Israel would be wiser to try ending Gaza war, rather than widening it

Iranian attack was performative – retaliation would only aggravate regional tensions

Disaster was narrowly averted last weekend in the long-standing conflict between Israel and Iran. Israel, aided by the United States and other allies, successfully repelled a massive Iranian drone and missile strike. But the reprieve might be short-lived.

The latest round of hostilities began on October 7, when Hamas, a terrorist organisation funded and armed by Iran, launched a barbaric attack on Israel, which responded by first bombing and then invading the Gaza Strip. Six months later, Israeli forces continue to battle Hamas in Gaza, with Palestinian civilians suffering devastating damage as Hamas hides among them.

Iran did not launch a full-scale war of its own after October 7, despite what must have been Hamas leaders’ hopes, but Iran’s proxies in Hezbollah opened steady rocket and missile fire from southern Lebanon into northern Israel, forcing roughly 60,000 Israelis from their homes.

The Houthis, another Iranian-backed militia, began attacking international shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Other Iranian-backed militia opened fire on US bases in Iraq and Syria. While US forces retaliated against Iranian proxies for attacks on US bases, Israel has kept up a series of strikes against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon while also continuing to target Hezbollah’s Iranian supply lines in Syria.

On April 1, Israel upped the ante by bombing the Iranian consulate in Damascus. The dead included two senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) generals and several other officers.

This airstrike was no doubt intended to put pressure on Iran to end the Hezbollah attacks on Israel, but this public humiliation – which included the destruction of a diplomatic facility that is technically sovereign Iranian territory – backed the mullahs into a corner. From Tehran’s perspective, retaliation became necessary to save face both with its own public and with its regional allies.

In the past two weeks, there was a public debate in Tehran about how to calibrate a response that would show strength against the “Zionist entity” but not drag Iran into a broader war with Israel and its allies. Israel had plenty of warning and so did the US. President Joe Biden even returned to the White House on Saturday afternoon from his home in Delaware to be ready to address the assault he had warned Iran not to launch.

On Saturday night, the Iranian attack finally materialised as it launched more than 300 drones and missiles against Israel. This was the first time that the Islamic republic had directly attacked the Jewish state; normally Iran prefers to operate through terrorist proxies.

However, while Iran’s attack was large and unprecedented, it had little chance of success in the face of Israel’s multi-layered air defences, buttressed by support from the US, Jordan, Britain, France and other friendly states. Israel announced that 99pc of the Iranian projectiles were intercepted and the damage was minimal.

The mullahs must have known that this would be the likely outcome. This attack was reminiscent of the Iranian missile strike on two US bases in Iraq after the US killing of the IRGC’s Major General Qasem Soleimani in early 2020, which also inflicted no deaths – and prompted no US retaliation.

Both attacks were performative acts designed to make a statement, not to inflict mass casualties.

On Saturday, the Iranians could have tried to overwhelm Israel air defences by directing Hezbollah to unleash its arsenal of around 150,000 missiles. Given Hezbollah’s geographical proximity to Israel, the flight times would have been short and Israel would have had little time to prepare.

But that’s not what the mullahs did. They opted for an attack launched mainly from Iranian soil, giving Israel and its allies plenty of time to activate their own defences.

The Iranians are no more eager for a bigger war with Israel than Israel is eager for a bigger war with Iran. Both sides prefer to wage a low-intensity conflict, as they have been doing for many years: Iran sponsors terrorist attacks against Israel by its “axis of resistance,” while Israel launches covert actions against Iran’s nuclear programme and airstrikes against Iranian operatives in Syria and Lebanon.

But, however much the two sides want to avoid a larger conflict, they could still stumble into one if the action-reaction cycle spins out of control.

Now it’s up to Israel’s war cabinet to decide whether to strike back against Iran. The pressure to respond would have been much greater if the Iranian attack had caused mass casualties. That didn’t happen, lessening the pressure on prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to do something rash. Indeed, in many ways the attack was a defeat for Iran. It gave the appearance that Israel’s military is strong enough to defend the country against Iran and it reduced Israel’s international isolation after more than six months of brutal war in Gaza.

Even nations that have been calling on Israel to implement a ceasefire and lessen civilian suffering rallied to its side on Saturday. House Republicans now say they will rush a floor vote on long-delayed military aid to Israel. (Given that Ukraine is also under regular air attack – often from Russia’s Iranian-made drones – it would be a travesty if the aid bill did not include Ukraine.)

If he were so inclined, Netanyahu could chalk up the exchange as a win for Israel and for his government. Or he could use the attack as a perfect excuse to bomb Iran’s nuclear programme or other Iranian military installations.

Iran has signalled its desire to de-escalate: Even before Iran’s drones and missiles had reached Israel on Saturday night, its mission to the United Nations had written on X that “the matter can be deemed concluded”. Biden, for his part, reportedly told Netanyahu in a Saturday phone call that the US won’t support an Israeli counterstrike on Iran. But Israel’s defence minister said on Sunday that the confrontation is “not over yet.”

The decision now rests with Netanyahu and the Israeli war cabinet. Israel would be fully justified morally and legally in ordering airstrikes on Iran.

But it wouldn’t be smart strategically.

Iran is a nation of 88.5 million people, while Israel is nation of just 9.5 million. Iran has more than half a million active-duty military personnel, a sophisticated defence industry and a vast network of powerful proxies across the region. Israel can hurt Iran, but it can’t defeat Iran – or even destroy its nuclear programme. It doesn’t even have heavy bombers such as B-52s capable of carrying the largest bunker-busting munitions.

Even the US would be hard-put to defeat Iran, and the Biden administration rightly has no desire to get dragged into a war with the Islamic republic that would be likely to lead to a spike in oil prices and a global economic downturn. Biden is urging restraint on Netanyahu. But will he listen now when he has so often ignored Biden’s pleas in the past?

Israel was lucky to escape serious harm in the latest Iranian attack. It may not be so lucky next time.

The prudent step now would be to avoid escalation, which could embroil the entire region in a calamitous conflict. Israel would be better advised to focus on ending the war in Gaza rather than widening it.

More can be done to stymie Iran’s regional designs if Israel draws closer to the Arab states that are also enemies of Iran than if it blindly retaliates. But emotions are running high on both sides, and the risks of miscalculation are growing. (© Washington Post)

‘The two sides could still stumble into a larger conflict if the action-reaction cycle spins out of control’