The Giant Leap: Ajeet to Tejas
In 1975-76, the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was perceived as a replacement for the Gnat light fighter which was overdue for phasing-out, having served well for 15 years. An improved version of Gnat, the Ajeet had not come upto the expectations and the fleet of Ajeets was due for progressive phasing out by the mid-eighties, proposed to be replaced by the LCA, six squadrons in all.
In October 1991, a decade before maiden flight of the first LCA prototype, Air Marshal Chandrakant V. Gole, former DCAS, responded to a request by then Defence Minister Sharad Pawar to brief him on the background, status, problem areas and options concerning the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project. 30 years later, this document is shared along with pertinent images to explain the situation as pertained to the time.
In 1975-76, the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was perceived as a replacement for the Gnat light fighter which was overdue for phasing- out, having served well for 15 years. An improved version of the Gnat, the Ajeet ( in photo above) had not come upto the expectations and the fleet of Ajeets was due for progressive phasing out by the mid-eighties, proposed to be replaced by the LCA, six squadrons in all. A position paper prepared by Air HQ was discussed with HAL & R&D and a draft Air Staff Target (AST) was prepared by 1978-79. Over the next three years, however, the AST was uprated and what was envisaged as a light weight, low cost tactical aircraft requirement grew into a more sophisticated, high performance state-of-the-art aircraft.
This was partly owing to the additional requirement for a MiG-21 replacement and partly because of the trend or attraction of high technology. Whether the eventual LCA specifications were a result of purely operational considerations demanding such high technology or of the attraction of high technology spurring the hunger for “the latest and the best” (regardless of pragmatic operational necessities) is a moot point.
In 1982-83, a technical team of experts with Dr SR Valluri as the leader and the DCAS as the co-leader, visited well-known aircraft designers and manufacturers in Italy, Germany, France, UK and Sweden to explore possibilities of transfer of technology and joint collaborations. Italy was a total blank. The Germans had no requirements of their own, although MBB and Dornier showed willingness to take part in project, respectively based on their TKF-90 and ND-102 project definition studies.
The Air Forces of France, UK and Sweden had requirements for a new fighter in slightly more advanced class than the LCA. The French Rafale, British Experimental Aircraft Project (EAP), later to be known as the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) and still later christened the Typhoon, as also the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen, emerged out of these requirements. However, a lighter, single-engined version of the British EAP/EFA, which had been studied by BAe (the P.106) seemed the closest to LCA requirements. A common feature of all these studies was the inevitable
need for ‘cutting-edge’ technologies to meet the demanding performance.
In 1983, Design Bureaus of the erstwhile USSR, which had also been informally studying the LCA requirement, proposed a slightly heavier design, but one which fully met LCA specifications, and was based on conventional technologies. Their contention was that the conventional technologies, being within the capabilities of Indian designers, their design offered a better chance of success. So far, the main responsibility for studying and progressing the project was that of the aircraft manufacturer ( HAL’s Design Bureau), as is the practice the world over, with the Air Force monitoring and the R&D providing expert technical advice. In 1984, however, an independent, autonomous agency was created directly under the Secretary Defence R&D, named as the Aircraft Development Agency (ADA). It was to be responsible for evolving the design, while the actual engineering aspects of building/ developing prototypes and later productionising it were left to HAL. Initially there was considerable resistance to this arrangement but the Atomic Agency and the Space Organisation were often quoted as examples, which was strictly not relevant since no industry existed in these spheres while in aeronautics, HAL was already a well established manufacturer.
Creation of the ADA took some time and in the intervening period of 2- 3 years, the LCA specifications were further uprated, in keeping with the promised capabilities of the high technologies. The Air Staff Target (AST 201) was followed by the formal Air Staff Requirement (ASR) firmed in 1985. Having done some earlier studies with BAe and later with MBB of Germany, the focus then surprisingly shifted to Dassault of France, who provided technical assistance in preparing the Project Definition Report (PDR). The PDR was completed in 1987 and submitted to Air HQ, who after a detailed study, did not accept if fully.
Air HQ had serious reservations on The estimated timeframe which was considered too optimistic. As it was, the timeframe had been progressively advanced from the mid-80s, to early ‘90s, to mid-90s, and now to the next century (2001-03).
The cost estimates were considered as far too optimistic.
The capabilities existing in-country were not considered as adequate to absorb and fully indiginise the high technologies.