What was Iran thinking? Maybe not what you imagined

Deciphering what the Iranian regime’s weekend air assault on Israel means is not as difficult as most observers are making it appear. There are really only two possible scenarios – either the Islamic republic’s aim was not to inflict major damage on Israeli targets or its aim was but it was incapable of doing so.

Either way, what the drone and missile attack should clarify is that Iran doesn’t have the means to mount a significant conventional response to Israeli might, and Tehran is painfully aware of this.

No one can deny that the image of hundreds of projectiles launched into the air was an impressive and terrifying sight. The argument that apparently not one hit a target of any strategic value, however, is telling. Despite its stated intention of destroying Israel, this was the first military offensive Tehran had ever launched against the Israeli state, and it was thwarted with apparent ease.

Many reports indicate a high level of information-sharing by Iran itself ahead of the attack, giving the US, Israel and other allies ample opportunity to prepare for the onslaught. This would suggest the Iranians did not want to maximise damage to Israeli assets and provoke a larger conflict.

The clear message seems to be that the regime, its bluster notwithstanding, is weak. Iran’s economy is in tatters, and its government has no credible remedies for people’s woes. Protests against the clerical system have grown in recent years.

Less obvious is the regime’s fear of a conflict that bleeds into Iranian territory. A direct, protracted war with Israel is not something Iran is equipped to fight. For context, Iran, a country of nearly 90 million people, spent roughly $7bn (€6.6bn) on its military in 2022. Israel, with a population of about nine million, spent more than $23bn. As Iran’s currency plummets in value (reaching an all-time low after the weekend attack), it’s difficult to envision how the country could ever catch up to Israel’s military capabilities.

Just as critical, though, is the point that since its devastating eight-year war with Iraq ended in 1988, the Islamic republic has been able to keep the country mostly safe from external military strikes. It’s one of the few arguments the regime can make to the people about its success. Yet suddenly – and ironically, if it wanted to avoid provocation – that promise of continued internal security feels very flimsy. So why conduct the strikes in the first place? This was not a simple act of unprovoked aggression. Don’t forget that the air assault was a response to an Israeli strike on an Iranian diplomatic compound in Syria that killed a top commander and several officers of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In recent months, and over several years, Israel has assassinated numerous Iranian military officials and nuclear scientists and generally wreaked havoc on Iranian assets without suffering significant consequences.

Iran’s leaders, shaken by the killing of top military brass, felt they had to respond with a show of strength. Not doing so would signal impotence to Israel and Iran’s Arab adversaries, as well as a restive domestic population that is increasingly eager to see the end of the theocratic regime.

Whether it was designed to cause damage or not, the result was a spectacular failure.

This doesn’t mean Iran is no longer a threat, but the threats it poses are not the ones we usually presume them to be. Democratic countries should be prepared for the kind of personalised terror Iran has exercised against the many people it has deemed threats to the system’s power since its inception. Iranian dissidents, human rights activists, former regime officials, diplomats and journalists – including me – have all been targets of the Islamic republic’s malice.

Abductions and assassinations, which are unpredictable and cheap compared with military operations, seem likelier in the weeks ahead than Iran wanting to engage in a war that would result in heavy domestic casualties.

The Biden administration recognises that a retaliation by Israel, which would be stronger than anything Tehran can muster – but would very likely result in Iran unleashing these asymmetrical tactics – is not in US interests. This is why US president Joe Biden has wisely declared that the US would not participate in any Israeli offensive actions against Iran.

Whether Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu heeds Biden’s advice remains to be seen, but Iran’s costliest failure might be that, by making an unprecedented assault on Israeli soil, it has ceded control over what happens next. Israel will decide – and the prospects for restraint appear bleak. (© Washington Post)