that can swim or float and 76 is the calibre of its gun. The tank’s ground pressure is equivalent to that of an infantry soldier and it can carry 22 combat soldiers/RCL mounted on jeep on its deck with the water current not exceeding 3 knots or so to cross a water obstacle. Being amphibious the PT-76 is light weight, does not have sufficient armour protection and was therefore not suitable
for armour battles – hence ‘Chariot of the Lesser Gods’!
An overview at strategic level of how formations were deployed before the war in erstwhile East Pakistan is given in the map to focus readers attention on our II Corps operating from the south west, covering a frontage of some 650 kilometers from Farraka barrage in the north to Bay of Bengal in the south. II Corps had 4 Mountain Division and 9 Infantry Division on its Orbat, with an Armoured Regiment, 45 Cavalry (PT-76s) and a squadron of T-55s (63 Cavalry). II Corps had allotted one squadron (‘A’) 45 Cavalry to 4 Mountain Division. The remaining armour was allotted to 9 Infantry Division. Hereafter, I focus on some of important battles of 4 Mountain Division though the three battles were distinct in nature, yet connected.
Tasks allotted to 4 Mountain Division were firstly to advance on axis MajidaJibbannagar-Kotchandpur-Jhanida, secure Ferry on River Madhumati, Faridpur and then secure Ferry at Goalunda Ghat. If the situation demanded, to mop up Kushtia and Hardinge Bridge and further north, towards Bogra in XXXIII Corps sector.
Conduct of Operations
Jibbannagar was to be the curtain raiser for 4 Mountain Division operations, therefore success had to be ensured at all costs. Intelligence sources indicated that Jibbannagar was held by two regular companies of the Pakistan Army supported by elements of recce and support. My Squadron, less a troop was allotted to 62 Mountain Brigade for this operation. Earlier, on 25 November along with a patrol of 5 Maratha Light Infantry led by Maj
Karambaya (later Maj Gen), we carried out a reconnaissance on the route our tanks had to take for the night move to the location from where my squadron was to support the attack, some 8 kilometers inside enemy territory.
On the night of 26/27 November, Jibbannagar was captured with our tanks providing close and effective fire support and threatening the enemy’s route of withdrawal. Kotchandpur was captured by 9 Dogra, supported by ‘A’ Squadron less two troops providing close fire support on the night 30 November/1 December. The presence of our tanks had psychological effect on the enemy who offered little resistance. After the successful attack, CO 9 Dogra expected a counter attack, but after some discussion he finally relented and allowed us to move. The next objective for 4 Mountain Division was to be Darsana.
Battle of Darsana
Darsana lay on northern flank of the axis of advance of 4 Mountain Division. It was held in strength and the GOC Major General MS Barar in his wisdom decided to capture it, so that it did not create any threat to the Division’s axis of advance. The plan was to clear enemy outposts at Akandabaria and contact his position at Darsana from the east with 22 Rajput and one company of 5 Guards to establish a road block on the enemy’s route of withdrawal. The task for capture of Darsana from the east was given to 41 Mountain Brigade and they were allotted ‘A’ Squadron 45 Cavalry less one troop and 2/9 GR from 62 Mountain Brigade.
By swift and bold action, 22 Rajput captured Akandabaria on night of 2/3 December and established a firm base for attack on Darsana. I was told to send one troop of tanks on 3 December at 1700 hrs to assist 22 Rajputs to capture enemy’s forward line of bunkers which were blocking their advance. The tanks neutralised these bunkers and company Rajput crept forward to occupy them. However, taking advantage of darkness the enemy re-occupied these bunkers. The Rajputs suffered some casualties but managed to capture five vital bunkers astride the railway line by 0300 hrs on 4 December. A company from 5 Guards then established the road block behind Darsana by 0400 hrs on 4 December.
The attack on Darsana
Attack on Darsana was to be in three phases: in the first, 5/1 Gorkha Rifles were to capture Darsana Railway Station with my squadron less a troop attacking from the South. In phase 2, one company from 5/1 Gorkha Rifles with one troop PT-76s was to capture Chandpur. Phase 3 would involve 2/9 Gorkha Rifles from 62 Mountain Brigade with my squadron less two troops to exploit the situation.
