What deterrence will look like in different government scenarios

The IDF’s deterrence with Hamas was shattered on Monday with seven rockets fired at Jerusalem.

Reasons for potentially the most dangerous conflict since the 50-day summer war of 2014 include the canceling of Palestinian elections, police incompetence in handling east Jerusalem friction and a perception in Hamas that Israel is at a politically weaker and indecisive point.

Now, the only question seems to be whether this will be a multiday escalation, the last of which occurred in 2019 before the first coronavirus wave, or a larger conflict more similar to 2014 or the 2008-09 and 2012 major operations.

Whether in the middle of the current conflict or immediately after it, the possibility is increasing that Hamas will be up against new faces and a new government for the first time since 2009.

What will deterrence look like with Naftali Bennett as prime minister, Yair Lapid as some mix of alternate prime minister and foreign minister and Benny Gantz continuing as defense minister?

Gantz may be the most key of the three.

Though Bennett will officially be in charge of national security, and Lapid will have heavy input, neither of them has anywhere near the stature of Gantz on the issue.

For the first time since 2009, the occupant of Balfour Street may need to defer sometimes to the occupant of the Defense Ministry’s top floor in Tel Aviv.

Not that Bennett and Lapid will be passive.

Both have been part of the security cabinet, and both have some strong opinions about how to handle Gaza.

But none of that is the same as doing what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has done for 12 years: be the person who decides whether soldiers live or die and how much to escalate and de-escalate in very uncertain situations.

The prevalent assumption before this flare-up was that Hamas would be less deterred by new leaders than it was by Netanyahu, who had bloodied its nose many times.

But the current conflict is shaking up assumptions.

Although Hamas seems to view Netanyahu as suddenly weaker, what if he and Gantz order the IDF to start hitting it even harder than they have to date?

As of Tuesday morning, the IDF had upped the ante by striking at least two higher-level Hamas targets, but these were still far short of a massive escalation. There were indications that the IDF prefers a multiday, mild escalation to reestablish deterrence – neither massive bombing nor a ground invasion.

If an escalation from the IDF reestablishes deterrence, but then Netanyahu leaves office immediately, will it hold because Gantz was involved? Or will Hamas test Israel again soon because of a new two-headed leadership team?

What if the operation runs into next week and Bennett-LapidGantz take control mid-operation?

Will they escalate or de-escalate in a different way than Netanyahu or maintain his strategy, not wanting to stand out in their first days in office?

Regardless of how this ends, there is a strong chance of friction with Hamas continuing.

The guidelines of the future government on national security broadly suggest sticking with the Netanyahu formula of limited building in the settlements and small economic perks for Hamas in exchange for quiet, but no major reconquest of Gaza.

It is highly doubtful that Gantz or Lapid, let alone Merav Michaeli (Labor) and Nitzan Horowitz (Meretz), would agree to retake Gaza even if Bennett wanted to. Equally unlikely would be a game-changing move of granting Hamas an artificial island port, which would be a major concession to open up Gaza’s economy to the world.

Of course, there could be surprises.

Former prime minister Ehud Olmert surprised Hezbollah with a major escalation during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, seemingly in part to show he was no softy.

Yesh Atid’s Ram Ben Barak, who is a former Mossad deputy director, other security figures and Finance Minister Israel Katz (Likud) have supported an artificial island port off Gaza for Hamas. The IDF and the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) could maintain heavy security measures, and this idea could get another look.

But in all likelihood, the preference of the new potential government will be to restore what existed before the last few weeks and to reach understandings that will avoid aggravating Hamas over the next year or so.

If this is the path, an important front will be the Mossad and Qatar.

One of the main jobs Mossad Director Yossi Cohen has undertaken in recent years, though less discussed, is keeping money funneling from Qatar to prevent Hamas from falling into the economic collapse that was one of the reasons it was ready to fight a war in 2014.

But Cohen steps down on June 1. “D,” his current deputy, is due to replace him. But the appointment has not been approved because of the government’s current transitional status.

Will Bennett-Lapid approve D? Will he undertake the middleman role with Qatar? Or will the potential new government try to pick another candidate in a period of weeks? How will all of this uncertainty impact attempts to calm the waters?

There are more questions than answers right now.

But with a new government potentially days away in the middle of a possible war, the questions are becoming far more real and pressing.