Europe’s premature celebrations
Asigh of relief was heard from Madrid to Berlin after it has become clear that Joseph Biden will be the 46th president of the United States, following four turbulent years of Donald Trump in the White House. This should not come as a surprise, since the relations between the US and most of the EU member states have been tense, to formulate it mildly. Nonetheless, as a consequence of the Trump administration’s “America First” policy and the global COVID- 19 pandemic, facts on the ground have been created that will make a return to pre- Trump relations between both sides of the Atlantic impossible.
First of all, if one detaches the name Trump from of his economic policies, it will become clear that many of them have popularity across political aisles in Washington. Although Biden will use a different kind of language, the idea of giving preference to domestic production over the global division of labor is already a pillar of the incoming administration’s program. In a speech on November 16, president- elect Biden announced that “from autos to our stockpiles, we’re going to buy American […] No government contracts will be given to companies that don’t make their products here in America.”
Assuming that an effective vaccination will become widely available in the course of 2021, the new administration will have to make sure that the expected upswing in GDP will benefit the domestic workforce. Being under pressure from his party’s left wing, particularly the former contenders in the Democratic primaries, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, President Biden will have to shift further to the Left on economic policies.
Although widely ignored during campaign season, the so- called “Biden- Sanders Unity Task Force Recommendations” contain many ideas that could come directly from Trump headquarters. Just one example: “For too long, the global trading system has failed to keep its promises to American workers. Too many corporations have rushed to outsource jobs, and too many countries have broken their promises to be honest and transparent partners. The COVID- 19 pandemic has shown the risks of relying too heavily on global supply chains.”
The role of the benevolent hegemon to maintain a liberal world order of free trade is as unpopular with the Democratic
base as it is with the Trump base. A return to a Clinton- era commitment to globalization will not materialize under the new administration.
Equally, it is highly unlikely that the United States will completely reverse its China policy. Being more soft- spoken than the raucous Trump, the Biden team is well aware that Beijing under the leadership of Xi Jinping
has fully entered into great power politics, demonstrated by its crackdown and de facto ending of Hong Kong’s autonomy under violation of international agreements, the continuous attempts to expand its influence in international organizations, and its ever more obvious attempts to become the regional hegemon in the Asia- Pacific region. It would be foolish to believe that the newly formed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership ( RCEP) will not be employed as a tool of Chinese power projection. This means that the “pivot to Asia” announced years ago by then President Obama will become reality, less because of Washington’s choosing but because of shifting facts on the ground.
The 90s nostalgia expressed by many European policy makers is going to have an unpleasant reckoning with reality, since it can also be assumed that the Chinese spending spree of buying up European infrastructure and deepening its influence on the old continent will be increasingly scrutinized by the US, as will be the participation of EU member states in the Belt and Road Initiative.
EUROPEAN RELIANCE on US protection from whatever turmoil emanates from Russia or the Middle East will also need some serious rethinking. With more attention being paid to the Pacific region, US pressure on other NATO member states to finally fully commit to their financial and military obligations agreed upon at the 2014 NATO summit will not cease under President Biden. Additionally, there are already signs that re- entering the Iran nuclear deal – something favored by many European leaders – is increasingly unlikely.
The more aggressive stance of the Trump administration might not be maintained, but the emerging anti- Iranian alliance between Sunni Muslim states and Israel cannot simply be ignored by the incoming administration. The last four years saw the breaking up of conventional wisdom regarding the Middle East, and so far, the new approach of striking deals with Arab leaders while containing the Palestinian question has delivered more, not less, stability in the region. One could even be cautiously optimistic that growing pressure on the Palestinian Authority by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states will make a realistic peace deal in the future a growing possibility. Donald Trump upended the idea that there can be no progress in the Middle East without an Israel- Palestinian agreement as a first step. Brussels will have to adjust to these new realities, independently of who is in power in Washington.
All of this, however, could also contain the beginning of a long overdue reform in European foreign policy making. In a recent piece for Project Syndicate, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borell wrote that “it is now more clear than ever that Europe must take its security, broadly understood, into its own hands. Doing so will not only secure the European Union’s proper place on the world stage but will also ensure a healthy transatlantic partnership in the years ahead.” I am sure the Biden administration would agree.