‘A’ Squadron less a troop moved into 22 Rajput location and was deployed by me for the ensuing task. All geared up and rearing to go! H-hour was 0730 hrs. We could see enemy bunkers. CO 5/1 GR Lt Col C Venugopal with his team and I were being briefed on last minute details when a barrage of artillery fire landed upon us, and the wireless operators and some officers were wounded. As the CO ordered me to move for the attack, I saw Capt Naik, the battery commander had been severely wounded and I carried him piggy back and left him in a 22 Rajput bunker.
Our guns now opened up and engaged the enemy bunkers, lifting the fire at 0715 hrs. Our tanks then provided close fire support to the Gorkhas assaulting in broad day light. We had identified 14 bunkers and knocked off 12 by the practiced creeping fire. The enemy were observed abandoning their bunkers and running away. This quote is from the after action report of 4 Mountain Division: “The tanks neutralised the flanks and the remaining tanks shot up the infantry from north to south bunker by bunker. The two companies of 5/1 GR now cleared the forward row of bunkers”.
The first phase of attack was over. I joined the CO and took him on my tank to join the Gorkhas on the first objective. Here I quote from History of The 9th Gorkha Rifles. “In Phase two 5/1 GR supported by tanks of ‘A’ Squadron 45 Cavalry (Maj PK Batra) cleared the Pak defences around Darsana. The attack by 5/1 GR was led brilliantly by Lt Col Venugopal riding on the tank of Maj PK Batra”. The devastating and accurate fire of the PT-76s and Gorkhas had unnerved Pakistan’s 18 Punjab. As the companies got organised to take on a counter attack, we planned the second phase. Our engineers did a fantastic job to rapidly make a lane through the minefield for the tanks. The quick success of the plan prompted the battalion commander to seek permission to capture rest of the objective. A quick plan was made for capture of Chandpur, which was actually objective of the second phase. The two troops in the meantime had joined us on the first objective. One troop with a company of 5/1 GR attacked Chandpur; however, the enemy had not sited his defences for an attack from this direction and withdrew without much resistance. With one troop, we moved towards the third phase. In one of their langars on the way we found half cooked meals. This objective too was captured without much resistance.
At this time 2/9 GR joined the action. Link up with the road block company was established by the Gorkhas and a troop of PT-76s and the operation was over in about 6 hours. This action is actually a classic example of close cooperation between tanks and infantry, utilising firepower, shock actions and mobility, which resulted in low casualties and unnerving of the enemy. For this action both 5/1 GR and ‘A’ Squadron 45 Cavalry were awarded ‘Battle Honour Darsana’.
However, there was to be no respite for my squadron. After capture of Darsana, the Pakistanis thought that our next objective would be Chuadanga, a town that happened to be the native place of Dr Malik, Governor of East Pakistan. 57 Infantry Brigade of the Pak army, after loss of Darsana had moved to Chuadanga. GOC 4 Mountain Division had different plans and decided to establish a road block between Chuadanga and Jhenida, based on the presumption that once the enemy realised our objective was not Chuadanga he would reinforce Jhenida.
The task given to 41 Mountan Brigade was establish a road block at Uttarnaryanpur with 5 Guards less one company and ‘A’ Squadron less a troop and another road block on a subsidiary track linking Chuadanga and Jhenida at Paschim Durgapur with an infantry company and troop of tanks. 41 Mountain Brigade, less a battalion was to advance along axis Kotchandpur – Jhenida and capture Jhenida at the earliest.
5 Guards and my squadron, less one troop commenced the advance at 0800 hrs on 5 December and moved cross country in enemy territory, crossed River Chitra in area Shibnagar and established both the road blocks by last light as planned. We had now moved 23 kilometers deep inside enemy territory. The road block proved to be timely and most effective, the enemy could not now reinforce Jhenida. At about 2030 hrs a convoy of vehicles was seen approaching site of the road block. This convoy could have been captured but some trigger-happy soldier opened fire which resulted in mayhem. Taking advantage of darkness, enemy abandoned their vehicles and managed to get away, losing some personnel and equipment. In this fiasco I lost my NCO, Dir. Sisupalan who was coordinating location of his tank in relation to the infantry deployed on ground.
