Do the Abraham Accords open up new energy opportunities?

The signing of the Abraham Accords and warming ties with Saudi Arabia open up many and varied regional cooperation opportunities for Israel. A key cooperation opportunity lies in the field of energy, and specifically alternative energy transportation methods from the Persian Gulf to Europe through the Mediterranean. On a December 2020 visit to Abu Dhabi shortly before leaving office, Former Trump administration Energy Department secretary Dan Brouillette met with his counterparts from the Emirates, Bahrain, and Israel to discuss energy security and the use of pipelines for gas exports. “If we can move natural gas to the coast of Egypt or the coast of Israel, then we’re moving it through the Mediterranean,” he said. He was referring both to the strategic aspect of such a move vis-à-vis Iran, and the importance of diversifying energy export routes from a sensitive region such as the Persian Gulf.

Following a visit to the Emirates in late January, Israeli Energy Ministry Director-General Udi Adiri issued a statement underscoring “the unique opportunity to develop the energy economy of both states and the entire region.” Adiri said his office was promoting a series of infrastructure projects designed to provide a connection to Europe, “and perhaps to Gulf infrastructure in the future. Electricity and natural gas projects will improve regional cooperation.”

It should be noted that the Europe-Asia Pipeline Company (formerly the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Company) signed a memorandum of understanding in October 2020 for the transportation of fossil fuel from the Persian Gulf to Israel. The fuel and oil products from the UAE will be shipped to a Red Sea terminal in Eilat and from there to the Mediterranean Ashkelon terminal for distribution to clients. The signing ceremony was held in the presence of the then-US Treasury Secretary and the Emirati Minister of Economy.

Reports and analyses have also emerged in recent weeks about plans for an overland pipeline through Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean. These plans have been denied, citing the high costs of such a project, but those involved in the plans appear to be seized with a spirit of creativity.

The diplomatic-strategic rationale is clear. Diversifying gas and oil export routes from the Gulf would reduce the total dependence on the Strait of Hormuz – a narrow, strategic sea route considerably vulnerable to an Iranian attack. In other words, a pipeline running through Saudi Arabia to the Egyptian or Israeli coasts, as mentioned by the former US Energy Secretary, could change the regional energy map and the relationships between the countries involved.

For now, these ideas and plans are all only on paper. However, they have already generated clear concern in Egypt given their possible implications for the Suez Canal.

The head of the Canal Authority has expressed concern about linking the Europe-Asia pipeline to the Persian Gulf. In an Egyptian television interview (January 29) he noted that Egypt was examining ways to deal with the “Israeli-Emirati project” – as he defined it – that could significantly reduce traffic through the canal.

Income from shipping through the canal, it should be noted, is vital to the Egyptian economy, which has already been severely affected by the novel coronavirus crisis. Such plans could also undermine Egypt’s aspirations to become a regional energy hub.

AS PRECIOUSLY noted, the projects’ diplomatic-strategic rationale is sound. The congruence of interests between the Gulf States and Israel, largely based on fear of Iran, could be translated into the energy field.

Nonetheless, Israel has no interest in undermining its relationship with Egypt. Serious thought must be given to integrating Egypt or compensating it appropriately if that is not possible. From an American standpoint, diversifying export alternatives from the Persian Gulf fits its interest in energy security and does not appear to contradict the Biden Administration’s desire to return to the nuclear deal with Iran.

Nonetheless, these plans generate many challenges and question marks. Can the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia adopt such strategic decisions? Is the level of trust with Israel sufficiently high and stable? And if so, can it be preserved and survive future crises? What about the problematic implications for Egypt? And what about the tremendous costs of such an overland pipeline? And of course, what is the position of the new US administration?

In-depth thinking is required to examine the seriousness and feasibility of such plans. Clearly, the Gulf angle opens up a new horizon for relevant players.

Israel is at a strategic-energy crossroads, facing a new range of options. At a news conference (February 14)) alongside the visiting Cypriot president, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu referred to regional cooperation in the post-Abraham Accords era, including energy cooperation. Netanyahu mentioned the UAE’s desire to join the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and reiterated the shared interest in the proposed East-Med gas pipeline to Europe. The Cypriot president presumably asked how the Gulf angle could be combined with the Hellenic one. As far as Israel is concerned, the two could be complementary.

