Does Iran think Israel is vulnerable at sea?
Recent reports that a cargo ship allegedly previously linked to Israeli owners was damaged at sea after recently visiting the Gulf illustrate the complexities of defending ships at sea, especially in the murky world of commercial shipping.
The reports appeared at Al-Mayadeen, which is pro-Iran, and also Al-Ain media in the Gulf. Iranian media also reported the incident.
What is important here is not necessarily the exact details of what happened, which may remain unclear, but the fact that pro-Iran media – and therefore the Iranian regime and its proxies – think Israel is vulnerable at sea. They don’t think Israel’s navy is vulnerable, but rather, commercial shipping linked to Israel. This is because what happened on July 3 is at least the fourth such incident in as many months.
In late February, the roll-on-roll-off cargo ship Helios Ray was also targeted. It was, according to reports, a Bahamian-flagged vessel but linked to Israeli owners.
In late March, another ship, whose name was given as the Lori in foreign reports, also “sustained damage” according to Israel’s Channel 12. It was reportedly en route to India at the time. Then, in March, the Hyperion Ray was also targeted in an incident. According to Reuters, the ship was heading to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman from Kuwait.
What is known is that these incidents appear to have unfolded near the Gulf states and not far from Iran. The messaging, if these incidents are all linked, would appear to be that Iran and its proxies have been looking at commercial shipping as a place they can carry out attacks.
THIS ISN’T just directed at ships allegedly linked to Israeli ownership. Iran carried out mining attacks on ships in the Gulf of Oman in May and June 2019. This is because Iran and its IRGC believe that striking commercial vessels is an easy way to send a message that also has plausible deniability. Iran can do this clandestinely and not even sink the ships, but still cause an incident to take place. In fact, it appears not to be in Iran’s interest to sink ships.
The reason Iran doesn’t sink the ships, if Iran is indeed behind all this, is because the crews of these ships – and the management, ownership and flags they sail under – are not Israeli. In the case of the Gulf of Oman mining attack in May and June, the crew was not harmed. This is because Iran didn’t want a war on its hands.
It believes in using proxies and pin-pricks to strike at enemies. That is why it sends drones and missiles to Yemen to get Houthis to die for Iran and it is why it delivers weapons to Hezbollah and units in Syria, and aids Hamas, but doesn’t do the fighting itself. And why it encourages Iraqi-based pro-Iran militias to fire 107mm rockets at American forces. Because a 107mm rocket is less likely to inflict severe casualties, but rather to cause damage and send a message.
The question these maritime incidents raise is whether Tehran believes it can carry out retaliatory strikes against Israel after it alleges incidents took place in Iran, and whether it will strike at commercial interests.
Iran has done things like this before. It was likely linked to the attack on the Jewish AMIA center in Argentina in 1994. Hezbollah, and thus Iran, was linked to the Burgas bombing in 2012 in Bulgaria. Iran may have been linked to a New Delhi attack in January this year and attacks in Bangkok in 2014. There were also attacks in India and Georgia in 2012, for which Israel blamed Iran and Hezbollah.
This means that Iran has sought to target Israelis and Jews abroad and that it has possibly set on a new course of action against commercial shipping. Then-prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu blamed Iran for the February incident at sea: It is unclear if officials will point the finger at Iran again.