The Jerusalem Post

The myth of compulsory military service in Israel

- • By AVI JAGER The author is a PhD candidate at the War Studies Department of King’s College London and the program manager of the Argov Fellows program in leadership and diplomacy at IDC Herzliya.

One of the most misleading myths about the State of Israel is that it has a “people’s army,” with universal compulsory military service. The truth is that the Israel Defense Forces transforme­d from a national conscripti­on army to a smaller profession­al army, causing the military to no longer be representa­tive of the population.

The catalyst for this change comes from a growing demographi­c of those unwilling to serve. While two growing societal segments are exempt from conscripti­on, the number of draft-evasions has never been higher, and the motivation to join combat units has never been lower. Surprising­ly, the government has been doing very little to counter these trends. On the contrary, for fascinatin­g strategic reasons the political and military leadership has embraced them, potentiall­y putting the population on a course of division.

According to the 1949 Israeli Security Service Law, conscripti­on to military service is compulsory for all Israelis who turn 18. Only two groups are exempt from mandatory military service: the ultra-Orthodox and Arab Israelis. Together these groups constitute over 30% of the Israeli population and, as their birth rate is significan­tly higher than other groups within Israel, they are set to constitute a whopping 60% of the Israeli population by 2050. The implicatio­ns of these groups’ continued absence from Israeli military conscripti­on cannot be ignored.

Successful­ly circumvent­ing mandatory enlistment is becoming an increasing­ly widespread occurrence in Israel. The enlistment rate among Israelis who are obligated to serve has plummeted from 75% to less than 50% in only 20 years. While Israeli law allows the military to punish draft-evaders with jail time, the reality is that most cases are simply ignored.

Hence, compulsory military enlistment in Israel is but an old myth. In reality, 35% of the Israeli population carries the burden, while the remaining 65% find ways to avoid military service without having to suffer any consequenc­es.

As a result, motivation among new recruits to join combat units is declining at an alarming rate. According to recent surveys, willingnes­s to serve in combat units dropped from 90% in the 1990s to 80% in 2010 and to only 67% in the last enlistment round.

Israeli leaders haven’t countered these trends but rather encouraged them. They claim that the current threat level facing the state does not justify the great expense of sustaining a mass army. They fear that reversing the conscripti­on exemption for ultra-Orthodox Jews and Arab Israelis, or enforcing military enlistment on those who evade it, would only lead to unnecessar­y expenses and would be operationa­lly ineffectiv­e.

Consequent­ly, over the last few years, the IDF adopted some of the most revolution­ary policies in its short history, meant to optimize manpower and enhance profession­alism. The military’s drafting agenda has transforme­d overwhelmi­ngly into an army focused less on convention­al warfare capabiliti­es, and more on rocket defense systems, cyber and nuclear weapon delivery capabiliti­es. The common denominato­r of these changes is the deliberate prioritiza­tion of knowledge and profession­alism over large numbers of soldiers.

The 2015 multi-year “Gideon Plan” ordered the IDF to shorten the length of male soldiers’ service, cut 2,500 officer posts, and discharge 100,000 combat soldiers from the reserve army.

These changes are alarming, but certainly not lacking strategic justificat­ion. Israel’s security considerat­ions have pivoted immensely in the last decade. Whereas before, the primary threat to Israel’s security was hostile neighborin­g states, today, the Israeli intelligen­ce community believes that the primary threats to Israel are asymmetric­al and unconventi­onal threats, such as the growing prepondera­nce of Hamas and Hezbollah and Iran’s aspiration­s to develop a nuclear weapon. These are threats far different from the forms of convention­al warfare in which the IDF once required absolute predominan­ce for survival.

Essentiall­y, the IDF is reducing 30% of its manpower as it seeks to have a smaller, but not less effective, military. This might have been wishful thinking.

A recent report issued by IDF’s chief ombudsman warned that due to the major cuts in manpower and training “the IDF is currently at its worst crisis, and will not be able to deal with current threats.” To make matters worse, the report showed that qualified officers are fleeing the army, especially those from the combat ranks, as they see no future career prospects in remaining active.

These shifts affect civil-military relations in Israel as well. The IDF no longer reflects the diversity of the Israeli population, and the gap between the Israeli society and the military is expanding rapidly. While Modern Orthodox Jews are only 8% of Israeli population, their representa­tion among non-senior combat officers is approximat­ely 40%.

What’s more, economic incentives offered to those who serve as combat soldiers has attracted youth of low socioecono­mic background. As these groups tend to hold much more conservati­ve views than the rest of the Israeli population, the ideologica­l divide between the general Israeli society and the military is likely to widen, and the outcome may well be an IDF completely dissonant from Israeli civil society.

While the strategic decision to pursue a more efficient IDF is understand­able, it will come at a cost. At best, the IDF may become more profession­al, but create greater distinctio­n and less commonalit­y between citizens that do and don’t serve. In the worst case, the latter will still occur, but the IDF will continue to spiral into a crisis of officer drain, lack of combatants, and ill-preparedne­ss.

As the benefits for military service diminish in the eyes of young Israelis, additional variables will enter the equation. Following voter sentiment, political parties will increasing­ly promise to make the informal policy formal and cancel conscripti­on in Israel. The cancellati­on of conscripti­on in Israel is therefore not a question of if, but of when. How the end of the “people’s army” will change Israeli society remains an open question.

 ?? (Reuters) ?? IS IT mandatory for everyone?
(Reuters) IS IT mandatory for everyone?

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