By this time it was realised that we were out of range of our artillery fire. Several attempts by the enemy including one by an infantry battalion to dislodge the road block were foiled the next day. The tanks were mainstay for the success of these road blocks. The Pak 57 Infantry Brigade had to finally pull back towards the Kushtia/Hardinge Bridge to the north, but before that they
were to give us bloody nose at Kushitia. However, this also broke cohesiveness of Pakistan’s 9 Infantry Division as their 107 Infantry Brigade were pulled back towards Khulna, down south.
41 Mountain Brigade less one Battalion advanced with 9 Dogra and contacted Jhenida with a troop of tanks, but came across heavy resistance. I was told to send one more troop of tanks to reinforce them, so I moved these from the road block at Pashim Durgapur by first light. The leading element came under heavy fire and could not make headway. I was ordered to move another troop to assist 9 Dogra. Since, two troops were already with the Dogras. I decided to take one troop there myself from the road block as most of my squadron were at Jhenida. I reached the Dogra location with a troop, was briefed by the CO and launched the attack at 1230 hrs. By 1400 hrs Jhenida was captured. The enemy had well prepared defences with anti-tank ditches but suffered 24 killed, many were wounded or captured as were 30 vehicles, tonnes of artillery, mortar, RCL and small arms ammunition and important documents, maps etc.
The next morning an elated GOC said, while complimenting me, “Batra, get me Magura before 9 Infantry Division from Jessore reaches and I will personally put MVC on your chest”. My reply was “we will do our best, Sir”. Thus started the race for Magura.
62 Mountain Brigade was given the task of capturing Magura. My Squadron less two troops and a company of SKOT APCs of 7 Punjab were allotted to 62
Mountain Brigade. After capture of Jhenida. I was ordered to leave one troop of tanks at Jhenida to foil any attempt by enemy to recapture it, while one troop had already been given to 7 Mountain Brigade, which was the Corps reserve.
The Combat group comprising my squadron less two troops, a troop of SKOTS and company 5 Maratha Light Infantry started at about 0800. The advance was led by ‘A’ Squadron headquarters with two troops followed by SKOTS and 5 MLI company. We were in high spirits and throwing caution to the winds, moved fast, in a kind of blitzkrieg. Lt Col Venugopal came on the net and advised me to be cautious as he had observed us moving fast. We did slow down a bit but the speed at which we moved took the enemy by surprise as at about 1500 hrs or so we contacted Magura which was under heavy shelling. Pakistan’s 9 Infantry Division headquarters now abandoned Magura and fell behind River Muchikhali. Magura was in our hands by 1700 hrs, though heavy shelling kept us on guard for quite some time. The Brigade concentrated on night 8/9 December at Magura and we advanced and contacted west bank of river Madhumati by 1100 hrs on 9 December.
Kushlia: A Tactical Blunder
In the evening I got orders to move to Kushtia immediately as there had been a major reverse and we had lost many tanks. I could get no more information. The Squadron 2i/c was in B echelon and not feeling well, neither was my senior troop leader. The move from Madhumati to Kushtia, a distance of 90 kms was very trying. All kinds of thoughts were coming to my mind as we sped onwards on a pitch dark night, but there was no fear of an enemy. We reached Brigade headquarters after 5 hrs and at a distance I saw one of my destroyed tanks, with some four of my men shrouded under a blanket on the deck. My mind went blank, anguish and pain hit me. I was summoned to meet the GOC and Brigade Commander. As this action were narrated to me, I lost my cool but all that the GOC said was “these things happen in war”, there was no remorse, feeling of guilt or regret. The BM took me one side and asked me to cool down. Tragically six officers were killed and 22 Rajput had suffered over 110 casualties.