At issue are strategic-scale decisions and projects. The COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated global economic uncertainty and cast a measure of doubt on the feasibility of these energy plans and the willingness of international energy companies to invest significant sums given the unclear post-pandemic economic picture.

Nonetheless, Israel is at a fascinating crossroads with significant room for maneuverability. It must ensure a close relationship with the Biden Administration, a necessary precondition for taking advantage of the maneuvering room it now has. The main obstacle for Israel is clear: to conduct itself in light of US plans to renew the nuclear deal with Iran, and to a lesser extent in light of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in a manner that does not place it on a collision course with Biden’s Washington.

The writer is a policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a former Israeli ambassador to Cyprus. He is currently also a lecturer at the Yezreel Valley College.

antisemitism is an ancient hatred, but it still plagues our society and can hide in plain sight. For too long, people relied on subjective approaches to identify it – they felt it in their bones. But antisemitism is too big a problem: one needs to define it in order to counter it.

us president joe Biden administration’s embrace of the non-legally binding Working definition of antisemitism of the International holocaust remembrance alliance makes it the third administration to support this definition. as chair and past chair of the Ihra antisemitism committee, and as individuals who have devoted our careers to holocaust education and awareness, we welcome this development; as americans, we applaud it and hope it generates more awareness of the threat of antisemitism to peaceful and secure democracies.

antisemitism is a global problem. It was born in the West and peaked during the holocaust, leading to its temporary repudiation by polite society. over the past decade, it has reemerged significantly across europe as borne out by statistics and official reports. the us is not immune from these trends, as references to blaming jews for the coVId-19 pandemic (“jew flu”) or the appearance of “camp auschwitz’’ shirts illustrate. FBI statistics showed a 14% increase in antisemitic crimes between 2018 and 2019, and the past several years have witnessed the most deadly wave of attacks on jews in american history. Because hate crimes are notoriously underreported and because social media amplifies antisemitism, racism and other forms of hate, the problem is probably worse than this. Fighting antisemitism requires common understanding that can lead to cooperative efforts.

In the past, scholars and advocates attempted to define antisemitism. none of these efforts achieved international status. In 2016, the now 34 countries of the Ihra adopted its Working definition. since then, 30 countries have adopted or endorsed it at the national level, as have many local governments, the european union, the organization of american states, religious organizations, universities, sports leagues and businesses. more importantly, the Ihra definition has generated open and useful public dialogue on the problems of antisemitism. one significant example of this was in the uK, where the definition became a catalyst for debate about antisemitism in the labour party and other British institutions.

at its core, the Ihra definition states, “antisemitism is a certain perception of jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward jews. rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward jewish or non-jewish individuals and/or their property, toward jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” It does not define who is an antisemite, or even who is a jew. Instead, it says there are certain manifestations of antisemitism. this focus on forms allows for dialogue, that is, conversations about conscious or unconscious expressions of antisemitism, which in turn can lead to real and lasting change.

Because antisemitism is not always evident, the Ihra definition includes 11 examples that can help one identify it when accounting for “overall context.” Built on agreement by multiple groups of experts and diplomats before its adoption by the Ihra, these examples include antisemitism as it is informed by religious, racist or nationalist ideas, as well as extremist opposition to Israel. the definition does not call for proscribed speech and does not seek to protect any group from reasonable criticism. It does note that some countries criminalize antisemitic expressions, but it does not call for criminalization. While the examples are not a rigid taxonomy allowing for the identification of every type of antisemitism, they are an internationally accepted baseline that can allow us to shine a light on places where antisemitism might exist.

Because of these features, it is important to note that the Ihra definition is not a political or legal weapon; it is an educational resource. Fighting antisemitism is not about the left or the right. It is about building mutual respect and overcoming those forces that tear us apart. societies that accept antisemitism open the door to other forms of violent bias. after all, most antisemites do not restrict their hatreds just to jews. By fighting one form of hate, we can become better at fighting them all.

the Ihra definition is a step on a longer path toward developing information-based approaches to countering antisemitism. taken by itself, it cannot cure a 2,000-yearold social malady, but it is a means by which jews and non-jews can understand better how antisemitism appears today. It provides a basis for education and the monitoring of trends, both of which are necessary to create better responses to hatred in its old and new, but always dangerous forms.

Robert Williams, of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, and Mark Weitzman, of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, are chair and past chair of the Committee on Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial of the IHRA.