What had happened that fateful day was that 7 Mountain Brigade, the Corps reserve was released and reverted to 4 Mountain Division and given the task to capturing Kushtia with two troops of 45 Cavalry attached. The Brigade Commander was told that Kushtia “was not held”, as ascertained by both the Corps and Divisional Commanders who had flown over the area. The advance would be led by PT-76s followed by 22 Rajput in troop-carrying vehicles (TCV). 2/Lt Sam Chandavarkar however felt that the terrain was not suitable for tanks, even for PT-76s with their low ground pressure. The area was marshy, wooded and Kushtia was a built up area, the main road just ten feet wide, passing across a high embankment. Advancing on this with tanks could be suicidal. Young Sam requested that the advance be led by Infantry. But sadly, there is no Tennyson in India to write about courage of 22 Rajput and ‘A’ Squadron 45 Cavalry who displayed extraordinary courage and devotion to duty for “theirs was not to reason why”.
Sam led the advance with five PT-76s on either side of the road following basic tactics of fire and move. As the leading elements entered Kushtia, Pakistan’s 57 Infantry Brigade, with tanks, RCLs, MMGs and all arms opened concentrated fire. This ambush surprised our advancing elements, the leading 4 tanks got direct hits from a distance of 200 yds by tank and RCL fire. The Pak Infantry deployed on the ground opened up on the unsuspecting leading company of 22 Rajput. There was no place to manoeuvre. One tank managed to get away but not before knocking out
two Chaffee tanks. The Pakis followed by pulling back of troops and Commander 7 Brigade in the meantime had deployed a battalion on a water obstacle to extricate the withdrawing Rajputs. By 1700 hrs, the situation had stabilised. The Brigade asked for air strikes but these were delayed as proper coordination had not been carried out before commencement of this operation.
Many years later, a retired Pakistan Army Officer wrote about this action in the East Pakistan which he titled ‘tank ambush at Kushtia’, referring to this “as the last battle fought by Pakistan’s 57 Brigade”. However, he has completely omitted the ghastly atrocities committed by the Pak Army on captured, and wounded, Indian Army soldiers at this battle. I write about this as a riposte to his article. Ambush yes, battle NO. A battle is a sustained fight between professional armed forces.
Now, the set back at Kushtia forced GOC 4 Mountain Division to concentrate his entire Division less one battalion on holding Madhumati which resulted in loss of crucial 72 hours.
Many year later, in 1979 I was sent with a questionnaire by the College of Combat for Gen Jacob who had retired as Army Commander Eastern Army and was Chief of
Staff Eastern Command during 1971. At the end of our interaction, I could not resist but ask him about the debacle at Kushtia. He said, “II Corps were making good progress and had contacted Madumati, there was no need for them to go for Kushtia. They would have captured ferry at Madhumati and onto Gotandaghat ferry and probably be knocking at the doors of Dacca. They lost 72 crucial hours. It was a bad move”. As the old saying goes, “never trouble the trouble, unless the trouble troubles you”.
4th Mountain Division now concentrated for the capture of Kushtia and patrolling was carried out on 9 and 10 December. The Indian Air Force had launched continuous air attacks, bombing and rocketing the enemy. The plan was to capture Kushtia
with 7 Mountain Brigade and 41 Mountain Brigade to lead the advance to Hardinge Bridge. However, indications were available that the enemy had withdrawn his major force from Kushtia. Luckily my suggestion to carry out an outflanking move by tanks to cut off the road linking Kushtia, and Hardinge bridge was accepted. Kushtia was captured by 7 Mountain Brigade by 1700 hrs on 11 December, to a thundering welcome by the local population.
The Gorkhas of 5/1 GR and PT-76s of 45 Cavalry had one task left: capture of the Hardinge Bridge. The enemy had built a strong defensive system on western side of the bridge. The embankment was some 10 meters above the ground level had three layers of bunkers covering all approaches, with minefields and anti-tank emplacement. A quick plan for the capture was made. With accurate and devastating fire by tanks, two companies of 5/1 GR cleared the outer defences. My gunner spotted a Chaffee on the bridge and knocked it out.
With such strong defences, Pakistan’s 57 Infantry Brigade could have given a better account of itself. However they had fled, leaving behind howitzers, mortars, RCL guns, machine guns and other automatic weapons, jeeps, trucks and other assorted weapons.
(to be continued ….)